



Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization

Officer Block 4 & Enlisted Block 5: USPACOM



Course Overview

The mission of the RCLF program is to ensure that Marine units are globally prepared and regionally focused so that they are effective in navigating and influencing the culturally complex 21st century operating environment in support of Marine Corps missions and requirements. The program is based on 17 regions of the world; however, Officer Block 4 and Enlisted Block 5 assigns and defines regions based on Combatant Command Area of responsibilities. The curriculum uses the regional construct to provide context for the cultural content of each RCLF block of instruction.

Learning Outcomes

- A. Analyze the impact of cultural values on military operations (Regional and Cultural Studies)
- B. Provide multiple explanations for the outcome of a successful or failed intercultural interaction (Communications and Cultural Studies)
- C. Assess techniques for aligning culturally appropriate and mission effective behavior (Leadership and Warfighting)
- D. Examine the effectiveness of communication strategies used to manage intercultural challenges (Communication and Cultural Studies).

Course Flow

This workbook serves as your instructional guide. It consists of six chapters. *Chapter 1* contains an overview of Geographic Combatant Commands, U.S. National Strategy, and the establishment and mission of your assigned Combatant Command (CCMD). *Chapter 2* includes an overview of the CCMD's Area of Responsibility (AOR) framed around key historical, government and politics, geographic, economic, people and society, and regional security issues. *Chapter 3* includes exposure to advanced operational culture general concepts, as well as considerations for culture general ethics. *Chapter 4* includes supplemental readings (available in the supplemental readings PDF) and applied scenarios, designed to illustrate specific cross-cultural concepts and skills. *Chapter 5* contains an overview of Marine Corps and Interagency Planning, with specific emphasis on culture as a variable in planning. Finally, *Chapter 6* contains a case study to illustrate the impact of cultural values and concepts on a specific military operations within the CCMDs AOR.

To successfully complete this block of instruction, Marines will need to download the materials zip file and read the workbook and supplemental readings. Marines must then complete an end-of-course evaluation and end-of-course survey.

Checklist:

- CCMD Workbook and Supplemental Readings (MarineNet)
 - CCMD Workbook PDF
 - Supplemental Readings PDF
- End-of-Course Evaluation (MarineNet)
- End-of-Course Survey (MarineNet)

Table of Contents

1	United States Pacific Command Overview	9
1.1	Mission Statement	9
1.2	Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. National Strategy	10
1.3	Establishment of USPACOM	13
1.4	Area of Responsibility	14
1.5	Structure	15
1.5.1	Headquarters.	15
1.5.2	Subordinate Commands.....	17
1.5.3	U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC)	17
1.6	Key Focus Areas	18
1.7	Contemporary Operations	19
2	Regional Overview	21
2.1	Historical Overview	23
2.1.1	Northeast Asia.....	24
2.1.2	South Asia	29
2.1.3	Southeast Asia.....	33
2.2	Geographic Overview.....	37
2.2.1	Climate	37
2.2.2	Himalayas	38
2.2.3	Rivers and Maritime Areas	38
2.2.4	Pacific Ring of Fire	41
2.2.5	Natural Disasters	41
2.3	Economic Overview.....	43
2.3.1	Manufacturing Industry.....	44
2.3.2	Agriculture.....	45
2.3.3	Informal Economy	46
2.3.4	Regional Economic Frameworks.....	46
2.4	People and Societies	48
2.4.1	Population Trends and Distribution	48
2.4.2	Megacities	51
2.4.3	Ethnic Groups.....	52

2.4.4	Religion	53
2.5	Government and Political Overview.....	57
2.5.1	Northeast Asia.....	57
2.5.2	Southeast Asia.....	58
2.5.3	South Asia	59
2.6	Regional Security Issues	60
2.6.1	North Korea.....	61
2.6.2	China	62
2.6.3	Russia	63
2.6.4	Territorial and Maritime Disputes	63
2.6.5	Natural Disasters	66
2.6.6	Violent Extremism	67
2.6.7	Proliferation Issues.....	67
2.6.8	Trafficking.....	68
3	Operational Culture and Cross-Cultural Competence	75
3.1	The Case For Culture General.....	75
3.1.1	Belief and Knowledge.....	77
3.1.2	Narrative and Creative Expression	78
3.1.3	Communication.....	80
3.1.4	Interaction with the Environment.....	82
3.1.5	Exchange and Subsistence.....	84
3.1.6	Organization and Interaction	85
3.1.7	Power and Decision-Making.....	86
3.1.8	Social Control and Managing Conflict.....	88
3.1.9	Leisure.....	91
3.1.10	Health and Wellbeing.....	93
3.2	Culture General Ethics.....	95
3.2.1	Defining Ethics.....	95
3.2.2	Marine Ethics Review	95
3.2.3	Exploring Alternate Ethical Constructs	96
3.2.4	Strategies for Ethical Sense Making	97
3.2.5	Ethics in Action.....	97
3.2.6	Marine Corps Concept: Honor.....	98

3.2.7	Marine Corps Concept: Courage	99
3.2.8	Marine Corps Concept: Commitment.....	101
3.3	Culture General Conclusion.....	103
4	Cross-Cultural Competencies Applied Scenarios.....	105
4.1	Language Competence and Communication Competence	105
	Background:.....	105
4.2	Cultural Values Displayed in Communication Behavior.....	108
4.3	Identity in Intercultural Interaction.....	110
4.4	Power and Authority in Intercultural Interactions	113
4.5	Perspective Taking and Perception Checking	115
5	Culture and Mission Planning	118
5.1	Culture and the Marine Corps Planning Process	119
5.1.1	Marine Corps Doctrinal Planning.....	119
5.1.2	The Nature of Planning.....	119
5.1.3	Marine Corps Planning Process	120
5.1.4	Understanding Culture as an Input to Marine Corps Planning	121
5.1.5	Assessing Cultural Situations	122
5.1.6	Organizing to Integrate Cultural Considerations into the MCPP	124
5.1.7	The Green Cell.....	125
5.1.8	Conclusion.....	129
5.2	Culture and Interorganizational Operations.....	129
5.2.1	Interorganizational Operations Overview	129
5.2.2	Interorganizational Coordination	134
5.2.3	Interorganizational Planning	136
5.2.4	Interorganizational Considerations for the MCPP	138
5.2.5	Interorganizational Coordination Resources and Enablers	139
5.2.6	Conclusion.....	142
5.3	Culture and Command Communication Strategy.....	144
5.3.1	Introduction	144
5.3.2	Communication Strategy Terminology.....	145
5.3.3	Communication Strategy Principles	148
5.3.4	Synchronizing Communications	150
5.3.5	Information Operations and Information Related Capabilities	151

5.3.6	Engagement of the Population and Key Leaders.....	153
5.3.7	Conclusion.....	155
6	Impact of Culture on Military Operations: Operation Sahayogi Haat	158
6.1	Operation Sahayogi Haat	158
	Background.....	158
6.2	Operational Environment.....	159
6.2.1	Physical Environment	159
6.2.2	Political Structure	161
6.2.3	Belief Systems	161
6.3	Required Readings	163
6.4	The Case – Operation Sahayogi Haat	163
6.4.1	Situation	163
6.4.2	Mission.....	167
6.4.3	Operational Culture Impacts on the Mission.....	168
6.5	Conclusion: Enduring Lessons on Culture from Operation Sahayogi Haat	171

List of Figures

Figure 1-1: Commanders' Area of Responsibility	9
Figure 1-2: Geographic Combatant Commands	10
Figure 1-3: Functional Combatant Commands.....	11
Figure 1-4: National Strategic Direction.....	12
Figure 1-5: USPACOM AOR	14
Figure 1-6: USPACOM Headquarters	16
Figure 2-1: USPACOM Sub-regions	22
Figure 2-2: The Silk Road.....	23
Figure 2-3: Northeast Asia	24
Figure 2-4: Taiwan	25
Figure 2-5: Japan.....	26
Figure 2-6: Korean Peninsula	27
Figure 2-7: South Asia	29
Figure 2-8: Jinnah (left) with Gandhi, 1944.....	30
Figure 2-9: Partition of South Asia	31
Figure 2-10: Bangladesh.....	32
Figure 2-11: Nepal.....	32
Figure 2-12: Southeast Asia	34
Figure 2-13: USPACOM Topography	37
Figure 2-14: Himalayan Mountain Range.....	38
Figure 2-15: Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra Rivers	39
Figure 2-16: Mekong River Basin	39
Figure 2-17: Strait of Malacca	40
Figure 2-18: Pacific Ring of Fire.....	41
Figure 2-19: Operation Sahayogi Haat, Nepal, May 2015	43
Figure 2-20: Rice harvest in Burma	45
Figure 2-21: South Asian Language Families	53
Figure 2-22: Historical Expansion of Buddhism.....	55
Figure 2-23: South China Sea Dispute	64
Figure 2-24: Preah Vihear Temple	65
Figure 2-25: Golden Triangle.....	68

Figure 4-1: Philippines Earthquake	105
Figure 4-2: Traditional Akha village in northern Thailand.	108
Figure 4-3: India Cyclone.....	110
Figure 4-4: Preah Vihear Temple	115
Figure 5-1: MCPPP Process	120
Figure 5-2: Integrating the Interagency Community.....	134
Figure 5-3: Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure.	135
Figure 5-4: Conceptual Framework for Diagnosing a Conflict.....	141
Figure 6-1: Nepal.....	158
Figure 6-2: Locations of two earthquakes, Nepal	158
Figure 6-3: Earthquake impact.....	159
Figure 6-4: Nepal.....	159
Figure 6-5: Nepal topography	159
Figure 6-6: Pashupatinath Temple	162
Figure 6-7: Boudhanath Stupa	162
Figure 6-8: Cremation Ghats at Pashupatinath Temple	163
Figure 6-9: Kathmandu, Nepal	165
Figure 6-10: Kathmandu, Nepal	165
Figure 6-11: USAID JTF-505 Assistance, Operation Sahayogi Haat.....	166
Figure 6-12: USPACOM Operation Sahayogi Haat Significant Events Timeline	167
Figure 6-13: GoN-assigned country sectors for HA/DR efforts.....	169

1 United States Pacific Command Overview



USPACOM's forward presence, posture, and readiness reassure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Strengthening these relationships is critical to meeting the challenges and seizing opportunities. Through bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships and activities, USPACOM is building a community of like-minded nations that are committed to maintaining of the international rules-based order.

Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander, USPACOM, 2015

1.1 Mission Statement

United States Pacific Command protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, we will enhance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.




Figure 1-1: Commanders' Area of Responsibility. Source: Department of Defense (DOD).¹

1.2 Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. National Strategy

National strategic direction is governed by the U.S. Constitution, U.S. law, U.S. policy regarding internationally recognized law, and the national interest as represented by national security policy. This direction leads to unified action. National policy and planning documents generally provide national strategic direction. National strategic direction provides strategic context for the employment of the instruments of national power. Executive Branch and DOD documents, such as the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and *National Military Strategy*, define the strategic purpose guiding employment of the military instrument of national power as part of a global strategy. One important strategic directive for employment of U.S. military forces is the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP).

The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), signed by the President, and reviewed at a minimum every two years. The President, through the UCP, establishes *Combatant Commands* (CCMDs). The current UCP establishes nine (9) CCMDs: six (6) *Geographic Combatant Commands* with a regional focus (*Figure 1-2*) and three (3) *Functional Combatant Commands* with worldwide missions (*Figure 1-3*).




Figure 1-2: Geographic Combatant Commands. Source: DOD.²




Figure 1-3: Functional Combatant Commands. Source: DOD.³

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for command preparedness and performance of assigned missions. GCCs have responsibility for a geographic *area of responsibility* (AOR) assigned through the UCP. The UCP establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities, delineates the general geographical AOR for GCCs, and provides the framework used to assign forces for missions to the GCCs.

Another important policy document directing GCC missions and responsibilities is the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF). The President approves the contingency planning guidance contained in the GEF, which is developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The GEF provides written policy guidance and priorities to the GCCs for reviewing and preparing operation plans (OPLANs) and theater campaign plans (TCPs).

GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces that conduct military operations within their AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area and for effective coordination of operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not achieve national objectives, military operations must be coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with other USG agencies, international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational forces (MNFs), and the private sector. GCCs direct this coordination and integration of military power to achieve strategic ends.

Using their strategic estimates and strategic options, GCCs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. GCCs' plans provide strategic direction, assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force; establish constraints and restraints (military limitations); and define policies and CONOPS to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. GCCs also exercise directive

authority for logistics over assigned forces and authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the GCC's AOR.

GCCs develop their theater strategies by analyzing events in the operational environment and developing options to set conditions for achieving strategic end states. They translate these options into an integrated set of steady-state engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities described in theater and subordinate campaign plans. In some cases, a GCC may be required to develop a global campaign plan. These plans operationalize the GCC's theater strategy. Contingency plans developed to respond to specific contingencies are treated as branch plans to the campaign plan.




Figure 1-4: National Strategic Direction. Source: JP 5-0. ⁴

In joint operations, the supported GCC often will have a role in achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported GCC, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CDR in support of other agencies. Supporting CDRs and their subordinates design their actions to be consistent with the supported commander's strategy. All CDRs provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; establish operational limitations such as rules of engagement (ROE), constraints, and restraints; and define policies and concepts of operations (CONOPS) to be integrated into OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs). GCCs may also establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef.

1.3 Establishment of USPACOM

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) was first established as a unified command on January 1, 1947; it is the oldest and largest of the United States' six unified combatant commands. The current USPACOM includes areas originally assigned to two former unified commanders: Far East Command and Alaskan Command. The USPACOM AOR was further expanded in 1976 to the east coast of Africa. This increased the territory under the then "Commander in Chief, Pacific Command" (CINCPAC), to more than 50 percent of the earth's surface, an area of over 270 million km² (105 million mi²). The AOR continued to change over the next several decades, into the twenty-first century, for various reasons, as illustrated in the following timeline:

- 1947: January 1, 1947 – U.S. Pacific Command established
- 1957: July 1, 1957 – Far East Command disestablished and responsibilities assumed by USPACOM some responsibilities of Alaskan Command also transferred to USPACOM
- 1957: October 1957 – Headquarters moved from Makalapa to Camp H.M. Smith
- 1958: January 1958 – CINCPAC also served concurrently as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet until January 1958, when the U.S. Pacific Fleet became a separate component with its own commander
- 1972: January 1, 1972 – Responsibilities for military forces and elements in the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and the Arctic assigned to CINCPAC
- 1975: Former Alaskan Command (ALCOM) disestablished and its responsibilities transferred to Pacific Command
- 1976: May 1, 1976 – USPACOM AOR expanded to east coast of Africa, resulting in the AOR expanding to cover more than 50 percent of the earth's surface
- 1983: October 1983 – Pacific Command AOR expanded to include responsibility for China, South Korea, Mongolia, and Madagascar
- 1986: Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act expanded and codified authority of the commanders of the unified commands to carry out their assigned missions and to employ combatant forces provided by the individual services
- 1989: July 7, 1989 - New Alaskan Command (ALCOM) established as a subordinate unified command responsible to USCINCPAC. (No relationship to original ALCOM, the unified command dis-established in 1975)

From 1989 through 2000, due to the focus of attention shifting to the Middle East, the UCP slightly reduced USPACOM's AOR:

- 1989: August 16, 1989 – Responsibility for the Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden transferred to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
- 1996: January 1, 1996 – Seychelles and adjacent waters transferred to USCENTCOM
- 2000: October 1, 2000 – Responsibility for Indian Ocean waters off Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa transferred from USPACOM to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)

The UCP changed again as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism, as well as the new defense strategy articulated in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*. For the first time the entire surface of the earth was divided among the various unified commands. A new Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was created for homeland security and other changes in the various commands' responsibilities resulted in significant changes for USPACOM:

- 2002: October 1, 2002 – The west coast of North America, including Alaska, reassigned from USPACOM to USNORTHCOM; Antarctica added to USPACOM AOR. On October 24, the title “Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command” (USCINCPAC) was changed to “Commander, U.S. Pacific Command” (CDRUSPACOM)
- 2008: December 17, 2008 – All areas of the Indian Ocean previously assigned to USPACOM west of 68° E transferred to the newly established U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). As a result, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Reunion Islands were reassigned from USPACOM to USAFRICOM.⁵

1.4 Area of Responsibility

The USPACOM AOR is the largest of all six geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), as it encompasses roughly 272 million km² (105 million mi²) – over half the earth’s surface – throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The USPACOM AOR stretches from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. It shares borders with all of the other five combatant commands. The USPACOM AOR contains a total of 36 countries within its territory.




Figure 1-5: USPACOM AOR. Source: United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).⁶

List of 36 Countries in USPACOM AOR

- Australia
- Bangladesh
- Bhutan
- Brunei
- Burma
- Cambodia
- China
- Fiji
- India
- Indonesia
- Japan
- Kiribati
- Laos
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Marshall Islands
- Micronesia
- Mongolia
- Nauru
- Nepal
- New Zealand
- North Korea
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Samoa
- Singapore
- Solomon Islands
- South Korea
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
- Timor-Leste
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vietnam
- Vanuatu

* USPACOM does not officially list Taiwan an independent country to reflect that while the United States government maintains unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including in defense-related matters, it does not officially recognize its independence, as part of the “One-China Policy.” See Taiwan “History” section below for more information.

1.5 Structure

As a geographic combatant command, USPACOM is in charge of using and integrating United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces within the USPACOM AOR to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national interests. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) is the senior U.S. military authority of USPACOM. CDRUSPACOM reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense. USPACOM is headquartered at the Nimitz-MacArthur Building on Camp H.M. Smith outside of Honolulu, Hawaii, and has forces stationed and deployed throughout the region.

1.5.1 Headquarters.

Approximately 360,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are assigned to the USPACOM AOR, with MARFORPAC consisting of about 86,000 personnel and 640 aircraft. Component command personnel numbers include more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel. DOD civilian employees in the Pacific Command AOR number about 38,000. Headquarters staff structure is depicted in *Figure 1-6*.




Figure 1-6: USPACOM Headquarters. Source: USPACOM.⁷

1.5.2 Subordinate Commands

USPACOM consists of the following subordinate commands:

1.5.2.1 Service Component Commands:

- U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)
- U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
- U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)
- U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC)

1.5.2.2 Sub-Unified Commands:

- U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)
- U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
- U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)

1.5.2.3 Direct Reporting Units:

- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)
- Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific
- Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM)

1.5.2.4 Standing Joint Task Force:

- Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West)



1.5.3 U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC)



MARFORPAC is the United States Marine Corps service component command of USPACOM. It is the largest field command in the Marine Corps and is headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii. As the assigned service component to the USPACOM AOR, MARFORPAC is responsible for the support, planning, and provision of forces in the USPACOM AOR or elsewhere as required. Longstanding missions for MARFORPAC include building partner capacity in support of regional cooperation and capacity-building efforts, as well as the defense of South Korea and Japan. MARFORPAC has also provided combat units to support Operation

Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. MARFORPAC is composed of the following units:



I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)

MCB Camp Pendleton, California, USA

I MEF provides the Marine Corps a globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), capable of generating, deploying, and employing ready forces and formations for crisis response, forward presence, major combat operations, and campaigns.



III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)

Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan

III MEF provides the United States with a forward-deployed force in readiness in the Pacific Theater, as a globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable MAGTF, capable of generating, deploying, and employing forces for crisis response, forward presence, major combat operations, and campaigns.



Marine Corps Activity Guam

The small contingent of Marines currently assigned to Marine Corps Activity Guam is responsible for building relationships with the community and facilitating the coordination required to make Marine Corps Base (MCB) Guam a reality.



Marine Rotational Forces – Darwin (Australia)

In November 2011, President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced the deployment of Marines to Darwin and Northern Australia for six months at a time, during which they will conduct exercises and training on a rotational basis with the Australian Defense Force. The intent in the coming years is to establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500-person MAGTF. The presence of Marines in Australia reflects the enduring alliance and common security interests in the region and improves interoperability between the U.S. and Australia.

1.6 Key Focus Areas

The magnitude of the size and population in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, combined with various potential factors of destabilization such as natural disasters, climate change, increasing competition for natural resources, and terrorism and violent extremism, will likely pose serious strategic long-term challenges for regional governments. The overall Indo-Asia-Pacific region is the most militarized area in the world, containing:

- Seven of the ten largest standing militaries in the world:
 - China, India, North Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam (USPACOM)
 - Russia (USEUCOM) and Pakistan (USCENTCOM)
- Five of the world's eight declared nuclear powers:
 - China, India, and North Korea
 - Russia and Pakistan
- Five of the seven nations allied with the United States through mutual defense treaties:
 - Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand

USPACOM's primary areas of focus include the following:

- Constructively engaging a rising China

- Dealing with provocations by North Korea
- Monitoring an increasingly active Russia
- Ensuring access to air and sea lanes
- Encouraging peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes
- Responding to natural disasters, as well as humanitarian and health-related issues
- Countering the threat posed by radicalism among violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
- Addressing transnational crimes, including cybercrimes, and drug and human trafficking⁸

A cornerstone of USPACOM policy includes maintaining and building upon partnerships in the AOR in order to deal with the challenges facing the region. Key focus areas of this policy include:

- Strengthen and advance alliances and partnerships
- Mature the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship
- Develop the U.S.-India strategic partnership
- Remain prepared to respond to Korean Peninsula contingency
- Counter transnational threats

1.7 Contemporary Operations

In addition to maintaining an overseas military presence in the USPACOM AOR, a significant cornerstone of USPACOM's mission is to participate in joint, combined, and other smaller military exercises with key allies in the region. Each year, USPACOM participates in hundreds of exercises and other engagement activities with foreign military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Contemporary regional cooperation and joint military exercises in the region are largely designed to promote partnerships of regional powers based on either regional or functional affiliations capable of responding to security challenges⁹, as well as to increase capability and effectiveness of relief, assistance, and humanitarian missions in the event of natural disasters and other crises that threaten public safety and health. Examples of some of the many exercises that MARFORPAC participates in on a regular basis include the following:

Balikatan: Balikatan (BK), which means "shoulder-to-shoulder," is a bilateral U.S.-Philippines exercise aimed at promoting joint humanitarian assistance projects and the ability of regional militaries to respond quickly and work together efficiently to provide relief and humanitarian assistance.¹⁰

Cobra Gold: Exercise Cobra Gold (CG) is a recurring multinational and multiservice exercise hosted annually by the Kingdom of Thailand and developed by the Thai and U.S. militaries. CG is focused on field training exercises, as well as humanitarian and civic assistance projects. Cobra Gold involves the militaries of the United States and Thailand, along with Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It is designed to "advance regional security by exercising a robust multinational force from nations sharing common goals and security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region."¹¹

PHIBLEX: Philippines-U.S. Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX) is an annual, bilateral training exercise conducted by U.S. Marine and Navy forces alongside the military of the Philippines, and is focused on a range of military operations, including disaster relief and complex expeditionary operations. It involves bilateral air-ground and amphibious training as well as staff planning exercises.¹²

Khaan Quest: Exercise Khaan Quest (KQ) is an annual multinational exercise cosponsored by USPACOM and hosted by the military of Mongolia, and is designed to promote regional peace and security. The training is usually comprised of command post exercises as well as field-training exercises, and involves

U.S., Mongolian, and other multinational forces working to “enhance regional interoperability and mission effectiveness, as well as to develop common tactics, techniques, and procedures.”¹³

Talisman Sabre: Talisman Sabre is a joint military exercise with the military of Australia that takes place every two years and aims to improve combat training, readiness, and interoperability by exposing nearly 30,000 U.S. and Australian participants to a wide spectrum of military capabilities and training experiences. The exercise is aimed at increasing the ability of both countries to plan and execute a full range of operations, from combat missions to humanitarian assistance.¹⁴

¹ "Unified Command Plan," *U.S. Department of Defense: Unified Combatant Commands*, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/Sites/Unified-Combatant-Commands>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, August 11, 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf.

⁵ "About USPACOM: History," *U.S. Pacific Command*, accessed March 15, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/History.aspx>.

⁶ "USPACOM Area of Responsibility," *U.S. Pacific Command*, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/About-USPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/>.

⁷ "Organization Chart," *U.S. Pacific Command*, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/Organization/Organization-Chart/>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Military Exercises," *Global Security*, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ex-pacom.htm>.

¹⁰ "Exercises Balikatan," *U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific*, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Exercises/Balikatan.aspx>.

¹¹ "About: Exercises Cobra Gold," *U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific*, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Exercises/CobraGold/About.aspx>.

¹² "About: Exercises PHIBLEX," *U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific*, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/exercises/phiblex/phiblexabout.aspx>.

¹³ "Exercise Khaan Quest 2015," *U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific*, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/600918/exercise-khaan-quest-2015.aspx>.


¹⁴ "Guardsmen Contribute to Theater Gateway Operations for Biennial Training," *U.S. Pacific Command*, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/610438/guardsmen-contribute-to-theater-gateway-operations-for-biennial-training-exerci.aspx>.

2 Regional Overview

The USPACOM AOR consists of a region referred to as the Indo-Asia-Pacific, which stretches from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. The region is one of the most culturally, socially, economically, and geo-politically diverse regions in the world. The region contained within the USPACOM AOR consists of over 3,000 different languages. It contains two of the three largest economies in the world (China and Japan), as well as nine of the ten smallest. The AOR includes the two most populous nations in the world (China and India), the largest democracy (India), and the nation with the largest Muslim population in the world (Indonesia). Over one-third of the nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are smaller island nations, including the smallest republic in the world and the smallest nation in Asia (Nauru).

This section covers the AOR from a regional perspective. The region is divided into four sub-regions (*Figure 2-1*): Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania.

USPACOM Area of Responsibility 36 Countries



North East Asia (5)

China
Japan
Mongolia
North Korea
South Korea

South Asia (6)

Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Sri Lanka

South East Asia (11)

Brunei
Burma
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Vietnam

Oceania (14)

Australia
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia
Nauru
New Zealand
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu

Figure 2-1: USPACOM Sub-regions. Source: USPACOM, Department of State (DOS).¹⁵

Russia (USEUCOM) and Pakistan (USCENTCOM) do not fall under the USPACOM AOR, as defined by the most recent Unified Command Plan; however, they will be mentioned in this curriculum as being actors in the greater Indo-Asia-Pacific due to their proximity and presence within the overall region, and their significance to regional relations within the AOR. Meanwhile, the sub-region of Oceania -- which includes Australia, New Zealand, and smaller island nations in the South Pacific Ocean -- is not mentioned in detail in this curriculum in attempt to focus solely on U.S. involvement and interests. These American interests primarily involve the sub-regions of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. These three sub-regions will be discussed later within the context of history, geography, economy, politics, and people and societies, and regional security issues.

2.1 Historical Overview

Complex civilizations, urban centers, and established forms of governance in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region go back thousands of years. In South Asia, the Indus Valley civilization, which was centered on the Indus River in the Indian subcontinent, was one of the world's earliest urban civilizations, dating back to 2600 BC. In Northeast Asia, Chinese civilization and governance, in the form of various successive ruling dynasties centered on the Yellow and Yangtze River valleys, go as far back as 2100 BC.




Figure 2-2: The Silk Road. Source: Wikimedia Commons.¹⁶

The Silk Road (114 BC – 1450s AD)

Contact between China and other civilizations throughout Asia and beyond occurred by way of the Silk Road, an ancient network of trade routes extending from China to Central Asia, India, Persia, and the Middle East, and on into the Mediterranean. The Silk Road became a means for the spread of goods, culture, and art, which connected the continent from east to west. The trade routes of the Silk Road first began with Chinese exploration into Central Asia as early as 114 BC, under the Han Dynasty, creating the first significant contact between China and civilizations throughout the rest of the continent. The Silk Road continued on in various forms up until the mid-fifteenth century.

While there are millennia worth of history, culture, and politics that can be studied for this region, this curriculum will focus on the modern history of the various regions of the USPACOM AOR (South Asia, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia), starting in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when European and Western powers began to exert political and economic control over areas throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. This influence occurred primarily through colonization, and ultimately shaped the cultural and political environment of the region as we know it today.

2.1.1 Northeast Asia



Figure 2-3: Northeast Asia. Source: CAOCL.¹⁷

2.1.1.1 China

Until the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, China chose to remain isolated from most of the rest of the world, and particularly from the West. However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Westerners began arriving in China in significant numbers as traders, diplomats, missionaries, and businessmen. The British sent an envoy to China in 1793 to establish ports for trade, specifically for Chinese products such as tea, porcelain, and silk, which had become extremely popular in Britain. It was around this time that opium found its way into Chinese ports, and the British capitalized on demand for it in China by using it as a commodity to trade with the Chinese. The opium trade grew significantly in China during the first part of the nineteenth century, to the point that smuggling, crime, and corruption began to spiral out of control, and China became increasingly vulnerable to an import-export imbalance from the rapidly growing international trade.¹⁸ This eventually led to the Opium Wars between the British and the Chinese, consisting of two wars: the First Opium War (1839-42) and the Second Opium War (1856-60). The Second Opium War weakened the Qing Dynasty, the ruling power in China, and forced China to reduce its level of isolation from the rest of the world.^{19, 20} The Chinese defeat resulted in the Treaty of Nanjing, the first of a series of treaties that forced China to cede Hong Kong to the British, as well as open up even more ports to foreign trade to the West, particularly to Britain, France, and Germany. The treaties also compelled China to allow more foreign traders and missionaries deeper into China for travel and work.

The defeat and humiliation of China at the hands of European powers, and the resulting concessions, created a deep sense of domestic distrust and discontent with the Qing government. Around this time, large-scale revolts began to occur across China, including the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), headed by Hong Xiuquan, a Christian convert who claimed to be the younger brother of Jesus and became the leader of a Christian millenarian movement that fought against the Qing Dynasty. This conflict resulted in the deaths of 20-70 million people, thus making it the bloodiest civil war in history.²¹ The Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) was an uprising that occurred with the support of the Qing Dynasty; it targeted foreigners, foreign missionaries, and Chinese Christians. The Boxer Rebellion was ultimately crushed by the Eight-Nation Alliance, a coalition of eight powers, including the United States, which sent -- on orders from President William McKinley -- 5,000 U.S. troops to quell the rebellion.²²

The Qing government's failure to deal with these crises, and resultant weakness of the regime, resulted in a massive show of nationalism on the part of the Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in China. Under pressure from the Han, the Qing government stepped down, which had been led by the Manchu, an ethnic minority. This occurred in 1911 and brought an end to the more than 4,000-year-old dynastic system of governance in China. The Republic of China (ROC) was established in mainland China in 1912. Following this, China became embroiled in a civil war, in which the Communists, led by Mao Zedong, carried out a bloody, low-tech guerilla battle against the ROC government led by the Nationalists, also referred to as the Kuomintang, the incumbent government of mainland China at the time led by Chiang Kai-shek. This battle between the two sides was for control of both the territory and ideology of China. On October 1, 1949, Mao declared the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The subsequent establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led the United States to suspend diplomatic ties with the PRC for several decades.

2.1.1.2 Taiwan

The Chinese Civil War – between the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang), led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong – led to the defeat of the Kuomintang, and the creation of the PRC on October 1, 1949. This forced the Kuomintang to flee to Taiwan in exile, in December 1949, establishing Taipei as the capital of the Republic of China (ROC). From this point onwards, the Kuomintang was reduced to control of Taiwan and other minor islands. However, the Kuomintang continued to claim sovereignty over “all China,” which it defined to include mainland China. On mainland China, the victorious Communists (PRC) claimed that they ruled the sole and only China -- which they claimed included Taiwan -- and that the ROC no longer existed. However, since its establishment as a sovereign state in 1949, the official name of Taiwan continues to be "the Republic of China."²⁴



Figure 2-4: Taiwan. Source: DOS.²³

The United States has maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan, while not officially recognizing its independence as part of the “One-China Policy.” According to this policy, countries seeking official diplomatic relations with the PRC (China) must not maintain any official relations with the ROC (Taiwan). Therefore, when the United States reinstated diplomatic relations with China in 1979, it officially severed relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, an act of the United States Congress. This severed

official U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including a refusal to recognize its name as the Republic of China, in order to reinstate official relations with the PRC. However, the United States continued to maintain unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including supporting it in defense-related matters.

“The United States does not support Taiwan independence. Maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, in line with the U.S. desire to further peace and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability. The United States insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and encourages dialogue to help advance such an outcome.”

- Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Fact Sheet²⁵

2.1.1.3 Japan

The Meiji Restoration period in Japanese history brought about the fall of the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate and restored imperial rule to Japan in 1868 under Emperor Meiji. Europe and the United States played a significant role in bringing about the Meiji Restoration, and, in effect, the revolution led to Japan warming to Western influence. Prior to the Japanese political system being consolidated under the Emperor, the country was largely an isolated, pre-industrial, feudal country with a weak military that was not very technologically advanced. However, the new revolution led to the country’s industrialization and modernization.

Japan’s expansion of power across Northeast Asia began in the mid-nineteenth century as it expanded its control to the Korean peninsula. While Korea had already faced considerable pressure from France and the United States to end its seclusion policy and to trade internationally, it was a newly industrialized Japan which finally pried open Korea’s economic doors in 1876. Japan gradually consolidated its control over Korea and was determined to utilize Korea as both a source of raw materials and a market for Japanese finished goods. Japan formally converted Korea into a Japanese protectorate in 1905, and a colony in 1910. Tokyo’s control over Korea ended in 1945 when Japan was defeated by the Allies in World War II following the unprovoked attack by Japan on the United States in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Following the defeat of the Empire of Japan, control of Taiwan was also given to China.



Figure 2-5: Japan. Source: DOS.²⁶

Sino-Japanese Relations: The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) was fought between Meiji Japan and the Qing Dynasty in China over control of Korea. However, the failure of the Qing Dynasty, which was already in decline, to modernize its military essentially led to certain defeat by the newly revived Japanese military forces. At the conclusion of the war, not only did the Japanese force China to relinquish control of Korea, but also seized Taiwan and Southern Manchuria. The loss of Korea as a vassal state, and the defeat by a traditionally weak neighbor, sparked intense nationalism and anti-Japan sentiment in China. Events in the beginning of the twentieth century did little to alleviate these tensions, including Japan's conquest and annexation of the resource-rich region of Manchuria in 1931. In response, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson issued what would become known as the Stimson Doctrine, stating that the United States would not recognize any agreements between the Japanese and Chinese that limited free commercial interaction in the region.²⁷

Regional relations were further exacerbated between China and Japan by an event during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1934-45) known as the Nanking Massacre, an episode of mass murder and mass rape by Japanese troops against Chinese residents of Nanking (now known as Nanjing), which was then the capital of the Republic of China. The incident began on December 13, 1937, the day when the Japanese captured Nanking, and lasted for six weeks. The event remains a contentious political issue, as aspects of it have been disputed by Japanese nationalists,²⁸ who assert that the massacre has been either exaggerated or fabricated for propaganda purposes.^{29,30} The controversy surrounding the massacre remains a stumbling block in Sino-Japanese relations and in Japan's relations with other nations in the region, such as South Korea and the Philippines.

2.1.1.4 Korean Peninsula



Figure 2-6: Korean Peninsula. Source: CAOCL.³¹

At the end of WWII, the Allies replaced Japanese control over Korea by dividing the peninsula arbitrarily at the 38th parallel, and agreeing to Soviet occupation in the north and U.S. occupation in the south. United Nations negotiations that attempted to unify government rule of the Korean Peninsula failed. In 1948, the Soviet Union installed Kim Il Sung as leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in order to set up a Communist client state of the Soviet Union. In the south, the United States supported Syngman Rhee's efforts to draft a constitution, set up the Republic of Korea (ROK), and got Rhee elected – albeit in unfairly rigged elections – as the country's first president.

The official division of North and South Korea led to several years of border hostilities between the two nations. In 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea with the goal of unifying the country under the Communist regime of the north, with material support from Communist Soviet Union and moral support from Communist PRC. As a result, the United States and a coalition of allies came in to support South Korea under the auspices of the UN. When a UN victory was

imminent, and in response to a fear of U.S. domination of the entire Korean Peninsula, China also entered

the war. Following two years of stalemate centered along the 38th parallel, clashes ended when an armistice agreement was signed in 1953 between North Korea, China, and the UN. Since South Korea refused to sign the agreement, a state of war technically still exists.

The official name of North Korea is the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, while the official name of South Korea is the Republic of Korea. In the United States, most media outlets use the terms North and South Korea; however, most official reports and international sources will use DPRK and ROK, respectively.

2.1.1.5 Mongolia

By treaty, today's Mongolia became an autonomous province of China in 1915 and was granted independence in 1945. The country adopted a Communist government and remained strongly aligned with the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. The Mongolian government adopted its most recent constitution in 1992, which calls for democracy with a multi-party system. Today, Mongolia remains aware of its precarious and geostrategic location between two giants – China and Russia – and is trying to reassert itself internationally. While remaining carefully neutral, Mongolia has demonstrated that it leans toward the West by engaging its military in international peacekeeping operations such as participating in the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition and bilateral exercises with the U.S. military like Khaan Quest.

2.1.2 South Asia



Figure 2-7: South Asia. Source: CAOCL.³²

The history of South Asia and the Indian subcontinent is rooted in the Indus Valley Civilization (2600 BC), which established the cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro; followed by the Vedic Period, which included the migration of the Aryan nomadic tribes from the Iranian plateau into the region (1750-1000 BC); along with the development of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism as major indigenous religious systems. This was followed by the establishment of various empires that consolidated power throughout much of the Indian subcontinent, including the Maurya (322-185 BC) and Gupta (240-550 AD) empires. This era was followed by the conquest of Sindh, in the northwestern part of the subcontinent, by the Arab military leader, Muhammad Bin Qasim (711 AD), and the spread of Islam throughout the rest of the subcontinent. This gave way to the period of Muslim India, in which nearly the entire subcontinent eventually came under Muslim rule in various forms, including independent Muslim kingdoms, princely states, the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526), and the Mughal Empire (1526-1857).

The era of Muslim political rule of India lasted up until the arrival of European powers, including the Dutch, Portuguese, and the British, and their colonization of the region in the seventeenth century. This coincided with the decline of Mughal power and eventually the expansion of control of the British East India Company. The British East India Company had originally been set up as a private trading company, being given permission by Mughal Emperor Jahangir to conduct trade with India, beginning in 1612. The company eventually began to make inroads into the subcontinent, using its own private armies to take control of large areas of the region, beginning in 1757, while also assuming administrative functions. Control by the East India Company ended when the British government issued the Government of India Act of 1858, which enabled the British Crown to formally assume direct control of India in the form of the new British Raj.

2.1.2.1 India and Pakistan

At the turn of the twentieth century, movements to seek independence from Britain began to gain traction in the Indian subcontinent. Hindus and Muslims, the two largest religious communities on the subcontinent, largely came together in their opposition of the British occupation and in their demand for independence. The Indian National Congress Party and the All-India Muslim League were the parties at the forefront of this movement. The League and Congress disagreed on various issues regarding Muslim religious, economic, and political rights, and it was during this period that gave rise to the two most significant figures in the independence movements of India and Pakistan: Mohandas Gandhi and Muhammed Ali Jinnah. Both of these leaders campaigned for independence from the British, with Gandhi arguing for an independent united India, which Jinnah initially supported; however, Jinnah later began calling for the creation of two separate independent states, divided along religious lines. Both Gandhi and Jinnah are considered the architects and founders of modern India and Pakistan.

Mohandas Gandhi, commonly referred to as Mahatma Gandhi, was a Hindu, born in what is today Gujarat, India in 1869. He studied law in London and went on to practice law in South Africa, where he experienced first-hand the discrimination and racial segregation faced by Indians under British authorities. This experience led Gandhi to dedicate his life campaigning for civil rights in India. He returned to India in 1915, where he quickly became the leader of the India independence movement. A major part of Gandhi's independence movement was his call for civil disobedience, in which he urged ethnic Indians to stop working in government posts under the British Crown, stop attending government schools, to leave their posts in the military, and to stop paying taxes and purchasing British goods. Gandhi then became the leader of the Indian National Congress and after spending time in and out of prison for leading several large civil disobedience movements, in 1942 Gandhi launched the "Quit India" movement, calling for the immediate withdrawal of the British.³³




Figure 2-8: Jinnah (left) with Gandhi, 1944. Source: Wikimedia Commons.³⁴

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was an Indian Muslim, born in what is now Karachi, Pakistan in 1876. Like Gandhi, Jinnah was also a lawyer by trade. He became interested in politics when he noticed the lack of Indian representation in British Parliament. Jinnah rose to prominence in the Indian National Congress party after becoming a member in 1906, advocating a platform of Hindu-Muslim unity against the British. In 1912, Jinnah attended a meeting of the All India Muslim League, prompting him to join the League the following year. Initially, Jinnah collaborated with Hindu leaders in Congress. However, he came to realize that Hindu leaders of Congress were working toward a different political agenda than the one he espoused. While he still thought that Muslim rights could be protected under a united India, Jinnah left

Congress and dedicated himself to the process of reforming the Muslim League. Over time, he began to believe more firmly that the only way to protect Muslim rights was to create a separate state for the Muslims of India. It was during a 1940 meeting of the Muslim League that Jinnah first proposed a separate Muslim state to be called Pakistan.³⁵

Following World War II, Britain no longer had the resources with which to control its territory in South Asia, and with the independence movements increasingly placing pressure on the British Raj to withdraw from the region, Britain began negotiations for Indian independence with the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. In August 1947, the subcontinent was granted independence and divided into a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan. Pakistan was composed of two noncontiguous regions, West Pakistan (modern-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh), separated by over 2,200 km (1,300 mi) of Indian territory. The partition of British India into these three political entities led to violent rioting and massive population shifts as Muslims in India migrated to Pakistan, and Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan migrated to India. Large numbers of people died during this human migration, with estimates ranging from 200,000 to one million deaths occurring during partition of the Indian subcontinent. After violence and communal riots erupted in 1947 over the partitioning of the country, Gandhi toured the affected Muslim areas calling for peace, leading some Hindus to accuse him of being a “Muslim sympathizer.” Thus, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu extremist named Nathuram Godse on January 30, 1948. Meanwhile, although Jinnah would see his dream of an independent state of Pakistan realized, he would live just long enough to be the first president of Pakistan. Jinnah died from tuberculosis on September 11, 1948.




Figure 2-9: Partition of South Asia. Source: Wikimedia Commons.³⁶

The newly established states of India and Pakistan almost immediately became involved in a territorial dispute, both claiming sovereignty over the area of Kashmir. Pakistanis believed that Kashmir should become part of Pakistan because the majority of the state’s population was Muslim. India believed that the state should be included in India because its last leader under British rule had agreed to join India. As a result, the two countries fought two wars over the state; first in 1947-48 and, again, in 1965. Reaching a stalemate and succumbing to international pressure, the two countries accepted a ceasefire, without a resolution to the dispute, one that remains a source of tension to this day. Pakistan currently controls roughly one third of the state, referring to it as Azad Kashmir, while India controls the remaining territory as the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

2.1.2.2 Bangladesh

During the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the country was established as two noncontiguous regions, West Pakistan (modern-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh). At the time, the Bengalis of East Pakistan made up a majority of the population of the newly formed country. However, the country's politics were dominated by the Punjabis of West Pakistan. The political disenfranchisement and growing frustration of the Bengali population was exacerbated when Mujibur Rahman, and his Awami League party, were blocked from forming a government and taking office, despite gaining a majority in the 1970 elections. Rahman was detained and imprisoned by the Pakistani military in March 1971. This led to Bengalis mobilizing along ethnic and linguistic lines, and a wide-scale civil disobedience movement erupted across East Pakistan, with calls being made for independence and secession from West Pakistan. The Pakistan Army moved to secure control of East Pakistan by killing Bengali leaders and intellectuals during a two-month campaign, with various estimates stating the number of those killed during the war being anywhere between 300,000 and three million. Furthermore, 10 million Bengalis fled the conflict across the border into the Indian state of West Bengal. The Provisional Government of Bangladesh operated in exile from Calcutta (Kolkata), in West Bengal, India during this time with the support of the Indian government. Bengalis formed the Mukhti Bahini (Liberation Army), who were trained and armed by Indian forces. After a war for independence (the Bangladesh Liberation War), which lasted from March to December 1971, the Indian army entered East Pakistan in early December 1971. The Indian Army and Mukhti Bahini forces defeated the Pakistan Army, leading to West Pakistan's surrender and East Pakistan's independence as the Republic of Bangladesh. Pakistan released Mujibur Rahman in January 1972, and he was elected Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 1973. Rahman, who is referred to as Mujib, is known as the founding leader of Bangladesh, and as the "Father of the Nation."³⁸³⁹



Figure 2-10: Bangladesh. Source: DOS.³⁷

2.1.2.3 Nepal



Figure 2-11: Nepal. Source: CIA Factbook.⁴⁰

Nepal remained a monarchy for much of its history, ruled by various dynasties, beginning with the Shah Dynasty in 1768, when Prithvi Narayan Shah unified several smaller kingdoms to form the Kingdom of Nepal.⁴¹ Due to its unique geography, Nepal was largely protected from being completely conquered or colonized by European powers. However, during the expansion of the East India Company in South Asia, disputes over Nepal's annexation of territories along the Nepal-India border eventually led to the Anglo-Nepali War in 1815-16. The war ended with the signing

of the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816, which led to Nepal becoming a *de facto* protectorate state of Britain and ceding nearly a third of its territory to British control. However, in 1923, Britain peacefully and formally recognized Nepalese sovereignty and ended its protectorate.⁴² Nepal continued to be ruled as a monarchy

until 2008, when the first elections for the 1st Nepali Constituent Assembly, held on May 28, 2008, overwhelmingly decided to abolish the monarchy and establish a democratic republic. Thus, the country officially became the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal.

2.1.2.4 *Maldives*

Like Nepal, the Maldives had been ruled as a monarchy for much of its history, and unlike the rest of the countries in the region, the Maldives remained largely out of British control. The Portuguese were the first to establish a garrison there in the mid-sixteenth century, but remained out of the governance and politics of the small island chain. Control of the garrison was assumed by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, though they never assumed any governance over the islands. When the British effectively expelled the Dutch from the region, they brought the Maldives under British protectorate status but paid it little attention, allowing for its internal governing by the local sultanate. This stayed in effect until 1965, when an agreement was signed between the Sultanate of the Maldives and the British Crown, effectively granting independence to the nation. A national referendum held in 1968 led to an end to the monarchy, transforming the small island nation into a republic, officially becoming the Republic of Maldives.⁴³

2.1.2.5 *Sri Lanka*

Sri Lanka was the last country in South Asia to gain its independence. Then called Ceylon, the country's history of control was similar to that of the Maldives, with the Portuguese first gaining control, then the Dutch, who later ceded the territory to the British. Due to its proximity to the Indian mainland, the push for independence spilled over, and by the turn of the century, politicians were calling for full independence for Ceylon as well. In 1944, the British appointed the Soulbury Commission to develop a new constitution, giving the colony internal self-government but maintaining control over the island nation's foreign policy and defense. In 1947, the Ceylon Independence Act granted dominion status to Ceylon, recognizing the country as an autonomous entity with allegiance to the British Crown. In 1948, the country became independent, while still retaining the name Ceylon, and forming a British structure of government. Finally, following a new constitution in 1972, Ceylon changed its name to the Republic of Sri Lanka.^{44 45}

2.1.3 *Southeast Asia*

Over the centuries, the history of Southeast Asia has been heavily influenced by both China and India. The Chinese Han Dynasty annexed what is today Vietnam in 111 BC and ruled it for over a thousand years. China had an immense cultural impact on religion, art, and government. Meanwhile, although India never ruled nor had any formal authority in the region, it has had enormous religious and cultural influence through the spread and adoption of Hinduism and eventually Buddhism. Additional Indian influences include concepts of social hierarchy, literature, art, and government. The history of Southeast Asia prior to European colonization was characterized by the establishment and development of various major empires and kingdoms in the region that spanned across the region, creating centers of power that shaped the political makeup of Southeast Asia today.

2.1.3.1 Western Colonization




Figure 2-12: Southeast Asia. Source: CAOCL.⁴⁶

The opening up of trade between Europe and Asia was a major historical event for both regions, and had a significant role in shaping the modern global economic system. With increased shipbuilding capacity and improved navigation skills, Western powers began to explore and expand eastward, beginning as early as the sixteenth century. Initially, however, Europeans were not able to exert any major political control in the region and only controlled small territories until the late 1700s. From that point on, however, a decline of the indigenous powers in the region began, coinciding with increased European control, and leading to widespread colonization by the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish.

In the 1800s, Britain acquired Burma, Malaya (now mainland Malaysia and Singapore), and Borneo (now Brunei and maritime Malaysia); France acquired Indochina (now Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam); the Dutch took control of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia); and Portugal acquired Timor-Leste (East Timor). Palau, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands have complex colonial histories that included rule by Britain, Germany, the Hawaiian Kingdom, Spain, Japan, and the United States. Spain ruled over the Philippines since 1521, until its defeat in the Spanish-American War in 1898 led to it ceding the islands to the United States.

The collapse of global stock markets (1929-30) and the resultant Great Depression in the United States (1929-39) had a great impact on colonial rule in Southeast Asia. It led to Western industrialist powers, including the United States, no longer being able to purchase natural resources from Southeast Asia, creating financial difficulties in the colonized areas. As a result, Burma, Vietnam, and the Philippines rose up in rebellion in the 1930s. Although the rebellions were largely unsuccessful, they demonstrated not only widespread public resentment, but also the growing dissatisfaction of indigenous populations with Western control in the region.

2.1.3.2 WWII and Decolonization

The Imperial Japanese Army occupation of much of the Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia, during the initial years of World War II also had a profound effect on Western/European control of the region. With the defeat of Western colonial powers in the region, a hope for independence arose among the various nations of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Japan's policies in Southeast Asia also quickly began creating hostility and resentment towards the Japanese occupation, which eventually built up to demands for independence following WWII. Thus, the end of World War II brought about the eventual dissolution of colonial rule as nearly all the nations of Southeast Asia began to demand their independence.

While the United States had promised independence to the Philippines before the war and granted it in 1946, other Western governments were reluctant to give up their territories in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Indonesia declared independence from the Dutch in 1945, resulting in a war that lasted until 1949. Cambodia and Laos both declared independence in 1953, with France reluctantly but eventually acceding in both countries. Britain was also reluctant to surrender control of its colonies in the region; however, it eventually granted independence to Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s. The smaller island states in Southeast Asia received independence during the same process of decolonization, with the exception of the Portuguese colony of Timor-Leste, which was invaded by Indonesia nine days after the Portuguese withdrew in 1975. Indonesia maintained control of Timor-Leste as one of its provinces until it finally relinquished control in 1999. Timor-Leste officially became an independent country in 2002.

2.1.3.3 Cold War Era

After the end of World War II, when China and North Korea fell to Communism, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies, became engaged in a Cold War which would last until the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991. During this period, there were well-funded, organized Communist parties in all major countries in Southeast Asia. China and the Soviet Union provided major support to insurgents in the region. Thus, countering the threat of Communism was a major theme in regards to U.S. involvement in the politics of the region, particularly justifying intervention by foreign powers according to the Domino Theory. In keeping with the Cold War perspective of the time, the United States viewed the wars in the region, including in Vietnam, as wars against Communist expansion.

The Domino Theory, which was a prominent theory in the United States at the time, argued that the Communists aimed to establish a political foothold in one country, and then expand that influence; and, like falling dominos, neighboring states would eventually be swayed to Communist ideology, therefore justifying the need for U.S. military intervention.

Vietnam: In 1941, Ho Chi Minh organized the Communist resistance movement known as the Viet Minh, formed primarily in opposition to Japanese and French control of the region. Following the defeat of Japan, Ho Chi Minh established a provisional government in Hanoi and declared Vietnam's independence. The French refused to recognize the new government and, with U.S. backing, fought back during the First Indochina War (1946-54). The French eventually conceded defeat, and the 1954 Geneva conference dissolved the French colony of Indochina, temporarily dividing Vietnam into two parts: a Communist north and a non-Communist south. The Viet Minh eventually lost political power and were replaced by the Viet Cong (officially called the National Liberation Front), the Communist movement of South Vietnam. The Viet Cong led the fight against the South Vietnamese government and, eventually, against the United States during the Vietnam War.⁴⁷

The Vietnam War (1955-75), less commonly known as the Second Indochina War, was fought between North and South Vietnam. The north was backed by the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist allies. Meanwhile, South Vietnam was supported by the United States and other anti-Communist allies, in order to resist Communist advance in the region. U.S. participation in the war against the Vietnamese Communist movement lasted until President Richard Nixon negotiated a peace agreement with North Vietnam and withdrew American forces in 1972. In 1975, the North Vietnamese Army stormed Saigon in South Vietnam, seized control of the country, and united both countries as the Communist-ruled, Socialist Republic of Vietnam.⁴⁸

In 1986, the Vietnamese government initiated a series of economic and political reforms that propelled Vietnam on a path toward integration with the world economy. By 2000, it had established diplomatic relations with all other countries around the world. Since 2000, Vietnam's rate of economic growth is among the highest in the world.⁴⁹ While many Vietnamese continue to resent the wartime activities of the U.S., Vietnam's official relationship with the United States has improved significantly since the end of the Vietnam War.

Indonesia: Indonesia's first president, Sukarno – who like many Javanese people, had only one name -- played an integral role in leading the country to independence from the Dutch in 1945, ruled for a period of 22 years (1945-67). Sukarno maintained power by balancing the authority of the military with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By 1965, the PKI had penetrated all levels of government and gained influence at the expense of the military.⁵⁰ On September 30, 1965, six of the military's most senior officers were assassinated in an action generally labeled a failed coup by the 30 September Movement, a group from within the armed forces. The army blamed the incident on the PKI, and Major General Suharto mobilized forces under his command and took control of Jakarta. Anti-Communists, initially following the army's lead, went on a violent purge of Communists throughout the country, and in one of the bloodiest incidents of violence in Cold War-era Southeast Asia, killed an estimated 500,000 alleged PKI members, essentially destroying the party. This led to the ouster of the politically weakened Sukarno, and the transfer of power to Suharto, who also had just one name. Suharto became Indonesia's second president, serving for a period of 31 years, until his resignation in 1998.⁵¹

Cambodia: During the decolonization process of Southeast Asia following World War II, France withdrew from its colony in 1953, which was then referred to as French Indochina, thereby granting independence to Cambodia. Cambodia became a constitutional monarchy under King Norodom Sihanouk. During the Cold War, Sihanouk adopted an official policy of neutrality, but as the Vietnam War progressed, he allowed the Communists of North Vietnam to use Cambodian territory as a safe haven and supply route for forces fighting in South Vietnam. In 1970, King Sihanouk was ousted in a military *coup d'état*, and the new regime demanded that the North Vietnamese Communists leave Cambodia. This led to a conflict in which the Vietnamese Communists fought against the government of Cambodia, paving the way for the country being taken over by the Communist movement of Cambodia, known as the Khmer Rouge.⁵²

The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, took power in Cambodia in 1975. The Khmer Rouge perpetrated one of the most savage regimes in history, carrying out the Cambodian Genocide (1975-79). Pol Pot sought a radical reform of society, converting Cambodians into a single working class, killing more than a million people in the process and displacing hundreds of thousands more.⁵³ The Khmer Rouge outlawed all religion, private property, banking, finance, and money. They instituted a massive forced relocation of all urban dwellers to collective labor camps. Hundreds of thousands died of exhaustion or starvation. In 1978, the now Socialist Republic of Vietnam eventually invaded and overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime. The Vietnamese occupied that country until 1991 and finally agreed on their shared national border in 2012.⁵⁴

2.2 Geographic Overview

The USPACOM AOR is the largest of all six geographic combatant commands; it encompasses roughly 272 million km² (105 million mi²), about 52 percent of the earth's surface. Composed of 83 percent water and 17 percent land, the USPACOM AOR stretches from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. USPACOM shares borders with all of the other five geographic combatant commands.



Figure 2-13: USPACOM Topography. *Source: United States Geological Survey (USGS).⁵⁵*

Geographically, the USPACOM AOR is as diverse as the region is vast. From some of the highest mountain ranges in the world and vast deserts in South Asia and Northeast Asia, to tropical rainforests and thousands of low-lying island territories throughout the Southeast Asia and Oceania regions, the AOR provides a landscape for a vast spectrum of air, land, and amphibious operations and exercises. Furthermore, the Pacific coast of Asia is situated along the Ring of Fire, a region highly susceptible to volcanic and earthquake activity. The combination of varied topographical landscapes coupled with the

geographical volatility of the region -- as well as the high population numbers -- makes the area especially vulnerable to a number of natural disasters, public health, and security issues.

2.2.1 Climate

Monsoons are the most common weather phenomena in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Tropical weather, winds, and rainfall control much of the climate in the region, which in effect, impacts life and military operations there. Consisting of seasonal winds and heavy rainfall, monsoons occur throughout the region when the temperature on land is significantly warmer or cooler than the temperature of the ocean. In South and Southeast Asia, the monsoon season lasts July-September, resulting in some of the heaviest rainfall in the world. Northeast Asia experiences a wet monsoon period in the summer, usually lasting May-August. Monsoons play an important role in the region's economy. Rice and tea farmers throughout the region rely on the monsoons for watering their crops, whether directly through rainfall, or indirectly through replenishing local water sources such as rivers, lakes, and reservoirs.

While the rain itself does not typically pose a catastrophic threat to the population, the sustained precipitation can lead to flooding. Deltas situated along the coast or near large rivers are often flooded by

seasonal rains from the monsoons, typhoons, and high-rising tides from the ocean. Because weather systems travel more easily across water, rain and high winds tend to have a greater impact on civilian life and military operations in coastal South and Southeast Asia, and in the maritime areas of Southeast Asia. Seasonal rain also provides a breeding ground for germs and bacteria that, in turn, can lead to a greater transmission of water- and vector-borne diseases. Illnesses such as cholera, typhoid, hepatitis A, malaria, and dengue fever affect the population in greater numbers during the monsoon season.⁵⁶

2.2.2 Himalayas

The Himalayas are a vast mountain range in South Asia and home to nine of the ten highest peaks in the world. This includes the tallest mountain on Earth, Mount Everest, which lies in Nepal, with a significant portion of it falling in the Tibet Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as Tibet) in southern China. The Himalayan mountain range acts as a stark physical boundary, separating two of Asia's most prominent geographic regions: the Indo-Gangetic Plain and the Tibetan Plateau. The Indo-Gangetic Plain is a vast fertile plain surrounding the Indus and Ganges Rivers in South Asia, stretching across the northern part of the Indian subcontinent, from Pakistan to Bangladesh. The Tibetan Plateau is the world's largest and highest plateau, stretching across most of the southwestern Chinese province of Tibet. The Himalayas have profoundly shaped the cultures of South Asia, as well as forming a barrier that prevented contact between neighboring civilizations for centuries. The Himalayas and its glaciers are the source of three of the world's major river systems: the Indus, the Ganges-Brahmaputra, and the Yangtze. The combined drainage basin of these rivers systems is home to around 600 million people.⁵⁸



Figure 2-14: Himalayan Mountain Range. Source: Wikimedia Commons.⁵⁷

2.2.3 Rivers and Maritime Areas

Vast areas of the USPACOM AOR are maritime territories, islands, or major urban centers that lie along coasts, rivers, or deltas. These areas are home to a significant portion of the population in the region, and have historically relied on the various bodies of water, rivers, maritime routes, and access to the sea for trade, transport, and irrigation. These water-related entities continue to play a crucial role in the geography, economy, and lives of people of the region. The maritime territory of this region includes some of the world's most important and busiest trade and shipping routes.

2.2.3.1 Rivers




Figure 2-15: Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra Rivers. Source: *Wikimedia Commons*.⁵⁹

South Asia: The Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers, along with the Indus River, form a vast fertile region of land which is home to millions of people, a region geographically referred to as the Indo-Gangetic Plain (highlighted in purple in *Figure 2-15*). The area is among the most densely populated regions in the subcontinent. As the Ganges-Brahmaputra River system flows through Bangladesh and into the Bay of Bengal, it forms the largest delta system in the world, known by various names: the Ganges Delta, the Sundarbans Delta, or the Bengal Delta.



Figure 2-16: Mekong River basin. Source: *Wikimedia Commons*.⁶⁰

Southeast Asia: The Mekong River (*Figure 2-16*) flows through six countries, including China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It forms the border between Burma, Laos, and Thailand, and flows into the South China Sea, creating the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. The river provides necessities of life for over 65 million people. Its waters are used for drinking, fishing, farming, industry, and the generation of electricity for Southeast Asia's emerging economies.

Northeast Asia: The Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, China's longest rivers, provide means of trade, transport, and irrigation; these rivers support the majority of China's agricultural production and feed much of the country's eastern plains, where a majority of China's vast population is located.

Southeast Asia is generally divided into two sections: mainland and maritime. Apart from a few deep underwater trenches, the oceans in maritime Southeast Asia are relatively shallow, which means they are rather warm and not very saline. This is an ideal environment for fish, coral, seaweed, and other products.⁶¹ The region as a whole, except for the Philippines, is generally untouched by major typhoons. However, maritime Southeast Asia is extremely vulnerable to volcanic and earthquake activity.

2.2.3.2 Strait of Malacca

The Strait of Malacca is a major maritime shipping lane in Southeast Asia, located between peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. It connects the Indian Ocean (from the Andaman Sea) to the Pacific Ocean (South China Sea), and is the shortest sea route between India and China, and is thus one of the most heavily traveled shipping routes in the world. The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) describes the Strait of Malacca as being one of the world's two most important strategic chokepoints by volume of oil transit.⁶³ About a quarter of all oil carried by sea passes through the Strait of Malacca, primarily from Persian Gulf suppliers to markets in Asia, with an estimated 15.2 million barrels of oil transported through the Strait of Malacca every day in 2013.⁶⁴



Figure 2-17: Strait of Malacca. Source: Wikimedia Commons.⁶²

2.2.4 Pacific Ring of Fire




Figure 2-18: Pacific Ring of Fire. Source: Wikimedia Commons.⁶⁵

Due to the locations and movement of tectonic plates, the entire rim of the Pacific Ocean is located along fault lines that are highly susceptible to volcanic and earthquake activity. This area, referred to as the Pacific Ring of Fire, has 452 volcanoes and accounts for over 75 percent of the world's active and dormant volcanoes. About 90 percent of the world's earthquakes occur along the Pacific Ring of Fire, with about 81 percent of the world's largest earthquakes having occurred in this volatile area.^{66 67} Furthermore, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes – both above and below the sea – can generate tsunamis, which can cause further devastation. The western rim of the Pacific Ring of Fire runs through the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan and down through all of maritime Southeast Asia.⁶⁸

2.2.5 Natural Disasters

The combination of the vast and varied spectrum of geographic landscapes in the USPACOM AOR, coupled with the high population numbers in the region, makes the area especially vulnerable to a number of natural disasters and public health and security issues. In addition to earthquakes and tsunamis, tropical cyclones and typhoons also affect the region, primarily coastal and maritime areas. Areas that are more inland are often plagued with droughts, flooding, and landslides that can devastate villages across the region.

2.2.5.1 Earthquakes/Tsunamis

Due to its proximity to the Pacific Ring of Fire and numerous fault lines, the region is especially prone to earthquakes. Five of the ten most catastrophic earthquakes ever recorded occurred in China and Japan. Furthermore, because of the population density in the region, death tolls from earthquakes are usually

higher than deaths caused by earthquakes of similar magnitude in other regions. The Shaanxi earthquake in China in the fifteenth century is still the record holder for the largest loss of life due to a natural disaster, with more than 830,000 people killed. The 1976 Tangshan earthquake caused the third-highest number of deaths: 250,000 people.⁶⁹

While earthquakes themselves are destructive, the resulting tidal waves (tsunamis) wash ashore without warning, with waves as high as 100 feet. In December 2004, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred in the Indian Ocean off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This triggered a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most countries bordering the Indian Ocean, from Aceh, Indonesia to the coast of Sri Lanka, killing nearly 228,000 people.⁷⁰

2.2.5.2 Tropical Cyclones/Typhoons

The names “cyclone,” “hurricane,” and “typhoon” all refer to the same weather phenomenon. The same type of disturbance in the Northwest Pacific is called a typhoon while cyclones occur in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean. In Southeast Asia, typhoons usually occur from east of the Malay Peninsula to the Philippines. Tropical cyclones typically are generated in the Indian Ocean. Cyclones can impact the western area of the region near Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Much like the annual hurricane season in the North Atlantic Ocean, the North Pacific Ocean typhoon season lasts from July through October.

In April 1991, a cyclone that struck Bangladesh resulted in the displacement of nearly 13 million people and killed 139,000, with an equal number of injured. In November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan struck the southeastern portion of the Philippines, resulting in nearly 7,000 deaths, and was the largest recorded typhoon to ever hit the country.

2.2.5.3 U.S. Government Response

The U.S. engages in bilateral and multi-lateral humanitarian aid/ disaster relief (HADR) exercises with countries in the region. For example, the Pacific Resilience Disaster Response Exercise & Exchange (DREE) is an annual engagement between the Government of Bangladesh and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) that promotes emergency preparedness.⁷¹ However, despite joint exercises with the U.S. and other militaries in the region, these countries still do not have adequate assets or the necessary preparedness training to handle these types of disasters, especially in regions that are far from a country’s capital or served by poor transportation networks. As a result, badly needed resources often do not reach their intended recipients. Because the U.S. military has a robust presence in the region, the United States is typically among the first responders to many local natural disasters.

United States Marines were the first responders to both the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia, and to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 in the Philippines. Ships and aircraft from the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were the most readily available means of rapidly providing urgently needed logistical support to these areas. In March 2011, the 31st MEU was critical to the relief efforts during Operation Tomodachi, providing food, water, and comfort items to the victims of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami that soon after resulted in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Within two weeks of the disaster, the Japanese government’s official death toll had exceeded 10,000; by the end of 2011, the total was nearly 20,000.



Figure 2-19: Operation Sahayogi Haat, Nepal, May 2015. Source: DOD.⁷²

U.S. Marines and Nepalese soldiers unload tarps off of a UH-1Y Huey at Orang, Nepal, during Operation Sahayogi Haat, May 19, 2015, following a magnitude-7.8 earthquake in the nation April 25, 2015 and a magnitude-7.3 aftershock on May 12, 2015.

In April 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake occurred in central Nepal, with an epicenter approximately 80 km (50 mi) from the capital city of Kathmandu. The U.S. military was a first responder to this disaster as part of Operation Sahayogi Haat. Days after the earthquake, a DOD Joint Humanitarian Assessment Support Team (JHAST) with approximately 20 military personnel arrived in Nepal to assist with the aftermath of the quake.

2.3 Economic Overview

The economies of the Asia-Pacific region have seen dramatic changes since the end of the Vietnam War. Most countries in the region have moved rapidly from being societies serving as suppliers to Western markets and colonial powers in the region, to being active and significant participants in the modern and global free market system. The significant economic changes in the region are primarily due to economic liberalization, globalization, and growing markets. The participation of Asia-Pacific countries in the world economy over the last 60 years has led to staggering economic growth in the region. The region contains some of the busiest and most important maritime shipping and trading routes in the world, including the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, as well as nine of the world's ten largest ports.

By most estimates, China has surpassed the United States as the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). China has moved from a centrally planned economy to one that takes advantage of market opportunities. Japan has become one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world and is the world's third largest economy. South Korea has grown to become a high-tech, industrialized economy, and it is now the world's 12th largest economy. With the exception of North Korea, most economies in Northeast Asia have been growing steadily since the 1960s, although globalization trends have created new challenges for regional economies. Today, Taiwan maintains an advanced industrial economy as a result of rapid economic growth and industrialization in the late twentieth century.

Between 1960 and the late 1990s, the Four Asian Tigers – Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore – became economic powers notable for maintaining exceptionally high growth rates (often more than seven percent a year) and rapid industrialization. By the twenty-first century, all four had developed advanced, high-income economies. Hong Kong and Singapore have become international financial centers, while South Korea and Taiwan are the world's leading manufacturers of information technology. Their economic success stories have served as role models for many developing countries.

Four Asian Tigers: *Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore make up the group known as the Four Asian Tigers, a term used to refer to these four highly free-market and developed economies in the region.*

In South Asia, India is the world's seventh-largest economy (when ranked by its nominal gross domestic product [GDP]), and is the third-largest (when ranked by purchasing power parity [PPP]). India is classified as a newly industrialized country, one of the G-20 major economies, and a member of BRICS – an acronym used for the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. India's developing economy had an average annual growth rate of approximately seven percent over the last two decades. India's economy became the world's fastest-growing major economy in the last quarter of 2014, replacing China.

Gini Coefficient: *Also referred to as the Gini Index or Gini Ratio, this is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation's residents, and is the most commonly used measure of income inequality.*

While there are still pockets of extreme poverty throughout the region, particularly in rural areas where incomes grow at a much slower pace than in cities, many countries in the USPACOM AOR have made significant strides in the last decade to close the wealth gap, with many now having a better Gini Coefficient than the United States.

2.3.1 Manufacturing Industry

Manufacturing is one of the strongest sectors in Northeast Asia, especially in South Korea and Japan, which are home to large companies such as Samsung, Hyundai, Toyota, and Honda. Japan and Taiwan are also producers of advanced electronic equipment. A major portion of China's economic success stems from manufacturing products for export. The United States relies heavily on imports from China, including everything from toys to electronics to furniture. China has also rapidly developed an automobile production industry that exports to countries throughout the world.

In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have become markets for global investors, and have expanded their economic focus from the production of purely raw materials and

agriculture, to the export of more advanced goods, such as electronics, semiconductors, and automobiles. Southeast Asia's manufacturing capacity has grown at a staggering rate over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The growth of Southeast Asia's labor force in the "fastest five" (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) has been more than twice China's growth rate each year from 2005 to 2009.⁷³ Important industries in the region range from textiles to semiconductors. The textile industry is a key industry in Thailand and Burma, while Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines have robust electronic products industries. While international foreign direct investment (FDI) in Southeast Asia has increased significantly, the region's governments have only recently liberalized trade and investment policies, and have just begun to implement more transparent regulations to combat corruption in economic sectors.

In South Asia, India's industrial sector underwent significant changes as a result of the economic liberalization reforms of 1991. This removed import restrictions, brought in foreign competition, led to the privatization of certain government-owned public sector industries, liberalized the FDI regime, improved infrastructure, and led to an expansion in the production of fast-moving consumer goods.⁷⁴ In Bangladesh, the economy has maintained macroeconomic stability, despite political turmoil, energy shortages, and infrastructure deficits. Constant political unrest reduced economic growth by one percentage point, with growth in 2015 being at 5.6 percent. However, a recovery driven by strong domestic demand is possible, according to the World Bank, but will require an improved investment climate and political stability.⁷⁵ The economy of Bangladesh is increasingly led by export-oriented industrialization. The Bangladesh textile industry is the second-largest in the world. Other key sectors include pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding, ceramics, leather goods, and electronics.

2.3.2 Agriculture

Agriculture remains a crucial aspect of Southeast Asian economies. Cash crops are agricultural products grown for profit, with many Southeast Asian cash crops sold via export markets. Regional cash crops include palm oil, rubber, coffee, cocoa, sugar, and sweet potatoes, among others. In most of Southeast Asia, people living in the rural countryside are impoverished and rely on subsistence agriculture to survive. The cornerstone of agricultural production in Southeast Asia is rice, as nearly every country in the region is engaged in wet rice cultivation.



Figure 2-20: Rice harvest in Burma. Source: USAID.⁷⁶

The countries of Southeast Asia and their thousands of islands have long coastlines. Hence, fishing is a significant aspect of the overall economies in the region. For coastal Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, fish is an especially important export commodity. Technological advances have allowed for faster fishing boats that can go further to catch more fish. However, this has also started to produce negative results. Those in the fishing industry today go beyond their traditional locations to catch fish. Overfishing of waters, fishing in off-limit waters, and competing for fish in congested waters have left overcrowded fishing areas of the sea with less fish. Furthermore, maritime fishing areas are polluted from fossil fueled engines and the dumping of garbage.

Agriculture continues to play a significant role in the lives and economies of South Asia. India ranks second worldwide in farm output. Agriculture and allied sectors like forestry, logging, and fishing accounted for 17 percent of the GDP and employed 49 percent of the total workforce in 2014.⁷⁷ As the Indian economy has diversified and grown, agriculture's contribution to GDP has steadily declined from 1951 to 2011, yet it is still the region's largest employer, and is a significant contributor to the overall socio-economic development of India.⁷⁸ For Bangladesh, being situated in one of the most fertile regions on Earth, agriculture plays a crucial role, with most Bangladeshis still earning their living from agriculture. The principal cash crops of Bangladesh include rice, jute, tea, wheat, and sugarcane.

2.3.3 Informal Economy

While the formal sector of a nation's economy is taxed, monitored, or regulated by the government, the informal economy is part of the economy that is not taxed, monitored, or regulated. Unlike the formal economy, informal economic activity is not included in the GNP (gross national product) or GDP (gross domestic product) of a country. Informal industries such as street vendors and operators of food carts are included in the informal economy, as well as day laborers and other jobs primarily filled by the poverty-stricken segments of society. Other aspects of the informal economy include the black market and various illegal markets such as human and sex trafficking, as well as the illicit drug trade.

The informal economy in Northeast Asia includes the manufacturing and sale of pirated goods and copies and counterfeits of brand-name products. While the government of China has official laws to combat pirating and illegal manufacturing, these laws are rarely enforced. North Korea is also a producer of not only pirated materials but also illicit drugs. With China as its biggest consumer, North Korea illegally supplies synthetic drugs to an increasing population of Chinese drug users. Human trafficking is also a major concern in the region. China has a thriving domestic black market in children. Most of the children are bought or kidnapped by gangs who force them into pick-pocketing and other non-violent crime in the larger coastal cities. Children might also end up in a prostitution network or become illegally adopted. China's one-child policy, formally changed to a two-child policy in late 2015, established the preference for male children and continues to create a gender imbalance. As a result, both infants and adults are bought and sold to counter the problem of gender imbalance. Women are trafficked domestically and from neighboring countries to the north and south of the mainland; they are usually sold as brides to young bachelors in rural areas who have been unable to find a potential wife in their own community.

A vibrant informal economy also exists in much of Southeast Asia. Many impoverished people use the unregulated informal economy as a way to make ends meet. Many of these workers operate as unregistered street vendors. In Bangkok, Thailand, there are about 380,000 food vendors who are not part of the formal economy. In local markets throughout the region, goods are often traded directly rather than purchased with national currencies. Southeast Asia also accounts for one-third of the world's sex industry; this illicit business, in this region alone, is a nearly \$10 billion a year industry, is completely unregulated, and is part of the informal economy. It is estimated that 30 to 35 percent of all sex workers in Southeast Asia are between 12 and 17 years of age. The Cambodian government reports that 37 percent of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation are children.⁷⁹

2.3.4 Regional Economic Frameworks

Regional economic organizations, trading blocs, and free trade agreements (FTAs) have been expanding rapidly throughout the various regions of the USPACOM AOR, impacting the economies of the region by

providing mutual benefits from imports, exports, and investments. FTAs can be bilateral, regional, or multinational. Some of the most significant regional economic frameworks in the region include the following:

2.3.4.1 ASEAN:

In Southeast Asia, a key component in the trade agreements is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) trading bloc. ASEAN was established in August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, as a political and economic organization of 10 Southeast Asian nations, to promote economic growth, regional security, social progress, and cultural development in the region. The countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand were the first signatories. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Countries such as Japan, China, and South Korea form ASEAN Plus 3, and these countries are included in many ASEAN meetings. The ASEAN secretariat is based in Jakarta, Indonesia.

2.3.4.2 SAARC:

In South Asia, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an economic and political organization of eight countries located in South Asia. The organization was established in December 1985 by the governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In 2005, Afghanistan was added as a member. The SAARC Secretariat is based in Kathmandu, Nepal. In 2006, SAARC member nations implemented an agreement known as the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), creating a free trade area throughout South Asia, agreeing to gradually reduce customs duties of all traded goods down to zero by 2016, and aiming to increase overall trade and economic cooperation throughout South Asia.

2.3.4.3 SASEC:

The South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) program is another economic framework in South Asia, which includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The program was established in 2001, and is a project-based partnership with the goal of promoting regional prosperity by improving cross-border ties, boosting trade among member countries, and strengthening regional economic cooperation.⁸⁰

2.3.4.4 APEC:

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a multinational, multi-regional forum for 21 Pacific Rim member economies that promotes free trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region. APEC was established in 1989 in response to the growing interdependence of Asia-Pacific economies and the establishment of regional trade blocs in other parts of the world. The organization is headquartered in Singapore and includes the following 21 economic powers located around the rim of the Pacific Ocean:

- Northeast Asia: China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan*, Hong Kong**
- Southeast Asia: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
- Oceania: Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea
- North America: United States of America, Canada, Mexico
- South America: Chile, Peru
- Others: Russia

* Due to the complexities of relations between Taiwan (Republic of China [ROC]) and China (People's Republic of China [PRC]), Taiwan is not represented under its official name "Republic of China" or as "Taiwan." Instead, it participates in APEC under the name "Chinese Taipei."

** Hong Kong joined APEC in 1991 during British administration with the name "Hong Kong." In 1997, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, and took the name "Hong Kong, China."

2.4 People and Societies

The Indo-Asia-Pacific is home to over half of the world's population, with a projected growth rate that is set to make the region home to 70 percent of the world's population by 2050.⁸¹ Along with being the most populous geographic combatant command, it also contains some of the most densely populated urban centers in the world, including eight of the world's 10 largest mega-cities. The region is home to some of the oldest civilizations in the world. It is also one of the most culturally, ethnically, linguistically, and socio-economically diverse areas in the world. Additionally, the 36 nations comprising the USPACOM AOR are home to a wide range of religious, geopolitical, and cultural systems, as well as over 3,000 different languages. In Papua New Guinea alone, about 750 indigenous languages have been identified.⁸²

2.4.1 Population Trends and Distribution

2.4.1.1 *Northeast Asia*

The countries that make up Northeast Asia are home to more than 1.6 billion people, with the vast majority of that population (80 percent) located in mainland China.⁸³ Industrialization in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan was largely responsible for the rapid population growth in these countries during the second half of the twentieth century. Urbanization percentages are the proportion of a country or region's population that lives in urban areas, as compared to the percentage of the population that lives in rural areas. This varies dramatically throughout the USPACOM AOR. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, rapid economic growth is closely linked with urbanization levels. Generally, more developed countries have relatively high levels of urbanization. Higher-income countries in the USPACOM AOR have an average urbanized proportion of 75 percent, while the less-developed countries of the region have an average urbanization percentage of 27 percent.⁸⁴

As the most populous country in the world, China adopted a one-child-per family policy in 1980. This policy was designed to stabilize the population by the end of first half of the twenty-first century. While the policy was effective in curbing the population growth rate, there were also significant problems that resulted as a consequence of China's population policy. This included forced abortions, sterilizations, and infanticide. Abortion of female fetuses became common due to the traditional preference for males. Faced with compounding social problems created by this policy, the Chinese government eliminated it in late 2015 and began to allow all couples to have two children.

Japan has been struggling with a birthrate decline for decades. Because of costs and the pressure of long and demanding work schedules, many Japanese opt not to have children. It is predicted that Japan's population will shrink from its current population of 127 million down to 87 million by the year 2060. Furthermore, as much as 40 percent of that population could likely be 65 or older.⁸⁵ The current Japanese government has become increasingly focused on this population issue, and has even considered relaxing its strict immigration policy to increase its declining and ageing population.

While overall population rates may be in decline in Northeast Asia, the region has seen a rapid increase in the percentage of its population living in urban centers -- due primarily to rapid economic growth. Approximately 55 percent of China's population is urban -- a significant increase from 25 percent urbanization in 1975. Population density varies across China, with the greatest number of people living in the eastern half of the country, and the least number of people living in the west and northwest. Between 2000 and 2030, it is estimated that an additional 400 million Chinese will migrate from rural areas to cities. As a result, China is expected to account for half of the world's building construction activity during that period.

Urban areas in Northeast Asia are densely populated because of employment opportunities and available services and amenities. However, rich agricultural land and water availability also influence choice of location. North Koreans have generally settled along the coastline, leaving the interior sparsely settled. The percentage of South Korea's urban population is estimated to be at 82.5 percent as of 2015. Taiwan's heavily populated urban areas have extended past the official city limits, forming large metropolitan areas, which are now home to nearly 70 percent of Taiwan's total population.⁸⁶

2.4.1.2 *Southeast Asia*

Around 625 million people live in the Southeast Asia region, with more than a fifth of them (143 million) residing on the Indonesian island of Java, the most densely populated large island in the world. Indonesia is the most populous country in Southeast Asia, with over 255 million people as of 2015. Indonesia is the fourth-most populous country in the world.

The Philippines, Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei tend to have higher population growth rates. Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia have considerably lower population growth rates, primarily because these countries have implemented effective family-planning programs. The child mortality rate in the Southeast Asia has dropped by nearly 50 percent in the last two decades.⁸⁷ In more-developed Southeast Asia nations -- such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand -- health care programs for infants and children administered by international organizations and NGOs have contributed significantly to this drop in infant deaths. However, the absence of these health care programs in countries like Cambodia and Laos accounts for higher mortality rates in these countries.

In Southeast Asia, river valleys, deltas, and major maritime trading ports positioned along trading routes between India and China are areas where early population centers and major kingdoms took root. Agriculture and maritime trade have led to the development of two different kinds of classical Southeast Asian states: mainland states based on the cultivation and sale of rice, and maritime states based on trade. Southeast Asia is predominantly rural: three-fourths of the people live in non-urban areas. Moreover, populations are heavily clustered in fertile river valleys and delta areas, such as those of the Mekong and Irrawaddy Rivers.

Upland and higher-elevation areas have lower population densities, and greater variability in language, culture, and ethnicity. Because of this, there is also greater political fragmentation. Lowland and lower

elevation areas of Southeast Asia -- where the people engage primarily in wet-rice farming -- generally have much larger areas of language similarity, higher population densities, and greater political integration.

Java and other urban centers such as Bangkok (Thailand), Hanoi (Vietnam), Manila (Philippines), and Singapore have high population densities. Singapore is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with 7,987 people per square kilometer.⁸⁸ With so many areas with such high population densities -- combined with the fact that many of these countries share a land-based or maritime border with China, the world's fastest-growing economy -- the competition for finite resources have increased dramatically in the last decade. This creates the potential for environmental crises, civil unrest, and/or military conflicts.

2.4.1.3 South Asia

The population of South Asia -- delineated by USPACOM to include India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bhutan -- is nearly 1.5 billion, according to July 2015 estimates,⁸⁹ only slightly behind Northeast Asia as the most populated area on Earth. The vast majority of the population of South Asia (over 1.2 billion) resides in India. India, already home to 17.5 percent of the world's population, is projected to be the world's most populous country by 2050, surpassing China, with its population expected to reach 1.6 billion by 2050.

Throughout the early to mid-twentieth century, less-developed countries were generally characterized by high fertility levels. Recognizing that a surging population could be an impediment to socioeconomic development, governments in South Asia implemented programs that promoted family planning and provided better access to quality health services. As a result, during the last quarter of the twentieth century many countries in this region have experienced a decline in fertility levels and improved life expectancy. However, since the turn of the twenty-first century, the age structure in these countries has increasingly shifted toward higher age groups. In South Asia, population ageing, defined as an increase in the proportion of older persons (those aged 60 years and over) in the general population, has emerged as a dominant demographic trend.⁹⁰

Even with some of the most populated and most densely populated urban centers in the world, most South Asian countries continue to rely heavily on agriculture. Thus, South Asia has a relatively low percentage of its total population living in urban centers. India's population is 32 percent urban, the population in Bangladesh is 34 percent urban, while urbanized people living in Nepal and Sri Lanka are both around 18 percent of the total population. Because Bhutan and the Maldives are considerably smaller, the urban percentage is somewhat higher -- 38 and 45 percent, respectively. However, generally, the South Asian countries with the lowest levels of urbanization are also those with the fastest urban growth rates. Also, for the first time since India's independence in 1947, the absolute increase in the country's urban population was higher than that in the rural population.⁹¹

Rapid urbanization rates have given rise to several significant issues, including urban poverty, the percentage of the urban population living in slums, crime and terrorism, homelessness, traffic congestion and air pollution, urban sprawl and gentrification, and the use of limited energy and material resources. Dhaka, Bangladesh, with a population of 18.25 million, has the highest population growth rate in the world. About 28 percent of the population is poor and about 3.4 million people live in slums. Furthermore, close to one third of Dhaka's urban population does not have access to sanitation.⁹²

2.4.2 Megacities

The growth of "megacities" is on the rise due to high numbers of people living in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and high rates of rural-to-urban migration. Megacities are defined as cities with a population that exceeds 10 million people. A megacity can be an urban area consisting of a single metropolitan area, or two or more metropolitan areas that converge into a metropolis. As of 2016, there are 35 megacities in existence, with Chennai, India being the latest addition to the list. Out of the world's 35 megacities, 18 are in the USPACOM AOR, including 8 of the 10 largest megacities in the world.

<i>World's 10 Largest Urban Centers, 2015⁹³</i>			
<u>Rank</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Population (millions)</u>
1	Tokyo-Yokohoma	Japan	37.8
2	Jakarta	Indonesia	30.5
3	Delhi	India	25.0
4	Manila	Philippines	24.1
5	Seoul-Incheon	South Korea	23.5
6	Shanghai	China	23.4
7	Karachi	Pakistan	22.1
8	Beijing	China	21.0
9	New York	United States	20.6
10	Guangzhou-Foshan	China	20.6

2.4.3 Ethnic Groups

2.4.3.1 *Northeast Asia*

The countries that make up Northeast Asia have relatively homogenous populations. Nearly 92 percent of China's population belongs to the majority Han Chinese ethnic group. Virtually 100 percent of the population in Japan belongs to the same ethnic group – the Yamato. Like Japan, North and South Korea also have a 100 percent homogenous ethnic composition. In Taiwan, 84 percent are Taiwanese, and 14 percent identify with mainland Chinese ethnicity, primarily the Han Chinese. The indigenous Taiwanese community makes up about two percent of the population. In Mongolia, about 82 percent of the people are of the Khalkh ethnicity.⁹⁴

Major ethnic groups in Northeast Asia:

- Han (China)
- Yamato (Japan)
- Korean (North and South Korea)
- Khalkh or Halh (Mongolia)

Other significant ethnic groups include:

- Zhuang and Manchu (China)
- Tibetan (Tibet Autonomous Region)
- Uighur (China's northwestern Xinjiang Province)

Despite being largely homogeneous, some of countries in Northeast Asia face problems due to ethnic rivalry. Taiwanese aborigines continue to press the government of Taiwan for self-rule. While Mongolians generally get along with their northern Russian neighbors, many resent the growing presence of Chinese in their country. Furthermore, although the two Koreas share a history, language, and ethnicity, they are in direct opposition and conflict due to differing political ideologies: North Korea is a politically and economically isolated Communist dictatorship; South Korea is an economically prosperous democracy.

In China, although each of China's distinct ethnic groups is officially recognized, some harbor resentment toward the ethnic majority Han people. In Tibet and Xinjiang provinces, the native populations are ethnically and culturally different from the main Han population, and have repeatedly found themselves at odds with the policies of the Chinese government. Xinjiang was incorporated into China when the Chinese Communist Party established the PRC in 1949. Tibet was annexed almost two years later through military force.

2.4.3.2 *Southeast Asia*

Southeast Asia's population includes a wide variety of ethnic groups and cultures. The Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Southeast Asia, with more than 100 million people, mostly concentrated in Java, Indonesia. In addition to the Javanese, the Sundanese also dominate Indonesia as the country's second-largest ethnic group. However, there are also dozens of additional, smaller ethnic and culturally indigenous groups living in areas spread across nearly 6,400 km (4,000 mi) of archipelago in Indonesia. In Burma, the Burmese account for about 68 percent of the population in the country, while ethnic Thais (96 percent) and Vietnamese (86 percent) account for the vast majority of the respective populations of those countries. Similarly, Cambodia is made up of about 90 percent Khmer people. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Singapore are multiethnic societies consisting primarily of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Within the Philippines, the Tagalog ethnic group is the largest, comprising about 28 percent of the population, with other ethnic groups such as the Cebuano, Ilocano, Bisaya, and Hiligaynon, among others, also being significant.⁹⁵

Linguistically, the influence of Chinese has spread via immigrants into many parts of Southeast Asia, especially to Singapore, where a majority of the people are of Chinese descent and speak mostly Mandarin or Yue Chinese. Indian influence is also evident in the region, as there are also significant numbers of Tamil and Hindi speakers.

2.4.3.3 South Asia

The ethnic composition of the peoples of South Asia is significantly diverse. The vast majority of the population of the countries of South Asia falls into one of two large ethno-linguistic groups: Indo-Aryan and Dravidian. Indo-Aryans are the majority, and form the predominant ethno-linguistic group in northern India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Dravidians form the predominant ethno-linguistic group in southern India and the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka.

However, while Indo-Aryan and Dravidian are terms used to describe ethno-linguistic identity, these terms are not commonly used as a form of identification of self or others in the region. Rather, ethnic identity is strongly linked to the specific languages spoken by various communities in South Asia, or by the caste or clan into which a person was born. In this manner, over 2,000 ethnic identities can be identified, with populations for each ranging from hundreds of millions to small tribal groups with members in the hundreds. Dozens of major languages are spoken throughout South Asia, with the most prominent being Hindi, Bengali, Urdu, Punjabi, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Gujarati, Nepali, Sinhala, Kannada, and Malayalam. English is the official language spoken in government and business.




Figure 2-21: South Asian Language Families. Source: Wikimedia Commons.⁹⁶

2.4.4 Religion

There is a wide range of religions and belief systems practiced in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These religions include:

- Christianity and Islam (imported from the Middle East)
- Hinduism
- Buddhism
- Sikhism (imported from South Asia)
- Taoism
- Confucianism

- Shintoism (largely practiced in Northeast Asia)
- indigenous shamanist, animist, and other folk religions (largely practiced in remote areas)

The religious beliefs of this region are vast and represent the immense human diversity present in the USPACOM AOR.

2.4.4.1 South Asia

Many world religions originated in South Asia, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism. The region is also home to a huge Muslim population.

Hinduism: Hinduism is the world's third-largest religion, after Christianity and Islam, in terms of global population. It is often referred to as the "world's oldest religion," tracing its roots back to at least the Vedic period in India, beginning around 1750 BC. Hinduism developed without a single founder and formed as a collection of philosophies revolving around multiple deities and a diverse set of beliefs, rituals, and practices. Today, Hinduism is primarily practiced in India and Nepal, with about 80 percent of the populations of each of those countries identifying as Hindus.

Islam: Islam is the second-largest religion in South Asia, after Hinduism. Arab traders first brought Islam to South Asia, initially to present-day Kerala on the west coast of India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, as early as the seventh century AD. Later, northwestern portions of the subcontinent were conquered by Arab leaders, followed by Turkic and Afghan conquerors who further spread the Islamic faith and culture. Islamic rule was particularly consolidated throughout virtually the entire subcontinent under the Mughal Empire (1526-1857), as they expanded control east to Bengal and south to the Deccan. The role of Sufi mystics played another major role in the spread of Islam in South Asia; today, the region is dotted with the shrines of these Muslim saints. Sufism has played – and continues to play – a significant role in the way Islam is practiced. Today, over 14 percent of the population of India and nearly 90 percent of Bangladesh is Muslim, along with nearly the entire population of the Maldives. The majority of Muslims in South Asia belong to the majority Sunni branch of Islam, with a sizable Muslim minority (estimates range from 20-30 percent) belonging to the Shi'a sect. There are also significant Muslim communities living as minorities in Nepal and Sri Lanka.⁹⁷

Sikhism: Sikhism is a monotheistic religion that originated during the fifteenth century in the Punjab region of South Asia, an area that today overlaps both India and Pakistan. This religion is based on the teachings of its founder, Guru Nanak. Sikhism has a following of roughly 27 million adherents worldwide, with the vast majority of Sikhs living in India; and about 76 percent of all Sikhs living in the northwestern Indian state of Punjab, where they form a majority.⁹⁸ Sikhism arose in an area with major Muslim and Hindu populations at a time when most of South Asia was being ruled by the Mughal Empire. Thus, the religion is based on elements that were incorporated from both Islam (a belief in one God) and Hinduism (the concepts of reincarnation and karma). There are many similarities between Sikhism and Islam, yet there are also significant differences: Sikh men grow beards and wear turbans; Sikhs also take pride in having a religion that is distinctly separate from Islam. Historically, Sikhs have even been in occasional conflict with Muslim and Hindu communities in India as a result of being persecuted.

Jainism: Jainism is an ancient Indian religion based on the teachings of a series of 24 spiritual leaders, or *Tirthankara*, with the last of these leaders being Mahavira, who lived in the sixth century BC. Followers of this religious path, who are called Jains, claim that Jainism is an eternal religion that has always existed. The religion shares common spiritual elements with Hinduism but is a separate and distinct religion. One of the primary teachings of Jainism is *ahimsa*, or nonviolence, toward all living things. Once a major

religion, Jainism declined due to a number of factors, including proselytizing by other religious groups, persecution, withdrawal of royal patronage, sectarian fragmentation, and the absence of central leadership. Since the time of Mahavira, Jainism faced rivalry with Buddhism and various Hindu sects as well.⁹⁹ Today, there are an estimated 4.5 million followers of Jainism, mostly residing in India.¹⁰⁰

2.4.4.2 Northeast Asia

In Northeast Asia, many people practice a mixture of several kinds of religions. The most practiced religious systems are Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Shintoism, Taoism, shamanism, and animism. Indigenous folk beliefs are often mixed in with more formal religious practices.

Buddhism: Buddhism arose in a Hindu region in what is now northern India and southern Nepal based on the life and teachings of Gautama Buddha, who lived sometime between the sixth and fourth centuries BC. Although Buddhism arose from within a Hindu social context in South Asia, Buddhism developed a separate religious identity and spread into the regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia over the centuries that followed its founding. Buddhism eventually became the dominant religion of these regions, while diminishing in numbers and influence in India itself, where Hinduism continued to remain the dominant religion. Buddhism split into the Theravada and Mahayana sects around 100 AD, with Mahayana spreading eastward and northward, entering Tibet in the mid-650s AD. There, Mahayana Buddhism developed into a third sect called Vajrayana. Most of the population of eastern China, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan practice the Mahayana sect of Buddhism. However, Mongolia and Tibet in southwestern China are known for their practice of the more esoteric Vajrayana Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism has largely been relegated to mainland Southeast Asia.




Figure 2-22: Historical Expansion of Buddhism. Source: Wikimedia Commons.¹⁰¹

Shintoism: In addition to Buddhism, most Japanese also practice Shintoism, an ethnic Japanese religion comprised of a collection of native beliefs and mythology focused on ritual practices and public shrines devoted to worship of a multitude of gods, or *kami*. The syncretic nature of belief systems in much of the region is apparent in the expression: “We live as Shintoists, but die as Buddhists,” a common saying among the Japanese.

Others: In Mongolia, Buddhism is practiced by roughly 53 percent of the population, with pockets of Muslim and Christian minority populations as well. In addition to these, shamanism is also widely practiced. Shamanism involves its practitioners – known as shamans – entering a trance during which an external spirit is believed to enter their body, allowing the shaman to perform exorcisms so as to relieve pain, illness, and bad luck in people’s lives.

In Korea, Cheondoism (Cheondogyo), or the “Heavenly Way,” is another prominent religious system that originated as a twentieth century Korean religious movement that incorporates aspects of neo-Confucianism, Korean shamanism, as well as Taoism and Buddhism. Cheondoism is widely practiced in South Korea and is practiced in North Korea as well. In North Korea, while freedom of religion and the right to religious ceremonies are constitutionally guaranteed, in reality, religions are restricted in practice.

The Chinese government is officially atheist, but religious observance is on the rise, with more than 45 percent of the population identifying as observers, while 52 percent continue to remain religiously unaffiliated.¹⁰² The government recognizes only certain state-approved religions, including Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism; although for political reasons, the Chinese Catholic Church is not associated with the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, religious organizations and activity are still heavily monitored and regulated by the Communist Party. Muslim Uighurs, Buddhist Tibetans, unregistered Christians, and groups that the party brands as cults, such as Falun Gong, face stiff persecution and repression from the PRC government.

2.4.4.3 *Southeast Asia*

Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity are the most widely practiced religions in Southeast Asia, with Hinduism practiced to a lesser extent in certain communities.

Islam: Islam is predominant in Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, in terms of population, with over 87 percent of Indonesia’s population being Muslim. As a result of the large Muslim population in Indonesia, Islam is the religion of some two-fifths of Southeast Asians overall. The spread of Islam to the region, particularly to Indonesia, began in the early fourteenth century through contact with Muslim traders in northern Sumatra. While Indonesia is predominantly Muslim, the government also officially recognizes Christianity (Protestantism and Catholicism), Hinduism, and Buddhism.

Buddhism: Although in sheer numbers there are more followers of Islam in Southeast Asia as a whole, the majority of Southeast Asian countries are predominantly Buddhist. The more orthodox Theravada sect dominates most of the mainland of Southeast Asia, including Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The more liberal Mahayana form of Buddhism is more commonly practiced in Vietnam.

Christianity: Christians account for less than 25 percent of Southeast Asia’s total population, and are most prevalent in the maritime region due to European contact and colonization of the area. Roman Catholicism was introduced to maritime Southeast Asia, particularly to the Philippines, by the Spanish and the Portuguese in the sixteenth century and, somewhat later, to the mainland by the French. Catholicism is most important in the Philippines and Timor-Leste, where a majority of the population is Catholic. Additionally, Catholicism has a significant presence in southern Vietnam. Protestantism is also locally important. The Batak and Minangkabau peoples in Sumatra -- and a growing number of Chinese in Singapore and elsewhere -- adhere to various Protestant denominations. Meanwhile, about 90 percent of Solomon Islanders are professed Christians.

Hinduism: Hinduism, once much more widespread in Southeast Asia, now is practiced by many people in the region's Indian communities. In addition, Hinduism, modified by animism and other native influences, is the primary faith of the Balinese people on the island of Bali in Indonesia. Various forms of animism also are practiced in the region's more remote areas, particularly in the central parts of the Indonesian island of Borneo, northern Laos, and northern Burma.¹⁰³

2.5 Government and Political Overview

All of the regions in the USPACOM AOR, including Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, have seen drastic political transformation since the end of WWII. For most countries in the AOR, this began with independence from colonial rule and the establishment of various regimes and forms of governance that ranged from democracies to one-party Communist rule to parliamentary monarchies. Over the past six to seven decades, political norms have since changed and most of the countries of the region have evolved towards various forms of democratic government, including parliamentary and presidential democracies, as well as constitutional monarchies. There are a few notable and obvious exceptions, however, as the region is also home to four of the five remaining openly Communist states in the world: China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos. The only other state in the world still officially espousing Communism is Cuba. Other countries are continuing to evolve politically, as 2010 saw Burma hold its first democratic elections in 50 years.

2.5.1 Northeast Asia

The types of governments in Northeast Asia range from democracies to dictatorships. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is a Communist state founded in 1949. When Mao Zedong helped to establish the republic, he installed his comrades from the Red Army in the highest government posts. Corruption is widespread throughout all levels of government in China. A large portion of contemporary China's government is made up of the children and relatives of the original founding party members. These descendants have virtually inherited the government, making up the majority of the Politburo Standing Committee, a committee consisting of the top leadership of the Communist Party of China. Furthermore, these leaders and their families enjoy lives well outside the reach of the average Chinese citizen. Their college-age children often attend prestigious universities overseas, drive exotic cars, and live in penthouses. These ubiquitous displays of wealth by civil servants highlight the disparaging income gap and serve as constant reminders to regular citizens of the levels of corruption in the government. Generally speaking, the Communist Party enjoys a relative stability, but unresolved social issues stand to destabilize the government if progress is not made to eradicate the problems. Furthermore, protests in Hong Kong in 2014 served to further illustrate that not all citizens of China are happy with a one-party Communist system.

Japan has a parliamentary constitutional monarchy as its system of government, whereby the power of the Emperor is limited and largely symbolic. As a ceremonial figurehead, he is defined by the constitution as "the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people." Power is held chiefly by the prime minister and other elected members of the Diet – the Japanese parliament. Japan continues to be a major strategic ally and trade partner of the United States. The Japanese generation of younger leaders, now taking over from the post-World War II leadership, are referred to as "prosperity's children." While the new generation of Japanese leaders share many of the conservative values of their elders, their biggest concern is domestic economic reform: they wish to remake traditional modes of Japanese capitalism that

prolonged the recession in the 1990s. This generation is also more receptive to Japanese defense forces participation in international peacekeeping or nation-building missions.

Hong Kong: Occupied by the British in 1841, Hong Kong was formally ceded to the English by China the following year; various adjacent lands were added later in the nineteenth century. Pursuant to an agreement signed by China and the United Kingdom on December 19, 1984, Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC on July 1, 1997. In this agreement, China promised that, under its "one country, two systems" formula, China's socialist economic system would not be imposed on Hong Kong, and that Hong Kong would enjoy a "high degree of autonomy" in all matters except foreign and defense affairs for the subsequent 50 years.

South Korea, officially referred to as the Republic of Korea (ROK), is officially a presidential constitutional republic, with a president and a prime minister. Much like the United States, ROK government is divided into three branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial. Although South Korea experienced a series of military dictatorships from the 1960s until the 1980s, it has since developed into a successful liberal democracy.

North of the 38th Parallel, North Korea, which is officially referred to as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is ruled under a one-party totalitarian dictatorship dominated by the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). The state officially describes itself as a self-reliant socialist state, based on the policies of *Juche* (national self-reliance) and *Songun* ("military-first"). The WPK was founded by Kim Il-Sung, who closed off North Korea from virtually all outside contact and transformed the DPRK into a hereditary monarchy based on an elaborate cult of personality revolving around himself and his family. Kim Il-Sung, who died in 1994, is the country's "Eternal President," while his son, Kim Jong-Il, was announced "Eternal General Secretary" after his death in 2011. Kim Jong-Un, the third generation of the Kim family, is currently the Supreme Commander of the DPRK, and thus the head of all major governing and military institutions, including the WPK, which currently has an estimated 3 million members and dominates every aspect of North Korean politics. Un has been accused of causing major shake-ups within the party's elite circles, including ordering the death of his uncle. Because it is such a reclusive state, very little about North Korea can be verified. However, it is widely accepted that aside from the Kim family's close acquaintances, high-ranking military officials, and others who make up the country's elite; the majority of people live in poverty and with little knowledge of the outside world.

2.5.2 Southeast Asia

Most countries in Southeast Asia held free elections immediately after independence. However, by the end of the 1960s, no functioning democracy existed in the region: most countries held elections, but the ruling party always won. This matched the general pattern seen in other countries that emerged from colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s, such as those in North Africa and the Middle East.

Beginning with the Philippines in 1986, many countries of the region have moved away from authoritarianism and gravitated toward democratic rule. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have all implemented democratic systems and procedures of some form or another, as have some of the smaller countries in the region. In 2010, Burma held its first democratic elections in nearly 50

years, taking promising steps away from military dictatorship, and opening up to international trade and increased bilateral relationships with other countries.

In the years following the Vietnam War, countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have experienced decades of relative stability. Vietnam is one of the world's few remaining one-party Communist states. The increasing role of Vietnam's national assembly in reviewing legislation and policies, coupled with a gradually more incisive media, have made the government of this country more transparent, but there are still limits on political opposition. Citizens who dare to question the actions of Vietnam's political leadership can be given long prison terms based on broad charges, such as "espionage" or "undermining national security."

Timor-Leste (East Timor) has been an independent state since 2002, following its independence from Indonesia. It is one of only two predominantly Christian nations in Southeast Asia, the other being the Philippines. Since 2006, the main threats to East Timor have been weak state institutions and rivalries between the ruling class and security forces. Extreme poverty, lack of infrastructure, unemployment, and population displacement continue to threaten Timor-Leste's existence.

Brunei, a very small oil-rich country, gained its independence from the British in 1984, and is governed by an Islamic Sultanate, which is essentially a monarchy. The current monarch, Hassanal Bolkiah, has reigned for nearly 50 years. Along with being the head of state, Bolkiah also serves as the state's prime minister, finance minister, and defense minister. The country is almost 80 percent Muslim; in 2014, despite international protests, the monarchy imposed a form of *sharia* law on the country.

While Thailand is also officially a monarchy, it has also experienced some political instability. In May 2014, the Thai army initiated a *coup d'état*: it imposed martial law, deployed troops in the capital, announced that it was taking control of the country, and suspended the country's constitution. The National Assembly of Thailand elected the army chief, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, as prime minister. Martial law officially ended in April 2015, and Prayut Chan-o-cha continues to remain the prime minister of Thailand. The military has ruled over Thailand either directly or indirectly for 56 of the 84 years since absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932.

The government of Cambodia is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The prime minister of Cambodia is Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge official who has held the office since 1985. Sen is the head of government, while the King of Cambodia (currently Norodom Sihamoni) is the head of state. Officially a multiparty democracy, "in reality the country remains a one-party state dominated by the Cambodian People's Party and Prime Minister Hun Sen."¹⁰⁴

While the growing economies of the region have reduced poverty and fostered the growth of the middle class, the region still grapples with political unrest, which creates regional instability and prevents better cooperation between governments. Additionally, corruption and political manipulation often limit effective political representation for the average citizen. Nepotism is prevalent in the region, and has been a hindrance to political development.¹⁰⁵ Personal connections based on tradition, religion, and centuries of practice affect the region's social and political landscape.

2.5.3 South Asia

South Asia is home to countries governed by various forms of democracy, most of them having been established after gaining independence – primarily from the British – in the mid-twentieth century. Each state has kept in place many of the institutional structures inherited from the British, primarily the concept

of parliamentary democracy, after the British withdrawal from the region in 1947. Sri Lanka and the Maldives are both presidential constitutional republics, with a mixture of a presidential system and a parliamentary system, whereas Bhutan is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, where the Druk Gyalpo (Dragon King) is the head of state of a parliamentary form of government.

India was established as a federal parliamentary republic since it became an independent state in 1947. It is world's most populous democracy, and operates as a representative democracy with a multi-party system. The government has six recognized national parties, including the two largest – the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as well as over 40 smaller regional parties. The Congress party is considered center-left in Indian political culture, while the BJP is a right-wing party dominated by a conservative Hindu nationalist ideology. The BJP is currently the world's largest political party in terms of primary membership. For most of the period between the country's independence and the late 1980s, the Congress held a majority in the parliament. Since then, however, it has increasingly shared the political stage with the BJP, as well as with powerful regional parties that have often forced the creation of multi-party coalitions at the center.¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁷

Bangladesh (formerly known as East Pakistan) became a sovereign, independent state in 1971 when it gained independence by seceding from what was then known as West Pakistan (modern-day Pakistan). The politics of Bangladesh takes place in the framework of a multiparty parliamentary representative democracy. Bangladesh, like Pakistan, has since independence shifted between democratically elected regimes and military takeovers. Traditionally, Bangladesh has been a two-party system since democracy was restored in 1990. However, concerns over the fairness of elections and annulment of the caretaker government system led to a boycott of the national election in 2014 by major opposition parties. Critics have accused the government of trying to turn Bangladesh into a dominant party state under the ruling Awami League party.¹⁰⁸

Nepal was a monarchy throughout much of its history, with rapid political changes during the last two decades transforming it from an absolute monarchy into a federal multiparty representative democracy. Nepal had been ruled by the Shah dynasty of kings from 1768. This began to change in 1990, when King Birendra, agreed to large-scale political reform after facing a widespread Communist movement by Maoist rebels. These reforms transformed the country into a parliamentary monarchy with the king as the head of state and a prime minister as the head of the government. However, in April 2006, an interim parliament was established and the king was forced to give up more power. In December 2007, a bill was passed officially making Nepal a federal republic, with a president as the head of state. This bill was adopted by an overwhelming majority of a newly-elected parliament in 2008, which also voted for the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a federal democratic republic, ordering King Gyanendra to leave the royal palace in Kathmandu. He abdicated and left the palace on June 11, 2008, bringing an end to Nepal's centuries-old monarchy.¹⁰⁹

2.6 Regional Security Issues

According to the Posture Statement delivered by Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 23, 2016, the USPACOM AOR deals with a number of significant regional security issues and challenges, including strategic intent and acts of provocation in the region by actors such as North Korea, Russia, and China. Additionally, the commander of USPACOM must contend with the issues of territorial and maritime disputes, the effects of climate change and natural disasters, violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking.

2.6.1 North Korea



Admiral Harris stated in his February 2016 USPACOM Posture Statement that North Korea remains “the most dangerous and unpredictable actor in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” as Kim Jung Un and the DPRK regime “regularly conduct provocative and escalatory actions,” and continues to propagate an aggressive attitude in advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile programs.¹¹⁰ USPACOM Commander highlighted that in January 2016, just one month prior

to the Posture Statement being delivered, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, the fourth since 2006, which violated its obligations and commitments under international law, including several UN Security Council Resolutions. Additionally, in February 2016, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test under the guise of launching a satellite. Admiral Harris asserted that these tests, coupled with the unprovoked landmine attack on South Korean soldiers in the DMZ in August 2015, are the latest in a series of actions intended to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, challenge South Korean President Park’s leadership, and raise tensions.¹¹¹

North Korea’s announcement on January 6, 2016 claiming to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb¹¹² has made it less likely that the country will live up to its international obligations and return -- despite urging from the international community -- to authentic credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework. North Korea’s unwillingness to discuss denuclearization commitments and its continuing nuclear tests

Six-Party Talks: The six-party talks are a framework in which regional countries in Northeast Asia aim to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns that have arisen due to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The first round of talks began in 2013 and include the following six states: North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States.

make the regime an ongoing challenge to security and stability in the region. According to the CDRUSPACOM, it is expected that North Korea will continue to promote ballistic missile development, to include mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles, and conduct missile launches and nuclear weapons tests in direct violation of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, such as the short-range ballistic missile launches in March 2015 and the alleged testing of a hydrogen bomb in January 2016. North Korea has repeatedly announced its intent to conduct “annual and regular” drills to advance this prohibited capability.¹¹³ Furthermore, North Korea has been accused of engaging in cyber warfare in order to damage computer systems at U.S.-based civilian companies, such as the hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014. North Korea continues to launch cyber-attacks against South Korean military and civilian networks. According to CDRUSPACOM, “North Korea refuses to abide by the rules and norms of the international community and represents a clear danger to regional peace, prosperity, and stability.”¹¹⁴

2.6.2 China



The People's Republic of China (PRC), the second largest economy in the world after the United States, has been asserting a greater role both economically and militarily throughout the Asia-Pacific region; it has increased its military presence and activity in disputed maritime territories in the region, and has made significant advancements in its military capabilities, operations, and missions. In his USPACOM Posture Statement delivered to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in April 2015, former CDRUSPACOM Samuel J. Locklear highlighted the fact that

senior PRC leaders, including PRC President Xi Jinping, have been seeking an alternative security framework in Asia that provides Beijing with an increased influence and diminishes the role of the United States. Locklear noted that this was highlighted at the "Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia," held in Shanghai in 2014, where President Xi Jinping called on all Asian nations to support the development of a new security order centered around China, which, in effect, pushed for a reduced influence of the United States in the region.¹¹⁵

Admiral Harris, the current CDRUSPACOM, has noted that China is carrying out a comprehensive military modernization program with the purpose of transforming its armed forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting complex operations, in order "to achieve its dream of regional dominance, with growing aspirations of global reach and influence." Furthermore, many of these initiatives are intended to develop capabilities to deter or counter third-party intervention in the region. These types of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are focused on controlling access and freedom of operations in vast portions of the air and maritime domains, as well as in space and cyberspace. These efforts include a series of sophisticated and increasingly long-range, anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space systems.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, China is making significant strides in electronic warfare capabilities, which contribute to the A2AD challenge.

Additionally, the Chinese Navy is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as expanding the area and duration of its operations and exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and more frequent contact; thus, the risk of an accident or a miscalculation increases. Therefore, it has become a high priority to make efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust in order to reduce risk. According to former CDRUSPACOM Locklear's Posture Statement, "The complexity of the regional and global security environment, as well as China's military advancements, necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interests converge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during periods of friction."¹¹⁷

According to USPACOM, "The United States believes that a strong U.S.-China partnership is essential for peace, prosperity, and both regional and global security," stating that "The U.S. continues to welcome a prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs, but China's growing military capabilities coupled with its lack of transparency is concerning." Therefore, USPACOM calls for efforts to pursue a more transparent, enduring, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship between the United States and China by maintaining "a consistent and meaningful dialogue to prevent miscommunication or miscalculation." USPACOM sees opportunities for cooperation in areas such as humanitarian relief and disaster response, counter-piracy efforts, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), military medicine, and maritime safety. According to USPACOM, such opportunities will enhance the U.S.-China bilateral relationship while working toward

common goals, candidly address differences, and demonstrate mutual commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.¹¹⁸

2.6.3 Russia



Like China, Russia has also been expanding its political and military presence in the Pacific, as highlighted by CDRUSPACOM Harris. He has stated that Russia is engaged politically and militarily in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and that while Russian activity is assertive, it is not confrontational. Ships and submarines of the Russian Pacific Fleet and long-range aircraft routinely demonstrate Russia's message that it is a Pacific power. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain especially active in the region. CDRUSPACOM further mentioned that

the arrival in late 2015 of Russia's newest class of nuclear ballistic missile submarine in the Far East is part of a modernization program for the Russian Pacific Fleet and signals the seriousness with which Moscow views this region.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, Russian BEAR bombers and reconnaissance aircraft regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan, and continue operations as far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental United States. Russia aims to demonstrate military capabilities commensurate with its Pacific interests: ensuring Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, and projecting a credible deterrent force.¹²⁰

2.6.4 Territorial and Maritime Disputes

South China Sea

Arguably, the most significant of the contemporary disputes are the disputes over small islands and maritime territory in the South China Sea. Due to the significance of the disputed area to important trade and shipping routes and fishing areas in the region, and the number of competing claimants, as well as the presence of the armed forces of several nations in the area (including a U.S. presence), this dispute has the potential of having a negative impact on security and stability in the region.

Six major claimants – China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines – have overlapping territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea, particularly over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. Additionally, Indonesia has also expressed its opposition to China’s claims over the Natuna Islands, which it claims as part of its own territory, but have been included by China in its maritime claims. Indonesia has announced that it will take China to international court over the issue.¹²²

Oil and natural gas reserves in the area make it attractive to countries whose expanding economies need energy to stay powered through the twenty-first century. Defending shipping lanes in the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, as well as in the Taiwan Strait, is crucial to national economies of the region; these countries rely almost exclusively on maritime shipping to import and export goods.



Figure 2-23: South China Sea Dispute. Source: Wikimedia Commons.¹²¹

There has been a steady increase in military air and sea patrols in the area, and claimants appear to be asserting their claims through increased maritime patrols, outpost and facility construction, and land reclamation. The 2016 USPACOM Posture Statement stated that “Chinese coercion, artificial island construction, and militarization in the South China Sea threaten the most fundamental aspect of global prosperity – freedom of navigation.”¹²³ The previous Posture Statement, in 2015, stated that while no country appears to desire military conflict, an escalation due to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out. The 2016 Posture Statement further notes that as the populations and economies of the South China Sea claimant nations continue to grow, access to the oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes more important.¹²⁴

China has the broadest claim in the disputed territory with its self-proclaimed “Nine-Dash line” that covers almost the entire South China Sea. In order for China to achieve its long-term goal of asserting its claim over disputed maritime territory, it has been carrying out a strategy that includes expanding outposts through land reclamation, preventing other nations from establishing or maintaining outposts, exploring for natural resources in disputed waters, and increasing the presence of its naval and air forces through exercises and patrols. China’s land reclamation activities and construction projects military outposts throughout the South China Sea include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships, and -- it is conjectured -- an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef, a project that is China’s largest reclamation effort. The completion of these projects will give China the ability for greater presence in the area, increase the period of time that military assets can remain there, and expand the areas covered by surveillance and area-denial (A2/AD) systems.

Examples of activities in which China has been engaged in order to support its long-term strategy in the South China Sea include attempts to prevent resupply missions from reaching the small Philippine garrison

at Second Thomas Shoal, and efforts to exclude Philippine and other fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. In 2013, China also moved an oil drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone; this resulted in a tense standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime assets. In January 2016, China landed civilian aircraft on its man-made airbase at Fiery Cross Reef. The PLA is installing new or improved radars, communications systems, and other military capabilities at seven separate reclaimed bases in the area. CDRUSPACOM has asserted that the scale and scope of these projects are inconsistent with China's stated purpose of supporting fishermen, commercial shipping, and search and rescue.¹²⁵

CDRUSPACOM has highlighted that while the United States does not take a position in regards to territorial claims in disputed areas in the South China Sea, the U.S. does insist that any claims must be in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Furthermore, the U.S. also continues to emphasize that maritime and territorial disputes must be resolved peacefully and opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to assert claims.¹²⁶

East China Sea

Another maritime dispute involving China is in the East China Sea, where Japan and China both claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The disputed islands are known as the Diaoyu Islands by the Chinese, and as the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese. According to CDRUSPACOM's 2016 Posture Statement, China seeks to challenge Japan's administrative control over the islands by deploying warships into the area, sailing coast guard ships inside the territorial waters surrounding the Senkakus, and intercepting Japanese reconnaissance flights. While the United States does not take a position on ultimate sovereignty over the islands -- as CDRUSPACOM has stated -- the U.S. Government has long recognized Japanese administration of them. In April 2014, President Obama affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty includes the Senkaku Islands. CDRUSPACOM's Posture Statement has further emphasized the fact that China's behavior in the area has resulted in uncomfortably close encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts of Japanese reconnaissance flights, inflammatory strategic messaging, and the no-notice declaration of a "Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone" in the East China Sea.^{127 128}

Thailand-Cambodia

The border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia dates back at least a century, when French Indochina and Thailand first sought to demarcate their common border. The most important issue in this dispute involves Preah Vihear, an ancient Hindu temple, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, as well as an important tourist attraction. A 1962 decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded the temple to Cambodia, a judgment that Thailand accepted, but continued to press the issue regarding the border areas around the temple. Starting in 2011, the two countries engaged in armed conflict over this matter, inflicting damage to the exterior of temple buildings. Once again, Thailand took the case to the ICJ, and in November 2013 the ICJ ruled that the area around and below the temple belongs to Cambodia, and that any Thai security forces still in that area must leave. However, the dispute remains a point of contention between the two nations.¹³⁰ Other countries in the region have called on both sides to exercise restraint; these countries include Indonesia,



Figure 2-24: Preah Vihear Temple.
*Source: Wikimedia Commons.*¹²⁹

Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, China, and Vietnam, as well as Canada, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Thailand and Cambodia have agreed to allow Indonesian officials to monitor the border between the two countries in order to help prevent further military clashes.¹³¹

India-China

India and China are engaged in territorial and border disputes over two large and various smaller unconnected territories along their shared border. The westernmost, Aksai Chin, is claimed by India as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir but is controlled and administered as part of the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. The other large disputed territory, the easternmost, is administered by India as the state of Arunachal Pradesh, but claimed by China. The disputed border of this area is known as the McMahon Line, which was part of the 1914 Simla Convention between British India and Tibet, an agreement rejected by China.¹³²

India-Pakistan

Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and the creation of India and Pakistan, the two newly established states became involved in a territorial dispute, both claiming sovereignty over the area of Kashmir. Pakistanis believed that because the basis of the creation of Pakistan involved the Muslim-majority areas of South Asia separating from Hindu-majority India, that Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan since a majority of the population of Kashmir was – and continues to be – Muslim. India believed that the state should be included in India because its last leader under British rule agreed to join India. As a result, the two countries have fought two wars over the state, in 1947-48 and again in 1965. Reaching a stalemate and succumbing to international pressure, the two countries accepted a ceasefire, without a resolution to the dispute, one that remains a source of tensions to this day. Pakistan currently controls roughly one-third of the state, referring to it as Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, while India controls the remaining territory as the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

2.6.5 Natural Disasters

Natural disasters such as typhoons, cyclones, earthquakes, landslides, and tsunamis, along with other extreme weather phenomena, frequently occur in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Between 2004 and 2013, the region accounted for over 40 percent of the world's reported natural disasters.¹³³ The tectonic plate structure along the rim of the Pacific Ocean has created the Pacific Ring of Fire, an area with an exceptionally high risk of earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Furthermore, understanding the scope and severity of the effects of long-term climate change is a global responsibility, as storms and natural disasters increase in severity and frequency as a result of climate change.

Due to the fact that a significant portion of the region's population lives in coastal areas, and the coastal regions consist of some of the most densely populated areas in the world, such disasters tend to be particularly deadly. Thus, in the event of a natural disaster, the large populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in the USPACOM AOR create prime conditions for the rapid spread of human and animal-borne diseases.

Therefore, as natural disasters and diseases continue to create public safety and health and humanitarian issues in the region, it is imperative that U.S. forces quickly and effectively implement Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations whenever they are needed in the USPACOM AOR. CDRUSPACOM has stressed the importance of addressing these challenges, highlighting that USPACOM focuses on pre-crisis preparedness by carrying out training and exercises with allies and partners in the

region. As part of this effort, USPACOM's Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) works to increase readiness of regional governments to respond to natural disasters. Many of the lessons learned and preparedness measures implemented after Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) reduced damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit struck the Philippines in 2014.

2.6.6 Violent Extremism

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) such as the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) are an ongoing challenge in various parts of the region, especially as ISIL attempts to attract and recruit radical militants from the USPACOM AOR. This VEO threat became evident in December 2015, when ISIL released a propaganda video in Mandarin Chinese that was specifically aimed at the Chinese, urging Chinese Muslims to "rise up" in armed conflict in their region.¹³⁴ According to former CDRUSPACOM Locklear's 2015 Posture Statement, "Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific." He adds, "A small number of these combat-experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability of regional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of the world."¹³⁵

In South Asia, al-Qaeda (AQ) has increasingly focused its rhetoric against U.S. partners in the Indian subcontinent, including the September 2014 announcement by AQ Chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri that the terrorist organization had established a new arm called "Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent" (AQIS), which aims to carry out attacks against the governments of not only Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the organization is believed to be based, but also against India, Bangladesh, and Burma.^{136 137} Other Pakistan-based extremist militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and others continue to remain active in the Indian subcontinent. CDRUSPACOM Harris stated in his 2016 Posture Statement that attacks in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Australia have underscored regional concerns about self-radicalized actors. He pointed out that "small but growing numbers of Bangladeshi, Indonesian, and Philippine extremists have pledged fealty to ISIL, and threats to host nation and Western interests are rising."¹³⁸

Former CDRUSPACOM Locklear highlighted in his 2015 Posture Statement that in Southeast Asia, "regional partners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however, competing security priorities in the region, coupled with the sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, have pressurized counter-terrorism attention," adding that "extremist groups are increasingly interconnected and the (USPACOM) region remains a potential safe haven, facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists."¹³⁹

2.6.7 Proliferation Issues

The illegal proliferation of materials and technology that are used to build and advance nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction -- including ballistic missile systems and their infrastructure -- remains a critical issue in the USPACOM AOR. Lax export control laws and inefficient enforcement in some countries in the region has led to the proliferation of such materials, thus posing a global challenge. The proliferation issue is exacerbated by the fact that technology manufacturing sectors in countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are rapidly developing, and many countries do not have effective export controls. CDRUSPACOM Harris has highlighted that the USPACOM AOR includes some of the busiest air and maritime ports in the world, "with shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through these ports almost daily." Underscoring the critical nature of the issue, he said that "Iran built its robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with materials that passed through the USPACOM AOR" and "North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferate

conventional arms for revenue generation, using a network of individuals and entities throughout the region.”¹⁴⁰

In order to address this issue, USPACOM actively works with partners in the region in capacity-building activities designed to improve export controls and improve capabilities to prevent proliferation. In August 2014, USPACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various “expert” nations in the USPACOM region will host, including New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.¹⁴¹¹⁴² USPACOM promotes exercises such as Fortune Guard as being a venue to provide nations a forum to “demonstrate the intention to act and share the best tactics against proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this complex challenge.”¹⁴³

2.6.8 Trafficking

2.6.8.1 Drug Trafficking

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the greatest illicit drug production and trafficking regions in the world, being a significant source of opium, heroin, methamphetamines, and amphetamine-type stimulants. The latter two illicit drugs continue to be the primary drug threat in the USPACOM AOR, according to CDRUSPACOM’s Posture Statement in 2015.¹⁴⁴ While a majority of methamphetamine available in the United States comes into the country from Mexico, the Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) reports that 90 percent of the precursor chemicals used to produce Mexican methamphetamine comes from China.¹⁴⁵

Additionally, the “Golden Triangle,” a lawless mountainous region in Southeast Asia in where the borders of Burma, Laos, and Thailand converge, is one of the world’s biggest sources of illegal opium and heroin,¹⁴⁷ with Burma being the world’s second-largest producer of opium, after Afghanistan. The Golden Triangle is second in opium production only to the “Golden Crescent,” the mountainous region spanning the border regions of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

A number of points of concern arise due to the drug trade in the USPACOM AOR: in addition to the devastating impact widespread drug use has on a society, the revenue generated from these illicit activities are also used to fund terrorist and violent extremist organizations.¹⁴⁸




Figure 2-25: Golden Triangle. Source: Wikimedia Commons.¹⁴⁶

2.6.8.2 Human Trafficking

In his 2016 Posture Statement, Admiral Harris, CDRUSPACOM, noted that nearly 36 million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide, and nearly two-thirds of these victims are from Asia, with India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand among the countries with the highest human trafficking rates. Furthermore, Harris pointed out that women and children – especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are the most vulnerable demographics affected by the human trafficking trade. Roughly a quarter of these victims end up in the commercial sex trade, while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories, farms, or as child soldiers. Other young human trafficking victims are bound to families as domestic servants. Not only do human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional abuse and social stigmatization, they are also usually denied their basic human rights and freedoms. CDRUSPACOM has stated that “While much remains to be done, USPACOM forces, including JIATF-W, are building partner capacity and sharing intelligence in order to combat these transnational threats.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁵ “USPACOM Strategy,” *United States Pacific Command*, November 2008, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/australia/39176/pdf/pacom_strategy.pdf

¹⁶ “Silk Route,” *Wikimedia Commons*, accessed October 10, 2017, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Silk_route.jpg.

¹⁷ Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), *An Introduction to the Northeast Asia Region*, OB2/EB3, p 3.

¹⁸ W. Scott Morton, *China, Its History and Culture*, 4th Ed., (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005).

¹⁹ “A Short History of the Opium Wars,” *A Short History of the Opium Wars*, accessed February 02, 2016, <http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/heroin/opiwar1.htm>.

²⁰ “Opium Wars | Chinese History.” *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*. Accessed February 02, 2016. <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars>.

²¹ Haiwang Yuan, *This is China – 10th Ed.*, (Great Barrington: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2010), p. 66.

²² Thomas Woods, *Presidential War Powers*, LewRockwell.com, 7 July 2005.

²³ “Taiwan,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ci/taiwan/index.htm>.

²⁴ J. P. D. Dunbabin, *The Cold War: The Great Powers and Their Allies*, (Harlow, England: Pearson Education, 2008).

²⁵ “U.S. Relations with Taiwan,” *U.S. Department of State*, February 12, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm>.

²⁶ “Japan,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ci/ja/>

²⁷ “The Mukden Incident of 1931 and the Stimson Doctrine - 1921–1936 - Milestones - Office of the Historian,” accessed February 2, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/mukden-incident>.

²⁸ Samuel Totten, *Dictionary of Genocide*, 2008, p. 298–299.

²⁹ Joshua A. Fogel, *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*, 2000, 46–48.

³⁰ Dana R. Dillon, *The China Challenge*, 2007, 9–10.

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3 Operational Culture and Cross-Cultural Competence

It has been said that the last one to notice the water is the fish who swims in it. How we use culture to shape our behavior and make sense of our observations often operates outside our awareness. By taking the time to read through RCLF culture general material, you are making a conscious effort to increase your understanding of variation in cultural values and the knowledge areas that will assist you in your attempts to make sense of culturally complex behavior. The necessity of this knowledge is captured by former US Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer's remarks as he reflected back on his career:

We had acquired the habit of looking at things two different ways – from the Japanese angle of vision as well as from our own national viewpoint. This proved to be the key to my career and, extended worldwide, it is the only hope I can see for world peace and human survival.¹⁵⁰

3.1 The Case For Culture General

Earlier in your career, you may have completed RCLF modules devoted to key culture general concepts and skills that were designed to help you think about and act in the culturally complex operating environments.¹ These concepts provide you tools for thinking about culture systematically (such as: change, variation, and holism) and understanding key cultural processes (such as: reciprocity, mobilization, conflict, and identity). You also may recall learning about the skills needed for cross-cultural operations that enable you to apply your knowledge during planning, analysis, and interaction (such as: observation, suspending judgment, maintaining tact and bearing, perspective taking, and reading the cultural landscape). You may want to refer back to the Operational Culture General Manual and the Reading the Cultural Landscape module from OB2/EB3 as you progress through this reading, since it is intended to build on that earlier learning. The intent of the culture general material in this block is to provide overviews of knowledge areas that will help you make connections among key cultural concepts and make sense of behavior in context.

The value of culture general knowledge lies in the fact that it is transferrable (in other words, applicable regardless of the specific culture) and can be elevated to higher levels of learning, as you will see in the pages to follow. Consider the potential consequences of *not* incorporating a culture general foundation into your mission preparation:

¹ CAVEAT: This document contains sections adapted from unclassified materials that also were used in the production of the Culture Generic Information Requirements Handbook (C-GIRH), DoD-GIRH-2634-001-08 and the Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG), DOD-GIRH-2634-001-10, which are available from Marine Corps Intelligence Activity's dissemination manager and in other products and publications.

You have been assigned to a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) as a part of the MEF G5 in order to advise on cultural issues that may impact the effectiveness of the mission. A cyclone devastated this small nation in which you are now deployed, causing flooding, wind damage and landslides in some areas. Prior to deployment you received a briefing on the local language, region, and culture. You know that the country was formed relatively recently as the result of a treaty between three nations in order to solve a long running border dispute.

Your arrival in country is a chaotic one. The foreign aid effort is being coordinated from the nation's only international airport on the outskirts of the capital. You step out of the C-130 and are immediately faced with various levels of disorganization and logistical distractions. The tarmac is littered with pallets of aid supplies from different nations, some broken open and scattered on the ground, others stacked on top one another. You count uniforms from at least seven militaries in the area, shouting in different languages. Looking over the area, you notice a small delegation headed in your direction.

The leader introduces himself as the local military liaison for your group. Accompanying him are representatives from the local police forces, health services and a few drivers/interpreters. Fortunately for you, they all seem to speak English fairly well. The Colonel in charge of your group asks about the logistical disarray around you. The liaison explains that they have been having issues with the Chinese assistance group that had arrived the week before. Other nations are pitching in with the relief effort, but the Chinese group has taken control of heavy moving equipment and refuses to let go of it until they are finished. Without the ability to move them, multiple refrigerated containers from other nations have sat out in the sun to spoil. They also have a tight grip on the transportation in the area, so securing transportation may prove to be difficult.

After a bit more discussion with the liaison, the Colonel calls you over and tasks you with the securing of the equipment from the Chinese. This places you in a difficult situation, because you were not briefed on the Chinese military element that is in country, and you know very little about Chinese people and their culture. You are going to have to rely on what culture general skills you have learned in the past to navigate this situation effectively...

When you think of the Marine Corps approach to understanding the impact of culture on military operations, you may recall the "Five Dimensions of Operational Culture" as a basis for organizing incoming information that could feed into planning frameworks such as ASCOPE or PMESII. The five dimensions framework (social, political, economic, physical, and belief systems) can help familiarize you with a new area on a basic level, but is unlikely to prepare you to navigate the more unpredictable events that may occur when boundaries are blurred and you are faced with unexpected intercultural interactions, such as the one you just read.

A culture-general foundation can help Marines identify and understand relevant information and, by employing these thinking concepts and skills, determine connections among different aspects of culture. For example, a general understanding of how people think about and use kinship relationships might help a Marine identify and understand the way kinship relationships are being used to move resources and information. Furthermore, it provides tools for taking full advantage of culture specific information using different lenses. For example, when you are provided a culture-specific pre-deployment briefing, you are not just receiving basic facts about that culture group. Culture specific information focuses on the patterns of behavior and meaning that are specific to a particular group or network at a particular time. This information is sometimes relevant to more than one knowledge area and, if you are tuned into potential connections, can help you understand better both the "what" and the "why" of what is going on around you. The fact that older men make most of the decisions in a group is a piece of information that can add to your knowledge about social roles (see "Organization and Interaction" below), who has authority to influence decisions (see "Influence and Control" below), and the values of the group (see "Belief and Knowledge" below). Understanding the multiple layers of meaning beneath the surface of your

observations can assist in mission planning and in your ability to anticipate second and third order effects of your decisions.

This section will review 10 knowledge areas. Why 10? There could just as easily be 25 or 8. Different aspects of culture are connected, and those connections are constantly being reworked through people's actions. Therefore, any set of knowledge areas, checklist, or taxonomy will be a limited tool. It will be apparent to Marines seasoned in learning about culture that the descriptions below are not comprehensive; however, they are a useful means for organizing facts and, *more importantly*, for understanding the connections among different parts of social life. The knowledge areas below help draw your attention to a greater level of detail so that you can identify additional considerations which may be relevant in different missions across the range of military operations. As you develop more knowledge about how people create and use culture to solve problems and make sense of behavior, it will become easier to select an approach that will be most useful for a particular interaction.

3.1.1 Belief and Knowledge

This knowledge area encompasses the beliefs, logics, values, learning, knowledge, and modes of questioning and investigation of a group (sometimes referred to as worldview). It includes, but is not limited to, topics such as religion and other beliefs, what people perceive to be logical and rational ways of thinking, what people believe is right and important, how the group thinks about and accomplishes learning and teaching, and the myths, history, and narratives that are important to the group. As with other aspects of culture, it is very common for multiple patterns of belief to co-exist, even when an outsider might see them as conflicting. People may be very devout in a monotheistic religion that instructs people to believe that a god controls all activities in the world. However, the same people may place great emphasis on scientific logic and also have shrines to ancestral spirits.

People use beliefs and knowledge to think about not only spiritual questions, but also more practical matters of how the world works, why things happen, and what is right or wrong. Beliefs need not be explicitly linked to religion to have significant impact. In the United States, many people place great value on individual rights and responsibilities. While this value is reinforced by some religious traditions in the country, it is shared by many non-religious people. Myths, historical stories, and other narratives also are important in how people interpret events and make decisions. For example, a group with many narratives or myths about past invasions may be more inclined to be wary of US military presence than a group without this sense of shared history.

Groups or sub-groups also form orientations toward developing knowledge through learning that are shaped by beliefs. Commonly, some kinds of learning are perceived to be the responsibility of the family or community, others expected to be covered in more formal educational systems, and others seen as things that will be handled during employment or apprenticeship. Access to learning is sometimes linked to social roles, status, or stratification, with some parts of the group encouraged or restricted in what kinds of learning opportunities they have. It is still common in many places for female children to be prevented from attending formal school. Instead, they are expected to learn from their family everything they need to know to fulfill the restricted set of social roles available to them. It is important to remember that people's beliefs are not always reflected in official policies. For example, even in places where people place a high social value on education, this value may not be reflected in government distribution of funds, and access to all or higher levels of education may be restricted to those who can pay.

People also use beliefs about knowledge to structure how questions get asked and by whom. For example,

Example: Venezuelan Particularists

Assumptions about what is logical and rational can vary dramatically across cultures. The following scenario and responses are drawn from the book *Riding the Waves of Culture* and illustrate a distinction between American and Venezuelan perspectives:

“You are riding in a car driven by a close friend when he hits a pedestrian. There are no other witnesses and the pedestrian is bruised but not badly hurt. The speed limit in this part of town is 20 miles an hour, but you happen to notice that your friend was driving 35. His lawyer tells you that if you will testify under oath that your friend was driving 20, he will suffer no serious consequences.”¹⁵¹

Would you testify that your friend was driving 20 miles an hour?

Percentage of Americans who said they would not: 96%

Percentage of Venezuelans who said they would not: 34%

Although there are a variety of factors that could contribute to this significant difference (e.g.; loyalty to friends vs. trust in the legal system) one way to make sense of the difference is to view it through the lens “universalism” and “particularism”. A universalist perspective (which tends to be preferred more heavily by Americans than Venezuelans) takes the stance that right is right and wrong is wrong no matter what the circumstance. Whereas a particularist perspective (often preferred more heavily by Venezuelans than Americans) takes the stance that particular circumstances (especially those involving family and friends) are the most important part of the equation. An understanding of these concepts can help you more accurately assign meaning to seemingly confusing behavior.

in a group where scientific ideas about causation are accepted, questions about the cause of a disease would be perceived as being best answered by medical or scientific professionals using a structured scientific method. Yet, in a group that sees cause and effect as driven by supernatural forces, people see it as more appropriate for a person connected to spiritual matters, such as a shaman or priest, to answer such questions.

The core considerations for this knowledge area are that ideas about what is logical and rational are not universally shared and that beliefs, values, and systems of logic are entangled in all aspects of life. It is important to learn as much as possible about these aspects of culture and to watch for their influence across all other aspects.

3.1.2 Narrative and Creative Expression

This knowledge area encompasses the different ways a group engages in expression of ideas and the use of different expressive forms to reinforce, challenge, or change aspects of culture. It includes history, myth, stories, oratory, the arts, and literature as well as their venues such as various kinds of media, public performance, museums, and archives.

The military relevance of this knowledge area may not be immediately apparent. However, the concepts and information included in this area can provide critical insights into every other aspect of culture – values, beliefs, rules, identity, etc. – as well as into how people in the group may interpret current events and how they think about their own history. Just as importantly, creative expression often is a means of challenging old ideas or trying out new ones, providing an opportunity to identify emerging changes.

Example: Chinese Footbinding

Consider the creative way in which “perspective-taking” was used by Kang Youwei to challenge the practice of foot-binding¹⁵². The practice involved binding young girls’ feet tightly, deforming them in an attempt to create the impression of “golden lilies” that were 4 inches in length. After enduring for close to one hundred years, it is said that a turning point in ending this cruelty forced upon Chinese women was in a letter by the Confucian scholar asking the Emperor to consider how other nations perceived the way China treated its women. It is said that his letter convinced the Emperor that nothing caused others to ridicule and look down upon the Chinese more than footbinding. This effective and creative use of perspective-taking was used in the right way at the right time to bring about change for millions of women.

Every group constructs stories about its past and present that contribute to people’s sense of shared identity and help them interpret new events. When narratives, whether about history or current events, are constructed, certain aspects are included and emphasized; others are not included or are de-emphasized. In some cases, this is deliberate, such as when a political party wants to emphasize particular values or de-emphasize the contributions of a sub-group. In extreme cases, a government or powerful sub-group may seek to insert deliberate distortions into narratives to shape public perceptions. However, in many cases, the selection of information is less deliberate, following patterns in people’s expectations about what stories and histories should include. For example, in the past US history textbooks rarely included information on the roles of minorities or women and focused on major political figures and events rather than the daily lives of people. This was not so much a deliberate choice on the part of historical scholars as it was a reflection of the assumptions and values of the time.

Myths, parables, and folktales are no less important than efforts to report factual accounts of past events. These kinds of stories often provide important insights into the beliefs (such as ethical constructs) and social relations of a group. In some groups, telling such stories can be an important social event, which can be important for building rapport. Additionally, the use of proverbs in initial interactions has been shown to help build rapport and can also provide insight into cultural values. For example, the common proverb in Swahili “The person you are with is more important than the person you are not with” reveals the prioritization of people over a schedule. Or consider how the following proverb in Dari reveals the cultural value of hospitality: “If a pot is cooking, the friendship will stay warm.” In many places, using local proverbs or telling a story can be used as a way of conveying information about a current event, observation or expected behavior if the speaker feels it could be inappropriate to speak more directly.

Likewise, fiction, poetry, movies, television, and other means of telling stories can be important for understanding values, changing or controversial ideas, and deep patterns in how people expect events to unfold. It is common in the United States for stories to have a fairly straightforward progression of characters and events, heroes and villains, clear resolutions, and happy endings, a particular kind of narrative optimism. Therefore, people from the United States may sometimes have difficulty with stories constructed in different patterns in following the storyline or identifying the intended message. As with many other aspects of culture, being able to understand these kinds of expressions can be difficult at first, but patterns will emerge over time.

Forms of creative expression such as art, music, literature, and performance are found in every group. These kinds of expressions can convey a great deal about both group identity and aspects of culture that are being contested, as can be seen when a painting or film creates controversy. Likewise, artistic forms sometimes enable people to convey feelings or ideas that have few other social outlets. For example, the fact that young Bedouin men in Egypt write poetry was surprising to many of the Americans who first

encountered it, but really is no more unusual than the fact that American male country music performers can sing about feelings that many American men would feel uncomfortable bringing up in normal conversation. Creative expression can be an important part of individual or family life. That said, military personnel are most likely to encounter it first in more public forms. Many groups expect that almost every individual will be involved in some form of public creative expression, even if only through participation in group events involving dance and music or by incorporating creativity and beauty into daily work. In such places, efforts to dismiss creativity as unimportant or impractical may be met with confusion or be rejected.

It is fairly common for more powerful parts of a group to try to impose restrictions on creative expression intended for the public, to control what “counts” as artistic, whether through overt political pressure or more subtle social pressures. Restriction of public creative expression also can happen more subtly as a few individuals become professional artists, writers, or performers through finding a patron or being able to exchange their work for goods and currency. These restrictions can have the effect of reinforcing social stratification or other social distinctions. It also is a very common part of overt political strategy to promote a particular ideology through the restriction or use of the arts, literature, and music. Under these circumstances, creative expression by people or in forms that challenge these controls can be an important part of protest and mobilization.

As open access to the internet has become more common across the globe, more individuals have the ability to contribute publicly to stories, historical narratives, and forms of creative expression as well as to use creative expression for political purposes. Involvement of many individuals is not necessarily new, but the medium of the internet does introduce some differences in terms of access, processes, and scope. The long-term implications of how people choose to use and/or restrict the internet are not yet known. Thus, it will continue to be important to pay attention to how people use various internet venues, including but not limited to social media, to construct and contest identities and narratives, support and challenge values, norms, and ideologies, and engage in various forms of creative expression.

3.1.3 Communication

This knowledge area focuses on very basic aspects of individual and group communication including anticipating intercultural communication mishaps, communication patterns, and different modes of sharing information. For this knowledge area, the most important thing to remember is that almost all human behavior involves communication of some sort. All humans communicate, and symbolic communication is one of the few human universals. To do so, humans use verbal, non-verbal and paralinguistic cues as well as objects, space, and various forms of behavior. We communicate non-verbally (via cues like body stance, gestures, and pace of speech) about such things as: our perceptions of the social roles and status of the people in the conversation, power dynamics, or willingness to compromise. By accepting or rejecting hospitality or a gift, we communicate something about the kind of relationship we have with the person making the offer. We build structures that communicate subtle cultural cues about the purpose of the structure and expected behavior, such as the use of high arches, pillars, and large open spaces associated with public and religious buildings in the United States. Even very large scale, complicated group behavior communicates a message, such as when the United States communicates the capacity for force by placing a carrier group off a coast.

The meanings associated with particular behaviors or symbolic objects and structures can vary a great deal, and misinterpretations of communication are some of the most common inter-cultural errors. Getting very close, making large gestures, and speaking loudly may be interpreted by an American as

rudeness or aggressiveness when the speaker is intending to convey sincerity and engagement. Having foreign military partners show up late for an exercise may be seen by Marines as lazy or disrespectful when the partners did not intend to communicate anything of the sort. Likewise, actions by Marines can be misinterpreted in intercultural contexts. For example, establishing a dumping area in a field used for grazing might have been a simple mistake, but be interpreted as the Marines communicating contempt for local farmers. In any intercultural interaction, the more stakeholders can learn about each other, the easier it is to avoid and recover from potential problems.

Learning about communication also involves understanding different communication patterns. It is a mistake to think about communication as purely transactional, a simple exchange of information. Communication involves behaviors (such as tone, style, physical stance, presence or absence of honorifics, inclusion or exclusion of personal information) that people use to signal things about social relationships, relative status of people involved, the stakes involved in a discussion, and so forth. Social roles, status, and situation can have a great deal of influence on who can communicate with whom and the way such discussions play out. The following example relayed by a Major from the Canadian Infantry illustrates this point:

Example: Question-asking in Afghanistan¹⁵³

“In 2008, while employed in the Canadian Task Force Afghanistan, I and a small number of Canadian and Afghan soldiers deployed to Maywand District, Kandahar Province, in what was to be the first permanent Coalition presence in the area to date. After a couple months of operations, we wished to implement some MoE to give us an azimuth check regarding our strategy. We canvassed the local population, asking such questions as: “Do you feel secure? Are you happy with the government? Do you trust the coalition and the Afghan security forces?” Inevitably, the responses were overwhelmingly positive; one would think that we were hugely successful—undoubtedly unrealistically so.

What we did not understand was that there were social norms, part of the cultural dimension of belief systems, at play when the local population was answering our questions. It was eventually explained to us by our Afghan security force partners that, when locals are engaged in conversation with people in positions of authority, the most likely responses are generally very positive in nature. Essentially, they were saying that most Afghans simply tell you what they think you want to hear. They do this primarily because they want to give the impression of being a “good” citizen and, secondly, because they do not want to cause trouble for themselves by appearing to be critical of the authorities.

From a Western perspective, our questions were designed to elicit direct and honest responses, regardless of whether these responses may have been an indictment of our efforts. Our failure to understand this social norm (also, perhaps, the Afghans’ inability to understand our true motives in asking the questions) led to an inaccurate evaluation of the population’s true perception of their environment, something that eventually became clear to us through the actions of the population as well as the insurgents. Eventually, we learned that the problem was not the questions we were asking but rather the manner in which we asked them. By offering a list of issues and asking the local population to prioritize the most important concerns that the government should address, we were able to ascertain a more accurate picture of their perceptions. Instead of asking, “Do you feel secure?” or “Is the government doing a good job?” we said, “Please prioritize where the government should focus its efforts: security, building schools, the economy, or eliminating corruption.” By changing the structure of the question, we were able to get the answers we were looking for, while still respecting the social norms of the population.”

The more you learn about social organization and other aspects of culture, the easier it will be to anticipate common patterns of communication.

A final consideration about communication involves different modes of sharing information and how the legitimacy of information is determined. All groups have many different ways of sharing information. There are usually at least some structured channels such as official announcements, education, town halls, sermons, public lectures, organized protests, scholarly publication, and news media. There also are always less structured ways information is passed, such as gossip, individual media broadcasts or publications, street corner sermons and talks, and ad hoc gatherings. The availability of internet access has made some of these less structured venues available to far broader audiences than in the past. In the United States, it is still common for people to perceive information from structured venues as more legitimate and to place value on the perceived objectivity of a source. In many other places, especially populations with high inequality or segregation and in times of conflict or disaster, people may place more emphasis on the social position of the source. They may trust an account from a neighbor or local religious figure more than official pronouncements or news accounts from people whose motivations and allegiances are unclear. Little or no value may be placed on the idea of objectivity.

Also, keep in mind that people often place more legitimacy on information that fits with their existing ideas. For example, in places where Westerners are believed (sometimes with good reason) to have spread disease in the past, people may not immediately believe in the good intentions of personnel supporting response to a medical crisis. They may distrust official messages about the response and be more willing to believe a local leader or media personality spreading rumors about outsiders bringing disease to kill the people and take their land. It is rarely possible to shut down less structured information channels. People simply create new ones. It is more effective to pay attention to what those channels and the information being passed can tell you about the ideas and concerns of the population. It also may sometimes be possible to build relationships with influential voices, thereby making it possible to shift what is being communicated.

3.1.4 Interaction with the Environment

This knowledge area comprises the different ways in which people from different groups interact with and use their varying physical environments in order to live and the cultural landscapes that result. All groups have a unique and interdependent connection with their physical surroundings. The physical environment - to include resources such as land, water, food, and materials for shelter, terrain, climate, etc. - influences the people living in it by providing a range of possibilities within which they act. The physical environment may set certain limits on human actions. For example, in order to live, people need to build different types of shelter in hot versus cold climates. However, people have the ability to adjust to their physical environment and choose a course of action from many alternatives. These alternatives are cultural and vary from place to place. They are not pre-determined by the environment. Consider the threat of river flooding. In one location a group may choose to respond by building houses on stilts. In another location a different group may develop a park on the flood plain and build their houses farther away from the river. And in a third, the people may decide to ignore the threat of flooding completely and, for aesthetic and economic reasons, build low lying houses on the flood plain overlooking the river. All three groups live in similar environments and face a similar threat, but they choose to interact with their environment in different ways.

Marines need to understand the close relationship between a local community and its environment. Most importantly, Marines need to determine what features of the local physical environment are used by people and the particular ways in which these features are used and understood. This is because a Marine presence in any area of operation will affect locals' interaction with their environment and, without careful planning, could jeopardize the locals' ability to live and survive. For example, if Marine operations

divert or impede access to resources such as food or water, they may inadvertently cause real shortages or upset the local balance of power by allowing greater access to one group over another. This, in turn, may lead to unwanted conflict. Planners need to anticipate how their operations will impact local people's use of their environment and recognize that, since use of the environment is cultural, the impacts may significantly differ from what would be an expected outcome in the United States.

Hadrian's Wall

During the Roman invasion of what is now Scotland, a wall was constructed as a measure of defense against the northern clans. While a seemingly simple military solution, some of the long-term impacts to the physical and cultural environment were: isolating wildlife, leading to divergent evolutionary paths; deforestation leading to decreased animal populations and erosion issues; new population centers as towns appeared to support the various military garrisons; and finally, facilitating the growth of a distinct cultural group (the forebears of what are now Scottish) due to decreased interactions with people on either side of the wall.

People's interaction with the environment will also inform the range of options available to Marine forces entering an area. For example, understanding the culturally specific choices people have made around transportation within the constraints of available resources, climate, and terrain in a local area can help Marines make their own locally appropriate decisions with respect to the vehicles they use and the equipment they carry.

Through human environment interaction, the ways in which people change and shape their physical environment create cultural landscapes that reflect their social, economic, and political attitudes as well as their beliefs and values. As you learned in RCLF OB2/EB3, a careful reading, or interpretation, of a cultural landscape can provide useful information about the people who create it, use it, and live in it. Certain features of the cultural landscape may be imbued with a significance or symbolic value that goes far beyond their mere physicality or utility. These items of cultural property – to include archeological, historic, and sacred sites - are extremely important as they represent a group's identity and heritage. Damage or destruction by either US or enemy forces can create great distress among local populations and prompt mobilization in opposition to the mission. In contrast, protection by US forces can aid mission success. Unfortunately, items of cultural property are often not immediately obvious or easy to spot. However, careful reading of the cultural landscape using observation and interaction skills can help uncover what is important to which groups and why.

Finally, as Marines learn to read cultural landscapes, it is common for them to begin to notice material culture. At its most basic, the term material culture refers to things people make. It includes everything from symbolic objects, such as religious totems or ceremonial swords, to the more mundane items that surround us in everyday life, such as furniture, tools, computers, and clothes, to the things we throw away, such as plastic wrappers and broken dishes. The value of particular items depends heavily on cultural context and personal meaning. For example, what might appear to be a worn, dull knife to an outside observer may be a valued family heirloom to its owner and, because of the object's heirloom status and the importance placed on family history in his culture, he may be unwilling to sell it, even in dire financial straits. What a group takes time and resources to make, what they protect, and what they discard can provide insights that are useful in understanding interaction with the environment, but also other areas, such as exchange and beliefs. Also, as is the case with cultural property, the value of particular objects may not be obvious at first. The same observation and interaction skills can help Marines successfully interpret material culture.

3.1.5 Exchange and Subsistence

This knowledge area encompasses the concepts and information used to understand how people get, store, share, and exchange resources, commonly referred to as exchange systems (or economies) and subsistence patterns. Subsistence patterns refer to the primary ways a group gets the resources it needs and wants. A group rarely relies on only one mode of subsistence. For example, one group may engage in agriculture and herding to feed themselves, but also plant more of certain crops, mine gems, and fish specifically for the purposes of being able to trade with other groups. In the United States, most people engage in wage labor for subsistence, but it's also common for people to garden, hunt, and trade, sometimes as a means of supplementing monetary income and sometimes because they enjoy the other subsistence activities.

Exchange refers to all the ways a group stores, distributes, and exchanges resources. Exchange includes practices that are formally recognized as part of the economy as well as those that are not officially recognized, such as gift giving, charity, barter, reciprocity, and remittances. It also includes practices that are considered improper or illegal in the group, such as bribery or sale of prohibited items. With regard to this last category, it is important to remember that what is considered improper varies across and within culture groups. While some practices may be officially illegal, they still can be considered normal and proper by most people, as is the case in areas where it is normal practice to tip or bribe government officials.

Money, taxes, and market exchange systems are common parts of exchange, but rarely the only means by which resources are stored, distributed, and moved. Resources are also moved through the means described above, as well as through sharing resources and labor among family, friends, and social networks. While these other means of exchange may be less visible, they can still be critical parts of how resources are used and moved in a group or network.

Subsistence and exchange are tied to other aspects of culture. A group's laws, beliefs, and values may limit how certain goods, such as family heirlooms, or kinds of labor, such as work by children, can be exchanged. People with certain social roles may have limited access to some aspects of exchange. Certain types of exchange, such as reciprocity, may be important in maintaining social relationships, as the giving and receiving of resources reinforces the bonds among individuals. While not every aspect of exchange will be critical to military operations, it is important to be aware that there are different kinds of exchange taking place and that people may interpret assistance from or to military personnel in terms of a kind of exchange other than a simple transaction or gift.

Special note on corruption: Across many types of missions and in all areas of the world, Marines report seeing exchanges that, according to United States norms and Marine Corps rules, constitute corruption.

On Gift Giving

It is important to note the dilemma this can place a Marine in as regulations forbid gift giving or receiving past certain monetary and annual amounts. Being handed a gift with nothing to give in return may place the individual in an awkward and embarrassing position or, because of honor and/or pride, place the Marine in a feeling of unspoken "debt" to the other individual. Always be aware of the policies in place (and varying interpretations) associated with the giving of gifts.

Example: Baksheesh

Baksheesh is a practice in parts of Asia and the Middle East that involves the gifting of sums of money for a range of reasons. Baksheesh can come in the form of alms given for charity or a tip given to a powerful or important individual as a form of respect. While some in the west interpret this as corruption, it can also be viewed as part of an elaborate system of interpersonal power relations.

However, in many places, exchanges that we categorize as corruption are perceived very differently. What we see as a bribe between villagers and the military may be perceived as a gift or normal payment by locals – the equivalent of bringing a bottle of wine to a dinner or tipping a waitress. Something that looks like nepotism to us may be seen by others as honorable attention to family needs. In short, some practices that seem illicit to us may be not only acceptable, but expected in other places. This does not mean Marines should ignore corruption. It means that, when time allows, it is best to apply cross-cultural skills, such as perspective taking, to determine how the action is understood by the people involved. That additional moment of data gathering and thought can help a Marine make a well-informed and effective decision about how to respond.

3.1.6 Organization and Interaction

This knowledge area encompasses the concepts and information needed to understand a group's patterns of roles, relationships, and social organization as well as how people use those patterns to shape interactions within the group and between the group and others. It includes topics such as social stratification, sub-groups or other divisions, kinship, status, and identity. This is a particularly complex knowledge area because many different patterns are likely to co-exist within one group, and there may be people both within and from outside the group trying to change the accepted patterns.

Every group has common social roles that involve expectations about behavior, status, and interaction, such as politician, brother, priest, wife, or community leader. Social roles often, but not exclusively, are linked to kinship or occupation. A person may take on a different social role depending on context or at different stages of life. There also is variation in the flexibility or inflexibility of social roles. For example, in some groups, there may be an absolute expectation that part of the social role of being an adult son or daughter is to provide for older relatives, but a different group may see that responsibility as being balanced against the individual desires and aspirations of the adult children.

There is a reciprocal relationship between identity patterns and social roles. Some social roles may be restricted based on identity factors, as was the case historically in the U.S. when married women were not allowed to be teachers and people identified as a race other than white were not allowed to serve in political roles. Likewise, when a person assumes a certain role, such as community leader, that role may become an important part of his personal identity. Some social roles and aspects of identity are ascribed, meaning they are determined by the group and cannot easily be changed by the individual. Other aspects are achieved or avowed, meaning the individual has some ability to choose them.

Social roles play an important part in the way people structure their relationships and interactions. For example, when interacting with an elected official, people often behave more formally and respectfully than they might if interacting with the same individual in a different role, such as a child's sporting event. In such cases, people are shaping their interaction around the social role, rather than the individual occupying it. Both social roles and identity are commonly linked to social status with some roles or identities being perceived as more or less valuable, important, or privileged. In turn, social status can affect how people interact. For example, a person who has a high social status may expect deferential behavior from people with lower status, and there may be serious consequences if this expectation is not met.

The concept of social organization refers to broad, enduring patterns of roles and relationships. One of the most basic forms of social organization is kinship, which takes many different forms and levels of importance across groups. It is common for groups to have sub-groups or sectors, based on things like ethnicity or race, occupation, religious beliefs, or socio-economic status. These sub-groups may not be

tightly organized and formally recognized, but they still have great influence over people's perceptions of how they can interact with one another.

Family Ties

You can learn a lot about a group of people by the way that they organize themselves. In the U.S. there is the traditional idea of the nuclear family: father, mother and children. That basic unit may interact with other related family units, but it generally moves along its own course, making financial and lifestyle choices that will be of most positive impact for that unit. For most of human history, this has not been the case. Other cultures past and present put different levels of importance on the idea of family and who is considered to be family.

It is important to remember that there is no one single function for kinship. Through the act of marriage, kinship becomes a tool of diplomacy. A less powerful family could marry a daughter to the son of a wealthier family, bringing the less powerful family prestige. A dowry would be given in order to make the marriage 'worth the while' of the wealthier family. Kinship can also play a part in the distribution of resources as families share resources in times of difficulty. Family tends to be a very important theme throughout all cultures, but the exact meaning of the idea does vary from place to place and people to people.

Most groups also have some form of social stratification, such as socioeconomic classes or a caste system. As is the case with individual social status, these broader stratification patterns can be closed, meaning the individual has no ability to change their position within the hierarchy. Others may be more flexible, giving individuals at least some possibility of changing position, as is the case in some socio-economic class systems.

Social organization also includes the institutions people create and use to organize their lives. These institutions may be structured and look familiar to people from the U.S., such as churches, educational or legal systems, governance, and social services. Other institutions may be less easy to recognize, such as a system of apprenticeships that is managed separately from the educational system. While these other institutions may appear to be "informal," that does not mean they are any less important or powerful.

One final aspect of social organization is social networks. While it is easy to think of social organization in terms of sub-groups and stratification levels, there also are social networks that cross these kinds of lines and give people a wider range of possible interactions. For example, social networks based on school ties, religion, or political affiliation may make it possible for somebody to have interactions that normally would be made difficult by the boundaries of social groups or stratification.

3.1.7 Power and Decision-Making

This knowledge area encompasses the officially recognized and unofficial ways that power and influence are gained, lost, and used by a group (sometimes referred to as formal and informal political systems). It also includes how different kinds of decisions are made and who gets to make them.

Broadly speaking, power and control are about getting people to do (or not do) something. Authority refers to the official or popular acknowledgement that a person has the right to exert power. These two things do not always come in the same package. It is possible for somebody to have power without authority, especially if he controls resources or has the means to use force, as is the case with drug cartels. It also is possible to have authority, but no real power, something that can be a significant challenge for officials in newly formed or unstable governments.

A further consideration is legitimacy, which is the degree to which authority and the use of power are perceived as being correct and are accepted. It is possible for an official, structured authority to be acknowledged as powerful, but perceived as illegitimate. This perception may undermine an individual or organization's ability to exercise power effectively and create problems for the people in the community, as they navigate different power processes. Legitimacy can be a particularly important concept for military personnel because there can be great differences in perception within a community or between a community and outsiders. What is seen as legitimate authority and use of power by US personnel may be understood very differently by people in the local area or region. When these kinds of differences arise, it is important to avoid focusing exclusively on trying to create the perception of legitimacy. It is just as important to understand why people are not accepting something and what alternatives they would propose.

In the United States it is common for people to think about power and control in terms of formal political processes, government institutions, and nation-states, all arrangements that have the sort of structured authority described above. These are important aspects of how people organize power in many places, but they are not the only aspects of this knowledge area that matter for military personnel. The ability to wield power may be very direct in cases where people have structured authority or control something, such as resources, the use of force, or the ability to give definitive interpretations of important guidelines, such as laws, religious doctrine, regulations, or history. However, people also wield power – and are perceived as legitimate - in more indirect ways, through influencing the beliefs and positions of others or by more subtle control over any of the things listed above. In many places, it is very common for high status community members, such as elders, religious leaders and scholars, highly educated individuals, the wealthy, or people from families with a long history in the area to have great influence and legitimacy (see *wasta*¹⁵⁴ example). Individuals without high status may gain legitimacy through advocacy for a sector of the population that feels the formal political structures are not acting in its interests. Even individuals whose social role or status prohibits them from formal participation in politics or decision-making can have a great deal of indirect influence. This can be seen in any place where women are not allowed a recognized political voice, but who – as individuals or collaboratively – wield power and affect decisions through male relatives. Keeping track of the social roles and individuals that have influence in particular aspects of culture can seem daunting, but over time, patterns will emerge that make this area easier to learn about and understand.

Wasta

Wasta is an Arabic term best translated as 'clout, connections, influence, mediation, or pull.' It is a form of corruption especially if there is any form of payment involved. Wasta involves using one's connections and influence in places of power to get things done outside of the normal bureaucratic procedures.

Power and authority intersect with decision-making for groups in complex ways. Official decision-making structures and processes are often layered on top of other expectations about how decisions should be made. For example, a government official may have the authority and power to make decisions about resource distribution for education. However, he may realize that his final decision will be seen as more legitimate, accepted, and acted on more readily if he consults with community leaders, important religious figures, and other influential organizations or individuals. In many cases, this kind of consultation is not officially required and may not be pointed out as a formal part of the decision-making process, but is still expected by all stakeholders. Also, sometimes the decision-making process can depend on context

and topic. For one topic, one or a handful of individuals with authority may be expected to deliberate and make decisions for the group. For another topic, a process such as voting can enable the group to make decisions based on the will of the majority of those allowed a voice in the matter being debated. These kinds of practices should be familiar to Marines who have observed military and civilian authorities socializing ideas and building consensus prior to making and announcing a decision. It is as important to observe and understand the activities and narratives leading up to a decision and the processes expected for particular kinds of decisions, as it is to know who makes the final call.

One final note on the intersection between power and decision-making involves implementation. Many Marines will have encountered situations, at home or abroad, where a decision is made, but not acted on in the expected way. People may creatively reinterpret a decision to suit their own purposes or simply find ways to ignore it. In some cases, this kind of disconnect between decision and action results from lack of authority or legitimacy, as described above. It also can result from corruption, lack of trained personnel to do necessary work, or other problems. However, in places where part of the population does not have access to the formal political system and other decision-making processes, not acting on a decision or deliberately undermining the decision in small ways may be a form of resistance and protest. People may believe, quite correctly, that this type of resistance is the only political action available to them, a situation that can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment.

As is always the case, this knowledge area is connected with all the others. Social roles, organizations, and status have a major impact on who can wield power and how. Religious convictions are often deeply entangled with political decision-making. Ideas about how knowledge is gained or what counts as a valid argument are very important in decision-making. Symbols and the built environment are often used to create or reinforce the legitimacy. Understanding these connections will make it easier for military personnel to understand and anticipate the use of power and decision-making.

3.1.8 Social Control and Managing Conflict

This knowledge area encompasses ideas and practices people have developed to regulate social relations, individual behavior, and the rules of a group as well as establish patterns in how rules are used and what happens when people violate them. It also includes accepted processes for disputing and for managing or resolving disputes and conflicts. As such, it includes things familiar to Marines like legal systems, structured law enforcement, and official punishment and sanctions, but also different concepts of justice and different ideas about how disputes should be handled.

All groups develop rules to govern behavior and interactions. The term “norm” is generally used to refer to rules that are commonly understood (although sometimes contested) but not codified in a group. The term “law” refers to rules that have been codified into a formal system, which generally includes concepts and processes for enforcement, dispute resolution, punishment, restitution, and reconciliation. The degree of emphasis placed on aspects of a legal system can vary. For example, in the United States, our concept of justice emphasizes punishment and sometimes restitution. In places with different concepts of justice, restitution and reconciliation may be seen as the more important outcomes. For a Marine learning about social control in a group, it is critical to recognize that, while laws may be easier to learn about, norms may have as much or more power in governing behavior.

It is common to talk about rules as functioning to maintain social order, and this is true in the basic sense. However, it also is important to recognize that rules, such as norms and laws, also frequently serve to reinforce social stratification and inequalities, providing advantages to some parts of the group and disadvantages for others. This latter purpose is sometimes overt and acknowledged, sometimes more

subtle. Likewise, rules do not always form a coherent system. It is fairly common for groups to have some rules that seem contradictory, especially during times of significant change. For example, long after women in the United States were legally allowed to vote, there was still a strong norm of women being expected to vote as directed by a husband, father, or brother.

When rules are broken, there are patterns in how the group responds. In the case of norms, all or part of the group is likely to respond to a rule breaker through social sanction. The social sanction can take many forms including but not limited to providing guidance, snubbing or shunning, gossip, shaming, or even violence. The reaction can depend on the individual as much as the offense. For example, if a child violates a norm of deference to a person of high social status, she might be gently corrected. An older person might be forgiven the offense without sanction, while a middle-aged offender might be shunned or beaten for the same behavior. As many Marines have experienced, most groups are willing to make allowances for outsiders not understanding norms. Offenses may be ignored or gently corrected. However, it is important to understand that in almost all situations the outsider is expected to learn “correct” behavior over time.

Saving Face

In many societies, personal status or prestige is a significant aspect of an individual’s identity and classification within the social hierarchy. As such, public praise or condemnation can have significant consequences to an individual or even their entire family. Therefore, in these cultures it is imperative to avoid personal identification when assigning blame or poor decisions (especially for senior individuals) not only because of the insult to the individual, but also the real possibility of loss of trust in you by the entire group over concern that they could also suffer loss of “face”. For example, consider saying “Certain actions have led to unintended consequences that we need to work through” vice “Bill didn’t listen to my advice and now we all have extra work to do to clean up his mess”. Everyone will likely know that Bill is at fault, but more importantly, will recognize that you were honorable by avoiding shaming him and that you value the collective efforts over individual contributions.

When a law is broken, the situation is usually taken up by the formalized system of justice. This system may look like a familiar arrangement of police, courts, jails, and so forth, or the system may consist of a group of elders convening to hear about the situation and making a decision about what should be done. In many places, the system may be multi-faceted, with some matters being handled by local mediators or judges and others entering into a system of courts. No matter what the system looks like, underpinning it will be a set of assumptions about what should be considered in decision-making and what constitutes a desirable, just outcome. In the United States, our ideal is that individuals should be equal before the law, that a person’s social status, race, sex, and other such factors should not be considered in the judgment. Also, while our judicial system is expected to consider some aspects of context, such as killing in self-defense, others aspects are not allowed, or their consideration may be contested. The ideal of “equal before the law” is not a cultural universal, and many groups consider it very appropriate to judge a person differently based on personal characteristics or the particular situation. Likewise, the kinds of evidence that can be considered are influenced by other aspects of culture. So, in a place where many people believe sorcery can cause loss or death, evidence of a person practicing magic might be seen as a legitimate consideration.

Cultural Variation: The case of Sharia Law

It has become increasingly common to hear the term “Sharia Law” in American news outlets due to the multitude of extremist groups advocating for its adoption. Unfortunately, there is very little discussion pertaining to what Sharia actually is...often leading to misconceptions about what it is and is not along with a wide range of interpretations. In its most generic sense, Sharia is the concept of state and religion operating in conjunction for the moral and spiritual benefit of the population, with legal judgments delivered in accordance with religious texts. The problem is that, much like the Catholic version of this principle that flourished throughout Europe and eventually led to the schism and creation of the various Protestant faiths, there is a lack of uniform acceptance and “righteous” behavior and the punishments for disobedience. This is evident in countries that currently practice Sharia, with rules and authorities widely differing from country to country, or even region to region. Instead, much like the Catholic Church example, the intertwining of nebulous and fluid state and religious principles are used as a method to help solidify control over all (physical, legal, moral, and spiritual) aspects of a population by a select group of elite individuals.

Perhaps more importantly, there also is a great deal of variation in what people see as the desired outcome of a judicial process. In the United States, it is common for people to expect that a judgment will include the declaration of guilt/blame or innocence and a prescription for some type of punishment for the offender if found guilty. Again, this expectation is not universal. In some places, the outcome of a judicial process is expected to be the restoration of social harmony through restitution and acts of reconciliation rather than blame and punishment. In fact, placing blame and imposing punishment may be seen as making things worse, as exacerbating tensions rather than reducing them.

The preceding paragraphs focused mainly on violations of rules by individuals or small groups. All groups also have ways of handling broader disputes and conflicts that occur within the group or between groups. All groups have tensions of one sort or another, and these are generally managed rather than fully resolved. It is far more common for tensions, even very difficult ones, to be managed rather than erupting into violence. When a tension reaches a point where one or both parties feel some action is required, there are culturally accepted ways of disputing. For example, many forms of public protest, strikes, mediation, seeking greater political power, and legal action are all considered acceptable in the United States. In many places, these disputing practices are not allowed, but there may be others, such as gaining an audience with a ruler or religious leader and persuading him to intervene.

Even when a conflict results in collective violence, there generally are forms of violence that are accepted and forms that are not. Historically, some groups have accepted raiding and feuding as legitimate means of addressing grievances. The international community continues to try to impose rules on large scale warfare, such as distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and treatment of prisoners of war.

Finally, all arrangements of social control, disputing, and conflict resolution rely on some mixture of perceived legitimacy and the threat of force (in the form of confinement, banishment, violence, or some other punishment). When some part of a population or an entire group does not have access to or does not accept the legitimacy of the social controls and patterns of dispute being imposed, the members of that group or population may try to pursue the conflict in ways that are perceived by other stakeholders as illegal or immoral. In the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014, each side accused the other of illegal and immoral acts in part because there were different concepts of what actions were acceptable within the conflict. Conflicts in which the rules of disputing are, themselves, part of what is

being disputed can be particularly complex to resolve to the point where they can be managed through non-violent means.

3.1.9 Leisure

This knowledge area encompasses activities that people in the United States would typically consider as distinct from work, undertaken for enjoyment or as personal pursuits. It includes things like sports, social gatherings, hobbies, sport hunting and fishing, using media (films, television, websites, etc.) or reading for pleasure, relaxing at home, and outings or vacations. It also includes the special rules and expectations that apply to these activities.

Talking about and participating in leisure activities are well-established ways of building rapport. Many Marines have reported that discussions of sports, hunting, or movies are the initial ice-breakers in discussions with partner forces or local populations. In order to participate, it is important to identify shared interests and to be open to the fact that there are cultural differences in what counts as fun. For example, local people may enjoy a goat roast and spend as much time discussing all the details of killing and preparing the goat as Marines might spend discussing the nuances of a football game. The global entertainment industry and increasing internet access mean that it is now sometimes very easy for Marines to encounter people who have seen the same films, websites, and television shows. Understanding the “leisure” knowledge area can be helpful for rapport building but should not be limited to what is familiar and comfortable. When beginning to participate in a leisure activity, it is important to observe and ask about any special expectations for behavior. For example, when an individual is invited to dinner party at a family home, some groups expect the guest to bring a small gift. However, in other places, such a gift may be perceived as rude because it suggests the host cannot provide for the guest. There is no universal pattern. It is necessary to observe and ask questions.

Leisure activities can give important insights into other aspects of culture. At the most basic level, things people choose to do with free time can show what they think is important or provide windows into other values. Some groups spend a lot of leisure time in sports or other activities that provide opportunities for individual or team competition. However, competition is not universally valued, and people from other groups may choose to spend their leisure time on activities that focus on artistic expression or more directly building social bonds. Most frequently, Marines will encounter groups where there is a broad range of available leisure activities.

The Banker and the Fisherman

An American investment banker was vacationing in Africa. While visiting a coastal fishing village, a lone man in a small fishing boat pulled up to the pier. The American walked over to the boat to see three large tuna inside. The American complimented fisherman on the quality of his catch, and asked how long it took. “Only a couple hours,” the fisherman replied. The American pointed out the nice weather and how early it still was in the day. “Why don’t you stay out and catch some more?” he asks. The fisherman said that he had enough for his family’s current needs. “But what will you do with all the rest of your time?” the American asked again.

“Well, this morning I slept in a bit then walked with my kids to school. I’m about to take a nap, then will go get my kids from school. I’ll play with them and the dog on the way home, where I’ll meet my wife. We’ll go to the market and see some of our friends, try some new wine that somebody’s selling down there. After that we’ll have a nice big dinner and relax, maybe play some guitar.”

The American's eyes light up enthusiastically, "Aha!" He exclaims "I can help you out! What you need to do is start working longer days. Catch two, three, even four times as many fish! Sell the fish you don't need at the market and keep the money. Save up and buy a bigger boat, and hire a crew too! That way you can catch even more fish. Eventually, you'll have enough money to buy more boats! From there you can move into a bigger city and look into ways to process and distribute the fish as well! You'll own your own company!"

The fisherman raised an eyebrow at the American, a quizzical look on his face. "How long will that take?"

"Probably fifteen or twenty years, but you'll be rich! And then you can retire!" The American exclaimed.

"But what would I do then?" asked the fisherman.

The American replied: "You could move to a small fishing village, sleep in, walk your kids to and from school, take naps, spend time with your wife, drink wine, spend time with friends and play guitar!"

As illustrated by this tale, different groups of people conceive of leisure time in different ways. The basic western idea surrounding work and leisure is that you do your job first, work hard and eventually be rewarded. Other groups do not always draw such hard boundaries around what is or is not considered work, nor is there a universal emphasis placed upon 'a hard day's work.

Social stratification, roles, and status may be reflected in who chooses (or is allowed) to participate in certain activities. In the United States, attending the opera tends to be associated with the upper socio-economic classes, although the only formal barrier to other people attending is cost. Participation in sports is still segregated by sex and/or race in many places, and the rules about segregation can be very strict. There also is cross-cultural variation in assumptions about who should have leisure time and why. Americans often assume that children and the elderly should have more leisure time than young and middle-aged adults, in particular that they should not have to be involved in wage labor. In other groups, this may not be perceived as desirable or may be impractical. This does not necessarily mean that children and the elderly are unhappy. They may value the chance to be perceived as making a contribution to the family or community.

As is the case with artistic expression, leisure activities are sometimes a context in which broader issues are challenged. For example, watching sports matches and sport hunting were traditionally male-only activities in the United States until recently. Over time, more women have chosen to challenge traditional gender stereotypes by openly displaying their interest in these activities or trying to participate. In cases where one part of a group is disadvantaged in ways that are not openly acknowledged, it can sometimes be safer for people to highlight the issue in leisure activities rather than openly challenge the more powerful group. So, it might be easier for people to try out the idea of ethnic integration in a series of soccer games than in the political process. This is not to suggest that people perceive leisure activities as unimportant. After all, Jackie Robinson and Larry Doby received threats after breaking baseball's color barrier in 1945. However, as with the arts, sometimes people are more willing to allow challenges and exploration in these kinds of activities.

The idea of leisure and work as separate activities is not universally shared. Americans often compartmentalize the times and spaces where leisure activity is to take place. For example, for American adults, leisure activities are expected to take place at different times and in different places than work activities. These kinds of separations are not followed in many places Marines may operate. The concept of leisure itself, in the way it is commonly understood, seems to be a fairly recent development in human history. This is not because people in the past never had time to relax or pursue activities purely for

enjoyment. It is just that the perception of a need to make a distinction between work and leisure does not seem to have been widespread. Blurred lines between work activities and non-work activities, still very common in many places, have sometimes created friction for military personnel. A common example is when a meeting includes time spent socializing, gossiping, making and eating food, and other activities military personnel think of as not work-related. US personnel may become frustrated, wanting to “get down to business” and stop “wasting time.” The other people at the meeting may see no reason that a business meeting should not also be enjoyable. They may see the maintenance of relationships and exchange of information and hospitality as important as the specific topic of the meeting. In fact, the lines between leisure and work are also blurred in the United States. Most Marines have had to participate in “mandatory fun” where something cast as leisure was really just an extension of work. Most Americans also have had experiences where an activity that we might normally characterize as work, like helping somebody move, took on some characteristics of a social gathering.

For this knowledge area, it is not important to determine what “counts” as leisure in the group being studied. For interaction, what matters is being able to identify opportunities for participation and the different assumptions that may cause friction if not addressed. In particular, it is critical to keep in mind that the separation between work and leisure activities is not universal. For more in-depth knowledge, what matters is being able to understand what leisure activities mean to partners or local people and what clues they provide to other aspects of culture.

3.1.10 Health and Wellbeing

This knowledge area encompasses the beliefs, social relationships, institutions, and other aspects of culture that intersect with the overall health and wellbeing of a group. It includes topics such as beliefs about the causes and treatments of disease, power dynamics that affect access to sufficient water and food, how beliefs and social relations affect how care is provided, and how people are expected to behave when sick or injured. It involves not only what we would think of as physical health and nutrition, but also cultural orientations toward mental health and whether health is an individual or social matter. It also includes the health and treatment of wild and domestic animals that may be important for subsistence, labor, exchange, or symbolic reasons.

Cultural ideas about health matter not only for medical missions, but also more broadly for military operations. Because health and other aspects of culture (beliefs, social relations, exchange, etc.) are frequently tied together, a disease event or some US action related to health may have a ripple effect. People may draw on unexpected aspects of culture to help them understand and deal with medical issues, such as the case of *empacho*.¹⁵⁵

Empacho

Empacho is an illness within Latin American folk medicine that is associated with indigestion, diarrhea, loss of appetite and other minor symptoms. It is believed to be brought on by a mass of food becoming stuck within the digestive tract. During the 1980s there were recorded instances of young children being brought into emergency rooms exhibiting signs of heavy metal poisoning. Parents told medical care providers that their child was suffering from *empacho*. Upon investigation, doctors found orange or pink powder inside the stomachs of the children brought in for the condition. The powdery substance is known as *azarcon* or *greta*, and is prescribed by some Mexican folk healers as a treatment for *empacho*. Testing of the material revealed that *azarcon* and *greta* contain lead tetroxide and lead oxide respectively, and the materials were responsible for the deaths of many children throughout the region.

How could this have happened? Shouldn't it have been obvious to parents that you shouldn't feed your child lead? In this case, it is important to note that the families in these situations are dealing with two separate medical systems at once. On one hand, they are dealing with western biomedicine when they bring the child to the hospital. But going to a *curandero* or medicine man is a very different type of medical system, and sometimes medical systems don't interact in positive ways.

People rarely stick to one medical system, often seeking help from multiple sources. Even in America, a person who contracts a type of cancer will go to a special doctor and begin radiation treatments. That same person may also go into church and ask that their congregation pray for them to be healed. One course of action is physical and scientific, while the other is metaphysical and faith based.

As a Marine, it is important to understand the medical systems you may run into when deployed. The medical assistance offered by the United States is a very specific kind of medicine based on our understanding of science and the physical world. Locals may have other medical systems you have not heard of that play an important role in their lives. Taking time to understand how locals conceive of disease and illness as well as how they treat it will help reduce the possibility of unwanted surprises when it comes to treating the population in question.

Health issues may affect other aspects of culture in short term or long-term ways. For example, in many countries, epidemics of AIDS occurred at times when there were weak public health and medical infrastructures and aid from the international community was insufficient to provide the levels of care common in the West. The outbreaks killed many young and middle-aged adults, leaving large numbers of children and elderly people on their own. Over long periods of time, this has resulted in significant changes in economic patterns and family structure. It also altered social roles, with the elderly and children having to head households and support the family. As is often the case with lingering illnesses or debilitating injury, caring for the ill added an additional time and resource burden to families or communities already stretched. Disease burdens or health and nutrition insecurity can contribute to instability as well as affect the social, political, and economic contexts Marines will encounter when carrying out their missions.

When assessing the health situation of a group, the physical, psychological, environmental, veterinary, agricultural, and infrastructure aspects of health matter. It is important to remember to look at both individual medical issues and broader public health challenges, such as those arising from insufficient clean water or the presence of environmental toxins. It also is necessary to assess less visible aspects, such as beliefs about what causes disease and how it should be treated or how social divisions, roles, and status may affect people's ways of seeking care. In many places, Marines need to be aware of the involvement of different kinds of practitioners, such as midwives, religious figures, herbalists, and community leaders in parts of care that may seem unusual to Americans. Overall, the goal is to balance learning about the community's health from the standpoint of US ideas about health with learning how the community thinks about health and what is necessary to maintain it or solve problems.

The quality of intercultural interactions will be improved when Marines learn about the cultural patterns of the people they encounter and consider how their own cultural patterns can affect the situation. In the case of health and wellbeing, this is particularly true, as many common assumptions from the United States are decidedly uncommon elsewhere. Consider what aspects of US beliefs and norms about health may be considered unusual by the local population. Many Marines are familiar enough with other cultures to recognize that certain normal US practices, such as a male physician treating a female patient, may be seen as unacceptable among certain groups. However, in some places, even more basic assumptions may not be shared. For example, most Americans believe that many diseases are caused by tiny organisms, invisible to the naked eye, that travel in people's blood and other bodily fluids. To some people, this may seem stranger than believing disease is caused by witchcraft. The idea that teeth and eyes are not part of

routine medical care in the US system seems illogical to people in many other areas, as does the idea that mental illness is something separate from and more shameful than physical illness. Even the idea that a patient might be divided from his family or social network during his treatment, something we take for granted, could be perceived as strange or dangerous to other people. This last assumption caused problems in some past responses to Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) when locals became afraid, sometimes hostile, as relatives disappeared into isolation and treatment centers. In some areas, responders were able to use transparent sheeting in place of walls so that families could monitor how patients were treated and communicate with them, greatly reducing tension. Understanding such differences in fundamental beliefs and values can help Marines understand reactions and plan more effectively.

At the most basic level, having an understanding of the health situations and practices of a group will help Marines understand what the community is contending with that can affect the mission. For example, if Marines know their partners are coping with exhaustion from malarial parasites or worried about malnourished children, they can make more realistic plans for how much can be accomplished in a day. At a more complex level, understanding the cultural aspects of health can provide insights into many other aspects of culture as well as help anticipate the second and third order consequences of operations.

3.2 Culture General Ethics

As Marines, you have the opportunity to work with people from many different cultures. It goes without saying that you will be exposed to cultural situations and interactions that seem strange or seemingly make no sense at all. Often these events can be brushed off as simply the result of interacting with a culture that does things differently. These differences can be reconciled, and those involved can continue about their business. Things change, however, when the actions of another individual or group violate the ethical code of conduct under which you operate. It is at this point where the actions of another may move from being perceived as ‘different’ to being perceived as ‘wrong,’ for example, the sexual practices of Marines’ Afghan partners with young boys. Witnessing the open violation of your own ethical code by others with whom you are working may incite frustration or anger within yourself and/or your Marines, potentially lead to friction or damaged relations with the other group in question, or worse, prompt an unethical response from your Marines. This section will offer an overview on the concept of ethics and alternative ethical constructs to help you navigate these culturally complex situations.

3.2.1 Defining Ethics

What does the Marine Corps mean by the term ‘ethics?’ At the Basic School’s course on ethics, Marines learn that ethics is “a set of standards or a value system by which free, human actions are ultimately determined as right or wrong, good or evil.”¹⁵⁶

From these definitions, we can tell: a) ‘Ethics’ is not a single thing, but rather the idea that right and wrong are made up of a number of standards/values that dictate what is appropriate (or ethical) and b) as they involve value systems, they are not universal. The standards and values that a group holds are the criteria by which thoughts and actions are judged as being ethical or not.

3.2.2 Marine Ethics Review

Honor, courage, and commitment are concepts that are familiar to all Marines. These core values are the bedrock upon which ethical Marine behavior is built. In general, most Marines view these concepts in a similar fashion. For example, there is no confusion among Marines as to what is meant by “patriotism.” Devotion to country is a key value when it comes to serving the United States as a warfighter. How might other groups outside of the U.S. think about patriotism? What if the country in which an individual lives

does not treat its citizens, or a select group within that citizenry, fairly? In order to be loyal to a cause, a person must generally agree with the standards and values of that cause. What happens when the goals of the organization to which a person is supposed to be loyal run counter to the needs of the individual or contradict other closely held values? Asking questions about how ethical ideas come to be perceived the way they are and how they interact with each other can help Marines to make sense of not only their own culture's ethics, but also those of others.

3.2.3 Exploring Alternate Ethical Constructs

Understanding how Marine Corps' values shape Marine behavior is very useful when it comes to exploring the ethical constructs of other cultures. While many groups have written down some aspects of their ethics in laws or other documents, such formal documents rarely capture the whole ethical system or the range of ways people are expected to follow it. In addition to observing behavior, there are a number of places where you can look for information about what others will consider right or wrong. As it is with Marines, you can observe any number of aspects within a culture group to find indicators of what is considered right and wrong. Art, history, religion, and general patterns of living all serve as good points of information. When you find familiar concepts such as honesty, courage, or honor, take time to consider how another culture might perceive them, keeping in mind that (as it is within your own culture group) you cannot make judgements based on any single observed aspect. If a certain film or story is popularly retold, for example, it is important to think deeply into why it is so popular. Is it because main characters display certain positive behaviors that are idealized? Is it perhaps a cautionary tale of how individuals should not behave? This can be seen throughout our own popular media, from the basic fairy tales and fables that Americans use to teach their children moral lessons to popular television series that tackle extremely complex moral situations. These stories often have multiple angles from which they can be interpreted. Not everyone within the culture group will necessarily have the same interpretation, so it is important to keep an open mind and constantly be on the lookout for opportunities to learn more and update your knowledge.

Ethics in American Popular Culture: The Anti-Hero

While there are many heroes and characters in American pop culture that do display American cultural ideals (Captain America, Spider-Man, Jack Ryan, etc.), there is also a movement that focusses on a different type of character: the anti-hero. People find these characters interesting because they do not conform to our notions of the classic virtuous 'hero.' These anti-heroes have come to dominate many films and television series (Mad Men, Breaking Bad, House of Cards, Deadpool). Sometimes these characters are more relatable to audiences because they embrace the flaws of the character and explore ethical gray zones in which audiences might find themselves. The next time you find yourself watching a film or television program, think about the following questions. Why do people find these characters compelling? What does the popularity or unpopularity of the characters say about the way audiences feel about the ethical virtues (or lack thereof) that are on display? The answers to these questions can be indicative of a group's ethical constructs.

The culture general skills that you have learned in previous RCLF blocks – observing, perspective taking, suspending judgment, avoiding mirror-imaging, and maintaining tact and bearing – can and should be applied when learning about the ethical constructs of other culture groups. Also, the culture general concepts of change and variation should be taken into consideration both in the application and perception of ethical constructs.

Change: Much as everything else involving culture, a group's sense of what constitutes ethical behavior changes over time. This change may occur incrementally over many generations, or it could occur very

quickly due to specific events or circumstances. It is also important to note that entire ethical constructs may not change evenly over time. Some aspects of what is considered right and wrong action may remain fairly static while other ideas evolve very quickly.

Variation: Not every member of a culture group interprets the groups' ethical standards in the same manner. Some may favor strict interpretations, while others favor more gray area in how right and wrong action is determined. This variation in 'gray area' also applies to individuals within a culture and can change depending on the situation in question.

3.2.4 Strategies for Ethical Sense Making

Because ethical constructs are not completely homogenous and are constantly in flux, it is sometimes difficult to immediately make sense of how right and wrong action is defined within a culture with which you are unfamiliar. In these times of uncertainty, you may find it useful to refer back to the culture general Rules of the Road.

Rule #1 The local people have not organized themselves, their beliefs, or their behavior patterns for your convenience. Figuring out what is going on can be complex. Accept it and move on.

Rule #2 Things you take for granted may not be true here. Basic concepts such as honesty, fairness, respect, winning, finished, ownership, and agreement may mean fundamentally different things to local people. Be prepared to cope with both your confusion and theirs.

Rule #3 You don't have to like it to understand it. Some things you learn about the local culture may anger or puzzle you. That's OK. View these differences as significant factors that shape the area of operations and affect a unit's ability to carry out missions. Figuring out what is going on may require temporarily holding in check your own beliefs, assumptions, and expectations so you don't blind yourself with emotion or assumptions. This takes mental discipline.

Rule #4 Local people are not just reacting to you. They are reacting to their entire perception of U.S. influence. Before the first Marines hit the ground, local people have a perception of the United States based on U.S. products, media (such as films and television), and perhaps U.S. companies, NGOs, or charities. These previous experiences shape the way people react to the Marine unit.

When operating in and around other culture groups these rules can act as a first line of defense against misunderstanding.

3.2.5 Ethics in Action

Ethical standards and values are negotiated, not fixed. While these standards and values are the guiding points by which individuals and groups inform their actions, those individual actions are negotiated within their own unique sets of circumstances and pressures. These pressures come from both within and without the individual or group, and are constantly in flux. This negotiation between the internal and external ethical pressures is not always obvious or pronounced during periods of calm; however, during times of conflict, it can cause strain on the individual. Individuals face ethical dilemmas daily. These dilemmas range from, for example, having to make individual choices between family and work to

prioritizing between the safety of the Marines under your command and mission accomplishment. While Marines have a solid ethical foundation upon which they base their own actions, interpreting the actions of others adds another layer of complexity.

When approaching ethically complex situations, it is helpful to ask the kinds of questions that explore the ways in which alternate ethical constructs may impact Marine operations. The following sections contain brief descriptions of current issues from across the globe along with some sample questions that can help explore the complexities of changing ethical constructs in times of crisis.

3.2.6 Marine Corps Concept: Honor

What constitutes Honor for the Marine Corps? For Marines, honor is “to live your life with integrity, responsibility, honesty, and respect.”¹⁵⁷ This all makes perfect sense to Marines, but how does this concept change when considering other populations? The unique nature of the Marine Corps gives it a unique sense of honor, a fact that is important to keep in mind when considering other groups’ ideas of the concept. During World War II, Japanese and American warfighters both fought hard for the defense of their respective countries, in order to protect their very way of living. Those ideal ways of living played out in the battlefield behaviors of the combatants. For example, even in the direst situations the very idea of surrender was offensive to the Japanese sense of honor. Their construction of honor was informed by propagandized versions of the Samurai bushido code, which idolized death in the purity of battle.¹⁵⁸ As a result, Japanese infantry would conduct banzai charges as a form of honorable suicide, preferring to die in battle than stain their honor in surrender. This behavior was puzzling to American infantry witnessing what they saw as senseless forward assaults by the Japanese forces. The American’s idea of honor allowed for units to surrender and retain their honor.¹⁵⁹

Differences in the interpretation of the cultural values that inform ethical behavior may have obvious consequences (as is the case with the Japanese infantry in WWII) or may be more subtle, depending on the situation. Here we will look at migrant crises across the world and suggest questions to explore how ethical constructs may be impacted by these situations.

*Europe’s Refugee Crisis*¹⁶⁰

Conflict across the Middle East has driven crisis migration to a new all-time high in recent years. The Syrian civil war, the advent of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the civil war in Yemen have displaced hundreds of thousands. These join the already large numbers migrating to escape conflict and crises on the African continent. Many refugees flee via sea and land routes in hopes of finding sanctuary and opportunity in Europe. While some countries welcome refugees, there simply is not adequate infrastructure to deal with the population influx.

*Rohingya Refugee Crisis*¹⁶¹

The Rohingya people are a minority Muslim group in Burma’s Rakhine State. Tensions with the local government, poor living conditions, and inter-communal violence have led many Rohingyans to flee the country, often by poorly maintained boats, to neighboring nations. This journey is perilous, as they have no guarantee of safety and no guarantee as to what type of response they will receive from destination countries. Strained relations between the Burmese government and the Rohingyans have made formulation of international policy toward this group difficult, at best.

*Mexican Immigration to the U.S.*¹⁶²

Migration between Mexico and the United States has been going on far longer than either country has existed but has become an increasingly contentious topic within the past few decades. As a highly politicized topic within the U.S., it is easy to think of Mexican immigration as a single event; but in reality, there are three distinct types of immigration that occur: permanent legal admission, temporary legal admission, and unauthorized migration. How the migration occurs varies for each group, but the action is often driven by similar motivations, such as to seek economic or educational opportunities or to escape the violence of the Mexican drug wars.

Think About It:

Because concepts such as honor are informed by cultural values that are unique to an individual group as interpreted by the individual members, it is unlikely that each migrant population and the individuals in that group will conceive of the idea in the exact way. In the situations above:

What does honor look like when acted out by the individual, the various groups, or countries?

How might contact with new host populations and the experience of migration impact a migrant population's sense of honor?

In what ways might the local population react to exposure to this new idea of honor?

Are migrant populations obliged to conform to their host country's ideas regarding honor and honorable behavior? How might the idea of tradition tie into that?

For that matter, does it make sense to apply the sub-concepts that the Marine Corps uses (including integrity, responsibility, honesty, and tradition) to other groups? Might some of these be more important to some culture groups than others?

How can one account for future fluctuations of ethical constructs within a region during the operational planning process?

3.2.7 Marine Corps Concept: Courage

What constitutes courage? Marines who are courageous have “The mental, moral and physical strength to do what is right in the face of fear, uncertainty, or intimidation.”¹⁶³ “Courage is the commitment to uphold your honor at all times,” provides a Marine respondent in a 2007 survey to the question, What is courage?¹⁶⁴ In these statements, it becomes clear that risk taking and boldness in face of danger, in and of themselves, do not equate with courage. There is another component, steeped in cultural values. It is when those acts are coupled the concept of “right” – a moral component – that we can label action as courageous. But what is “right?” In his work on courage in the Marine Corps, Dr. Frank Tortorello noted that courage is “the selfless pursuit of *prized cultural values* in situations of moral and physical risk”¹⁶⁵ (italics added for emphasis). How a culture group determines if an action is courageous is dependent on what cultural values are at play and how these values are defined. Obviously, these are going to vary in both definition and appearance across and through culture groups, and at times, there will be competing or conflicting values. It is important to remember that while the process of ethical construction takes place external to the individual, it is still up to the individual to decide upon *how* those ethics manifest in action. Take the Japanese businessman who commits suicide because of company failure. What are the cultural

values at play? Is he acting courageously, or is he a coward seeking the easy way out? How we interpret another's actions largely is shaped by our own ethical framework, by what we consider to be "right." Let's look at the international security situation in Syria and Iraq involving ISIL and how the concept of courage and some of its associated concepts like loyalty and patriotism may manifest themselves and vary from the perspective of some of the players on the ground.

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)¹⁶⁶

ISIL is seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate, anchored in the territory of Iraq and Syria with global aspirations. ISIL bases its legitimacy in a particular branch of Sunni Islam, has established political and military structures and governance programs, and has gained physical territory. It employs the tools of terror and brutality to intimidate opposition and local communities, eliminate apostates, agitate disaffected Muslims globally, and influence Western countries' treatment of their internal Muslim populations. ISIL believes it gains increasing political and religious authority through military victories and justifies its military action and violence as sanctioned by God. ISIL's goal is to unite Muslims worldwide under the Caliphate and seek world domination.

The Refugees Feeling the Crisis¹⁶⁷

The challenges facing refugees fleeing the security crisis in Syria and Iraq in transit to and upon arrival in Europe are daunting - human smuggling and trafficking, cramped, squalid conditions in the camps and holding areas, bureaucratic wrangling and processing, lack of economic opportunity, and death by drowning, to list a few. An individual, when deciding to stay or to depart, must weigh these against his or her current reality on the ground. Many in this position are parents, which factors into their decision calculus.

International Anti-ISIL Coalition¹⁶⁸

As of March 2016, 66 countries represent the international anti-ISIL coalition. Contributing countries provide both military and non-military (such as humanitarian aid and weaponry) support. Operation Inherent Resolve is the military component of the coalition's activities, in which 22 countries participate. The intent is for local forces to take the lead on the ground. U.S. and other coalition members work to support a three-pronged effort, involving training and equipping local forces, providing coordinated air strikes, and conducting limited targeted special operations. The level and type of support are adjusted as the situation on the ground evolves. With so many countries involved, there are inherent challenges with competing national priorities and strategic objectives and differences in levels of risk tolerance and rules of engagement and in the ways and means of carrying out missions.

Pro-ISIL Foreign Fighters¹⁶⁹

Pro-ISIL foreign fighters come from around 85 countries in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America. They tend to be drawn from the youth of these countries. All figures relating to these fighters are estimates, and sources disagree sometimes on source countries and numbers; however, they agree on the large and increasing numbers of fighters joining ISIL. Despite the efforts of the international anti-ISIL coalition, their numbers nearly doubled in the latter half of 2015. Their motivations for joining are as diverse as they. Some come for the religious appeal; others for the sense of belonging missing from the current life experience; others for the adventure or the opportunity to be a part of something bigger; and others for their own personal reasons. Source countries are also experiencing returning fighters, whose motivations for leaving are just as diverse as for joining. For source countries, this, of course, elevates security concerns.

Think About It

What does courage look like for each of the above culture groups? Are they acting courageously? Says who?

Break it down: First, note the various culture groups in the above descriptions.

Think about what cultural values are at play. Remember there may be competing or conflicting values that the individual member of the culture group must consider before determining what is right and, thus, ethical.

For Marines, the cultural values of loyalty and patriotism are key components of courage. What does loyalty look like in each group? How about patriotism? Are they relevant?

Consider the diversity of membership in each group. How may these concepts vary within the group? What becomes the prized cultural value? Are all members in agreement? How do you think those who have prioritized different values view each other?

What happens when the prioritization of cultural values changes? Consider, for instance, the fighters leaving the pro-ISIL coalition. What is considered “right” then? By whom? What does “courage” look like? To whom? Would ISIL leadership think about the situation in the same way the individual does?

Consider how the concept of courage is inherently both individual and collective and how perspective shapes your understanding. Why is this important for you as a Marine leader?

3.2.8 Marine Corps Concept: Commitment

What constitutes commitment? For Marines, commitment is the “unwavering, selfless dedication to mission accomplishment and personal and professional responsibilities.”¹⁷⁰ Marines are to have unwavering, selfless dedication to their work and family and, while in the field, to mission accomplishment. Well, we all know that sometimes – many times – you cannot do it all. You have to decide. Marines and individuals all over the world face such ethical dilemmas daily when values they hold dear are in conflict with each other. What is the right thing to do? Which cultural value should you uphold and how? As discussed above in Ethics in Action, how culture groups and the individuals within them determine what is the right is shaped by a unique set of circumstances and pressures, and this is constantly evolving.

Let’s look at one value: commitment to one’s children. For Marines with children, this is one manifestation of how they live out their commitment, a core value in the Corps and a key component of the Marine Corps ethical construct. Many culture groups and individuals within would agree with this cultural value, and they uphold this value through such actions as providing food, shelter, community, educational opportunities, healthcare, and safety to their children. It is important to remember that how such concepts display in and across culture groups varies and, thus, the accompanying actions do as well. Do all Marines with children agree on what commitment to one’s children looks like? Of course not. Cultural values inform how parents and communities enact their commitment. The behavior associated with commitment to one’s children does not look the same everywhere. Consider when it involves ensuring acceptance into the community through female genital mutilation or prohibiting a morbidly sick child access to medical care to ensure eternal salvation.

While culture groups may have a certain shared idea of what “right” commitment looks like, that cohesiveness can breakdown in times of crisis. Changing realities of life within a culture group have far reaching consequences on how the ideal ethical behaviors of that group are carried out and may, over time, change the underlying standards and values themselves. In the case of commitment to one’s children, when faced with crisis, parents and communities are often confronted with ethical dilemmas to determine what is the “right” way to carry out their commitment to their children. How parents and communities prioritize the different values shaping that commitment informs their decisions on what to do with their children. The following examples explore situations involving children in crisis situations. Let’s take a look at how the concept of commitment to children displays in each.

Unaccompanied Children from Central America¹⁷¹

In 2012, the United States started to see a dramatic increase in the number of unaccompanied minors entering the United States illegally from the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2014 (fiscal year), the numbers were near 52,000. This unprecedented volume shocked people in the United States and overwhelmed the U.S. immigration system. During this time, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were experiencing high levels of violence, instability, and poverty and lack of opportunity. To reach the United States, children had to travel via dangerous, life threatening routes to face uncertain futures upon arrival to their destination.

Educating children in war-torn Ukraine¹⁷²

Education for children is a right, guaranteed under Ukrainian law. Both Ukrainian and Russian-backed rebel forces have commandeered school infrastructure for their use and destroyed it during the course of military action. Some of these schools were orphanages. School administrators, teachers, and parents alike have gone to great lengths to ensure continuity of learning, oftentimes at great risk and sacrifice.

Children as suicide bombers in Nigeria¹⁷³

Jama’ a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da’ wa wa-al Jihad, commonly referred to as Boko Haram (Western education is forbidden), has been operating in and around Nigeria since the early 2000s. Around 2009, they instigated an insurgency, and their tactics shifted to escalated violence. Boko Haram’s 2014 kidnapping of more than 270 Chibok school girls garnered the attention of the international community. Since 2014, there has been a troubling trend of using women and children as suicide bombers. The source of the children is varied. According to the Fund for Peace’s research on the ground in Northern Nigeria, research and data do not support that all the children used as bombers are victims of kidnapping; rather it is more complex than that. Interviewers found that yes, some may have been abducted or coerced, forced to carry out this act. Some are old enough to join in the act willingly, as adherents to Boko Haram’s message. Other older girls are “returned girls,” those rescued from Boko Haram who have been raped and impregnated, deemed untouchable and socially marginalized by the recipient community. And then there are those children who are given to Boko Haram by their parents, either because of ideological affinity or out of desperation, an exchange of one life for the means to sustain others. The complex drivers of this phenomenon demand attention in order to design effective counter-measures to defeat it.

Think About It

In these examples, what does commitment to children look like? At the parent-level? At the community-level? At the national level? At the international level? When thinking about this, did you consider the community and parental response to the “returned girls” in Nigeria?

What cultural values are at play? How do you see them changing? Consider how the crisis shapes parental decision-making and the actions of the various groups in the examples.

What ethical dilemmas are facing parents and communities in these examples? Consider some of the internal dialogues these parents and communities may have had.

What is considered “right” action? Consider your response to the parental action in the Boko Haram case. What are you thinking?

How can an enemy exploit cultural values, say commitment to one’s children, to further their cause? Think about two or three cultural values you hold dear. Consider how an enemy could use these cultural values and your commitment to them to his advantage.

As a Marine, how does gaining a deeper understanding of the ethical constructs involved in a situation make you a more effective Marine? Consider problem framing and how that determines courses of action.

3.3 Culture General Conclusion

The next section introduces a variety of applied scenarios that put several culture general concepts and intercultural communication skills into action. They allow you to explore the interconnectedness and variability of the knowledge areas you just read about in a specific intercultural interaction. The scenarios are designed to transition between culture general and culture specific content and illustrate how key concepts can be applied to Marine operations in your assigned GCC.

¹⁵⁰ J. Bennett, “Cultivating Intercultural Competence: A Process Perspective,” *The Sage Handbook of Intercultural Competence*, Ed. D. Deardorff, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 135.

¹⁵¹ Adapted from F. Trompenaars & C. Hampden-Turner, *Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Diversity in Global Business*, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998).

¹⁵² K.A. Appiah, *The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010).

¹⁵³ C. Frederickson, “Culture & Evaluation of Methods and Assessment,” *Case Studies in Operational Culture*, Eds. P. Holmes-Eber & M. Mainz, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2014), 51-52.

¹⁵⁴ J. N. Hooker, “Corruption from a Cross-Cultural Perspective,” *Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal*, 16, no. 3 (2008): 251-267.

¹⁵⁵ Robert T. Trotter II, “A Case of Lead Poisoning from Folk Remedies in Mexican American Communities,” in P. Brown, *Understanding and Applying Medical Anthropology*, (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1998), 279.

¹⁵⁶ “ETHICS I, II, & III, B130736, B130756, B4W6829,” (student handout, The Basic School, Quantico, VA, 2014), 2, accessed 20 May 2016, <http://www.usmcofficer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Ethics-I-II-III.pdf>.

¹⁵⁷ “ETHICS I, II, & III,” 3.

¹⁵⁸ William R. Patterson, “Bushido’s role in the growth of pre-World War Two Nationalism,” *Journal of Asian Martial Arts*, 17, no. 3 (2008).

¹⁵⁹ Frank J. Tortorello, *AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF ‘COURAGE’ AMONG U.S. MARINES*, PhD Dissertation, (Urbana, Illinois: Graduate College of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2010), 19.

¹⁶⁰ International Organization for Migration, “Europe/Mediterranean Migration Response, Situation Report,” 18 January 2016, accessed 16 May 2016,

http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/europe-mediterranean-migration-crisis-response-situation-report-28-january-2016.pdf.

¹⁶¹ European Commission Human Aid and Civil Protection, “The Rohingya Crisis,” *ECHO Factsheet*, April 2015, accessed 16 May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/rohingya_en.pdf.

¹⁶² Marc R. Kandel, William A. Seelke, Clare R. Wasem, and Ruth E. Rosenblum, *Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends*, CRS Report for Congress R42560, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2012), accessed 16 May 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42560.pdf>.

¹⁶³ “ETHICS I, II, & III,” 3.

¹⁶⁴ Quoted in Frank J. Tortorello, The Marine was participating in an anonymous survey, 2010, 280.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, iii.

¹⁶⁶ Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, *Islamic State and U.S. Policy*, CRS Report for Congress R43612, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 2016), accessed May 16, 2016, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf>,

¹⁶⁷ International Rescue Committee, *Policy Brief: Europe’s Refugee Crisis*, September 2015, accessed May 12, 2016, <http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/IRC%20-%20Europe's%20Refugee%20Crisis%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20September%202015.pdf>.

¹⁶⁸ Kathleen J. McInnis, *Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State*, CRS Report for Congress R44135, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 2016), accessed 12 May 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44135.pdf>.

¹⁶⁹ The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” December 2015, accessed May 12, 2016, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Where do they come from?,” accessed May 12, 2016, <http://www.rferl.org/content/infographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html>.

¹⁷⁰ ETHICS I, II, & III,” 3.

¹⁷¹ Manuel Orozco and Julia Yansura, *Understanding Central American Migration: The crisis of Central American child migrants in context*, August 2014, accessed May 18, 2016, http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FinalDraft_ChildMigrants_81314.pdf.

¹⁷² Human Rights Watch, *Studying Under Fire: Attacks on Schools, Military Use of Schools During the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine*, February 2016, 1-24, 51-61, accessed May 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ukraine0216_web.pdf.

¹⁷³ Patricia Taft and Kendall Lawrence, *Confronting the Unthinkable: Suicide Bombers in Nigeria*, February 2016, accessed 18 May 2016, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/303011602-nigeriasuicidebombers.pdf>.

4 Cross-Cultural Competencies Applied Scenarios

Before reading the following applied scenarios, please complete the following required readings:

- Mackenzie, Lauren (2014). Strategic enablers: How intercultural communication skills advance micro-level international security. *The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security*, 1 (1): 85-96.
- Rasmussen, Louise J. & Sieck, Winston, R. (2012). Strategies for developing and practicing cross-cultural expertise in the military. *Military Review*, Mar-Apr: 71-80.

4.1 Language Competence and Communication Competence

Background:

A 7.0-magnitude earthquake has hit the Philippines, causing significant loss of life as well as damage of buildings and infrastructure in the rural areas of Mindanao. The Filipino government has struggled to cope with the scale of the disaster, and many communities remain stranded and in need of evacuation. You have been assigned as part of a team to assist with the evacuation of rural communities in Mindanao, where roads and infrastructure have been damaged extensively. You have taken courses in Tagalog, the language primarily spoken in the Philippines, as part of your Marine Corps education and training, and you are told that your language skills may be necessary to communicate with the local community.



Figure 4-1: Philippines Earthquake.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.¹⁷⁴

Critical Incident:

After arriving at the main staging area in Mindanao, you and your contingent of Marines load up in trucks and depart for the affected areas, where you observe collapsed buildings, homes, and bridges. As your party ventures into the residential area, you encounter various families camped outside of homes that have either fully or partially collapsed. You begin handing out bottled water and blankets to people, speaking with them in Tagalog, in order to explain that you are here to assist evacuating people from the area. However, you soon perceive a recurring pattern of people who avoid assistance. As you approach a young couple, you invite them to come with you to the truck, but they refuse, telling you to help others instead. Confused, you move on to another group of adults sitting next to a pile of meager belongings that they appear to have collected from the rubble of their homes. You say to them, “We are here to assist you by evacuating you to a safer location. Please, come with me.” They look at you, but refuse to move. One of the young men in the group stands up and insists that you help the elderly members of the community instead. Upon asking, the man tells you that his name is Marco. You assure him that you are here to help everyone in the community, and that everyone will be assisted and evacuated in turn. Marco responds with a Filipino proverb by saying, “A broom is sturdy because its strands are tightly bound,” while gesturing towards an elderly couple sitting further down the road. After observing your confusion, he adds, “They are the strands that bind us.”

Context Considerations:

In many cultures in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the concept of respect and reverence toward the elderly within a community is an integral part of the culture. In the United States, we tend to see each individual just as worthwhile as the next, and so helping people in the order in which we encounter them on a street appears to be a natural or logical way to provide assistance. However, the cultural system for those in the Philippines – and other countries in the region – may demand that elders be assisted first. Furthermore, the use of communication in a cultural context is a critical part of this scenario. While you may be proficient in speaking the language, successful cross-cultural competence is concerned less with knowing how to speak a language than knowing how to communicate, or understanding communication, appropriately.

In this situation, what culture and communication considerations could be taken to improve the situation and remedy the frustration being created for you and your Marines by people refusing help?

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

Marco's use of a Filipino proverb, translated as, "A broom is sturdy because its strands are tightly bound," requires understanding of the communicative element of the phrase, which illustrates the cultural value of respect ascribed to the elderly members of the community. The proverb is generally used to mean that a community gains strength by standing together. In this scenario, Marco's additional comment that "they (the elderly) are the strands that bind us" was further emphasis on the fact that the community is what it is because of its elderly members. Therefore, the idea of Marco being given assistance or evacuated before older individuals would be deemed by the local people as extremely disrespectful.

An American or Western cultural "action-oriented" instinct may be to help people in a sequential order, as illustrated by the concept of "first come, first served." To an American, this may be the most efficient way to do things, in an attempt to assure that time is used most effectively and everyone is treated equally. However, understanding the communicative element of Marco's comment, rather than merely the literal meaning of the phrase, would make it easier to understand that in this cultural context, it is most appropriate to help those who are elderly first. Adjusting one's own point of view on what is considered to be the "good" and "morally responsible" thing to do often requires understanding context through the various cultural layers of communication.

For Further Consideration:

Linguistic competence is concerned with the ability to speak a language, while communication competence is concerned with the ability to use a language effectively and appropriately in context. While the context and content of cultural communication may differ from one culture to the next, the concept of understanding the difference between linguistic competence and communication competence is a universal skill that will help you anywhere you go.

From a cultural point of view, it is also important to be aware of the vast cultural diversity and range of values that are present not only in the USPACOM AOR, but often even within the same country. For example, much of the rural areas of the southern Philippines will generally tend to be more collectivist as a society, where traditional extended family systems and the importance ascribed to the elderly is still commonplace, as observed in this scenario. However, major metropolitan cities, such as Manila, which have become increasingly globalized and cosmopolitan in nature over the past several decades, will tend to be more individualistic, as family systems are based more on the nuclear family. Therefore, while this

scenario illustrated a situation that could likely be observed in one part of the country, it is possible that this type of situation would play out quite differently in another more urban area of the same country.

4.2 Cultural Values Displayed in Communication Behavior

Background:

You are assigned to a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to work with the Thai military to carry out an anti-drug operation in Chiang Rai province. Chiang Rai is Thailand's northernmost province and is part of the "Golden Triangle," an area known for illicit opium cultivation and drug manufacturing and trafficking, which overlaps the mountainous border regions of Thailand, Laos, and Burma. You have been assigned to make liaison and ask for the cooperation of the Akha tribe, one of the remote hill tribes that inhabits the area in order to better assist your team in gaining information about and access to areas used for illegal opium cultivation.



Figure 4-2: Traditional Akha village in northern Thailand. *Source: Wikimedia Commons.*¹⁷⁵

Critical Incident:

You and a detachment of Marines arrive along with your Thai military liaison, Major Bunyasam, to a rural Akha village. The village is made up of traditional Akha huts made of wood and thatched roofs. You are met by a village elder and he invites you into his home. As you sit down with the elder, individual dishes of rice on banana leaves are served to you and your party. Major Bunyasam initiates the meeting by explaining to the village elder the point of your mission in the area, while simultaneously acting as the interpreter for you. You are focused on the conversation and do not partake in the meal and continue to pose questions for Major Bunyasam to ask the village elder, specifically about the drug trade in the region and the mission at hand. The elder's face begins to appear impatient and increasingly withdrawn. Eventually he stands up, says something angrily to Major Bunyasam and walks out of the room. Major Bunyasam tells you that the elder appears to have changed his mind about being willing to help provide any relevant information.

Context Considerations:

The Akha are a prominent indigenous hill tribe who live in small villages at higher elevations in the mountains of northern Thailand, as well as across the border in Burma, Laos, and southern China. The tribal community is largely agricultural and grows crops for much of its subsistence. Rice is the most significant crop and is prominent in much of Akha culture, traditions, and rituals. The village elder is responsible for making many of the decisions regarding the community and Akha lands. Traditionally, meetings among the Akha take place over the shared consumption of cooked rice, which acts as a symbolic gesture to welcome the other party into the home and initiate any discussion.

The incident you just read is impacted by expectations surrounding the rice-offering ritual, which is based on the cultural concepts of community and the sharing of a valued commodity with an outside party in order to welcome them and show hospitality. In this situation, the rice is not just a food item; rather, it is a communication symbol that represents the opening up of one's home and community and offering kindness and generosity to an outsider.

Keeping in mind the ways in which cultural values influence communication behavior, what are some possible explanations for the elder's decision to not provide any information and to leave the meeting abruptly?

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

The concept of holding a meeting over a meal, particularly rice, is a display of cultural values in many communities of the hill tribes in northern Thailand. Its meaning goes beyond simply eating together, and reflects the Akha's cultural values of community and offering something of value to a guest. Therefore, refusing to eat the rice during the meeting after it had been presented to you could have been perceived by the village elder as you not valuing the community's welcome and offer of hospitality. Because rice is used in numerous cultural rituals and ceremonies in Akha society, it is a symbol of the Akha people. Therefore, taking the time to partake in the meal could have worked to your advantage in building the relationship with the village elder.

In the United States, and particularly in the Marine Corps, it is common to give priority to the mission at hand, in order to "get the job done." However, in various other cultures, particularly in the USPACOM AOR, the concept of communication and holding meetings often includes the expectation to take the time to build rapport and make small talk beforehand. While posing direct questions about the anti-drug mission in the region may be taken as you valuing your counterparts' time and eagerness to get the job done in certain Western contexts, this may be quite different in Thailand, and among the Akha hill tribe community in particular. In cultures such as the Akha, the concept of successful communication is expressed by taking the time to sit down with the other party and engage in small talk. Such communication rituals and behaviors are often expected. Therefore, reserving questions about the mission until the appropriate time during the meeting could likely have created a more favorable environment and ultimately yielded a more positive result.

The fact that the meeting, and major decisions regarding the community, revolve around the village elder is one of the ways the Akha community attributes respect and honor to the elderly. In various Northeast and Southeast Asian cultures, the seniority in age of an individual automatically confers a certain degree of respect to the speaker. Thus, by understanding that the cultural value of respect for the elderly is manifested in the way meetings are held among the Akha community will provide you and your Marines additional awareness of how a successful discussion and appeal for cooperation can be achieved.

For Further Consideration:

In our daily lives, we don't interact with cultures – we interact with people. It is in these interactions that cultural difference becomes noticeable and has the potential to impact military operations. It is often at the micro-level of international security that make-or-break policy moments occur. Like any other relationship, cooperative alliances are formed or dissolved one conversation at a time. The rejection of the rice likely portrayed a rejection of the Akha's key cultural values of community and hospitality. The act of turning down the rice could likely be viewed as offensive as it disregards these values. This does not solely apply to sharing a meal of rice, but can be in common social rituals such as tea-drinking in Northeast Asian countries such as China or Japan as well. Furthermore, the importance of holding meetings over meals of rice does not only take place in Thailand, but in many traditional Asian cultures such as Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, China, and Japan. Rice is a primary agricultural crop in societies throughout the region and due to its cultural prominence, is often symbolic of the host's openness. Its consumption and symbolic value is widespread throughout the region, even outside of rice-growing countries.

4.3 Identity in Intercultural Interaction

Background:

A tropical cyclone has hit the east coast of India, causing devastation in the coastal city of Chennai and surrounding rural areas in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Indian government estimates put the current death toll at 2,000, with thousands more displaced and homeless.

Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMARFORPAC), in response to a request from the government of India to the United States, and at the direction of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is leading efforts to assist the people of India in the wake of the cyclone. You have been designated as the Officer in Charge (OIC) for your Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)'s Advanced Party (ADVON), to assess the needs of the affected population and coordinate the delivery of relief aid prior to the arrival of the main body for a HA/DR mission.



Figure 4-3: India Cyclone. Source: *Wikimedia Commons.*¹⁷⁶

Critical Incident:

You arrive at your meeting with Indian military officials in Chennai, which is to be the relief supplies distribution hub for the affected areas. Major Narayan has been appointed by the Indian Army as the liaison to you and your party for this mission. Major Narayan is a Hindu from Ludhiana, a city in the northwestern Indian state of Punjab. Therefore, in addition to speaking English, his native languages are Punjabi and Hindi. He does not speak Tamil, a South Indian language predominant in the affected area, so his party also includes a Tamil-language interpreter named Akash.

Major Narayan leads your party on a tour of one of the villages that was devastated by the cyclone in order to assess what supplies are needed most. You arrive at a makeshift camp that is being used to house families displaced by the storm. As you are speaking with Major Narayan and his party, some people from the camp who appear to have fewer provisions than others in the area begin coming up to your group, holding out their hands to you as if in need, and many of them are speaking at once in Tamil. Major Narayan, whom you have gotten to know as a friendly and respectable man, begins scolding them in what you perceive to be a vicious tone, while also beating them away with his baton. You are taken aback by his treatment of these people, who already seem to be poverty-stricken and in need of aid.

As Major Narayan is shooing them away, you discreetly ask Akash, who is standing next to you, to explain what just happened. Akash replies, "Sir, those people are Dalits. Major Narayan is from a higher caste, and doesn't want to be near them. He sees them as the untouchables."

Keeping in mind the ways in which identity can complicate intercultural interactions, what are some possible explanations for Major Narayan's seemingly harsh behavior?

Context Considerations:

The traditional Hindu caste system has ancient origins dating back to the early Vedic period (circa 1500-1100 BC). It generally classifies members of Indian society into four hierarchical classes, with the Dalits or

“untouchables,” considered to be a fifth class that is outside of the class structure altogether. Historically, Dalits have been associated with occupations regarded as ritually “impure” by Hindus, such as garbage removal or dealing with animal carcasses and human waste. Dalits traditionally work as manual laborers cleaning streets, sewers, and bathrooms. These activities are considered to be polluting to the individual, and this pollution is historically considered contagious, therefore creating the perception of Dalits as “untouchable.” This led to caste segregation and discrimination, with Dalits commonly being banned from full participation in Indian social life, and being physically segregated from the community. Other castes often took precautions to prevent incidental contact with Dalits. While the Indian government outlawed discrimination based on caste and the practice of “untouchability” in 1950, stratification in the social structure and discrimination based on caste still exists, especially in rural areas.

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

Although you observed Major Narayan to be a friendly and respectful individual, it is important to remember that people have many different forms of identities. The one they choose to emphasize in an interaction will depend on the situation in which they find themselves. While Major Narayan’s identity may lead him to behave in a certain way with a U.S. Marine or other members of a military contingent, another aspect of his identity – which may stem from his specific cultural upbringing and his views on class and caste – may lead him to act drastically different towards the Dalit community. Although you may consider such behavior to appear “uncharacteristic” of him, it is important to remember that identity, and thus behavior, can change depending on where an individual is and with whom he is interacting.

Identity contributes to the many roles we play in our lives and is always changing and evolving. Consider the possibility that in his interaction with the members of the Dalit community, Major Narayan could have been choosing to emphasize his role as an authority figure (as authority is perceived in the society of which he is a part). While some societies value order and discipline, even in an extreme situation such as a natural disaster, other societies may resort to rioting and looting over necessary commodities where a lack of authority is perceived. It could be that Maj Narayan was choosing to emphasize his role as an authority figure to assist in a situation that might otherwise deteriorate.

Along with the various roles that stem from our identities, come role expectations. Role expectations are sets of behavior and characteristics associated with particular situations. Although the behavior Major Narayan exhibited towards the Dalit people may seem harsh or unjustified to you, keep in mind that it is possible he was acting in a certain way because he believed that such behavior was expected of him and the specific role and identity he was emphasizing in that situation. Thus, his behavior could stem from the role expectations of various identities. Some examples of these identities include: 1) being a major of the Indian Army and in a position of authority; or 2) being a man in his role in Indian society, where gender roles and characteristics are clearly delineated and expected. In such a situation, softness could have possibly been perceived by Major Narayan’s peers as damaging to his concept of masculinity, thus leading to him lose face.

For Further Consideration:

Identity is commonly defined as a set of social expectations related to ourselves and others that is shaped by such factors as: profession, gender, race, social class, ethnicity, family, sexual orientation, religion, and language. There are some aspects of identity that are products of choice and personality, and others that are shaped more by context and relationships, (including ascribed — or imposed — identity). People have many different identities, and the one they choose to emphasize in a particular time and place depends

upon the situation in which they find themselves or who they are dealing with. The key to remember is that just because you meet a person in one context does not necessarily mean that s/he will emphasize (or that you will observe) the same aspect of his identity the next time you interact.


It is also important to acknowledge that while various forms of identity may lead to specific role expectations and behaviors in one culture or society, they could manifest in a way that are drastically different in other cultures, even within the same Combatant Command AOR. In the USPACOM AOR, there is vast cultural variation in places like India in South Asia, Japan in Northeast Asia, or Indonesia in Southeast Asia.

By way of contrast, if a similar HA/DR mission were to occur in Japan, the ways in which identity could complicate intercultural interactions would be quite different. Japanese culture, for example, places a much greater emphasis on emotional restraint and discipline. Therefore, in an Indian context, perceived “harsh” treatment or an outburst towards members of a local displaced population may reinforce an Indian Major’s gender identity or the identity aligned with his authority. However, the same type of behavior in a Japanese context may be perceived much differently, and damage the perceptions that might have of his authority and masculinity due to his inability to maintain emotional restraint and self-discipline.

4.4 Power and Authority in Intercultural Interactions

Background:

You have been designated as Officer in Charge (OIC) of a contingent of U.S. Marines attending the Han Kuang exercises, an annual military drill carried out by the armed forces of the ROC (Taiwan). You are scheduled to observe some of the amphibious military exercises of the ROC Marine Corps (ROCMC) at Zuoying Naval Base.



Critical Incident:

You and your party are welcomed on base by a delegation of ROC military officers, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Kao of the ROCMC. He is accompanied by a delegation of 10 officials, including many majors and captains. While many of the higher ranking officials are able to speak English, they have also brought along two interpreters as part of their team. Lieutenant Colonel Kao invites you on a walking tour of the facility. As both of your parties are walking along, you are positioned so that you and Lieutenant Colonel Kao are standing immediately side by side with each other, with junior officers from both of your delegations standing on either side of you. As you and Lieutenant Colonel Kao converse throughout the walking tour, he points out different types of military equipment that will be used during the scheduled exercises, as well as various aspects and locations of the drills. You take the opportunity to provide constructive criticisms and suggest your own recommendations based upon your expertise and experience. You notice that after the third or fourth instance of you providing feedback, Lieutenant Colonel Kao has switched positions with one of the majors who was standing next to him as part of his delegation, placing him between the both of you. You find this odd but continue to respond over various points in the same manner, with the goal of providing suggestions on how things could be improved. Over time, the delegation begins to create more space between your party and theirs, with one of the majors now bringing in an interpreter in between your delegation and his, adding another layer of distance between both parties. The major asks the interpreter to help translate your comments even though you noticed that he was speaking English quite comfortably up until then. As more time goes by, the major and Lieutenant Colonel Kao have now broken off from the group altogether and are holding a separate conversation with other senior members of their delegation, while you and your delegation continue along with some of the captains and the interpreters from the ROC delegation.

Context Considerations:

Taiwanese culture, and military culture in particular, highly emphasizes a clearly defined hierarchy of power and authority. This may be seen in relationships between parents and children, teachers and students, or senior and junior ranking military officers. The concepts of power and authority in Taiwan are typically clearly defined in various social and professional settings, each with its own set of expectations and taboos. Among the ROC military, this is manifested in the emphasis on criticisms, even if constructive, only being given by higher ranks to subordinate ranking officers. Furthermore, the concept of space being used as a non-verbal cue is an important aspect of the expression and display of power of authority, not only in Taiwan or in Northeast Asia, but around the world, in different ways.

Keeping these concepts in mind, what information should you take into consideration in order to explain how power and authority were displayed in this intercultural interaction?

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

Expressing power and authority in a clearly defined manner, namely in a “top-down” fashion, is a highly emphasized aspect of Taiwanese culture, and particularly in the country’s military. In the United States, although the military has a hierarchical power structure, we are accustomed to understanding members of society in a more egalitarian way, in which individuals are generally understood to be on an equal footing. In this situation, because you were the OIC of a U.S. Marine Corps delegation dealing directly with a counterpart in the ROC armed forces, you may have felt that you were able to provide constructive criticisms at a peer-to-peer basis. However, from a Taiwanese perspective, the particular ranks and positions of everyone involved are not overlooked. Therefore, since you are a major, speaking to a senior ranking officer of the host country, it is possible that Lieutenant Colonel Kao was uncomfortable taking criticism or feedback from you, leading him to place another officer that he perceived of more equal rank to you in between you and himself.

Furthermore, your method of providing suggestions and feedback may be perceived as completely appropriate in certain low-context cultures such the United States, where being direct, action-oriented, and “to-the-point” are seen as positive traits of communication. However, societies in Northeast Asia tend to use high-context communication patterns, which value the concept of being indirect in order to maintain respect and politeness, especially in conversations that are not on equal levels of peer-to-peer. Therefore, while you may have been making efforts to be polite, your comments could have come across as directive to members of the ROC military. Thus, in order to mitigate the perceived “harshness” of your tone, the ROC military officials, who are accustomed to indirect communication, could have created the physical distance and space between you and their party as a non-verbal cue of their discomfort, rather than bringing it up to you directly.

For Further Consideration:

Power and authority are displayed in different ways in different cultures. In this situation, the ROC military personnel may have been uncomfortable taking criticism or feedback from a U.S. military official due to the perception that you were of a lower rank, or even due to the fact that you were an outsider and part of a U.S. military contingent. With that being said, it is important to realize how the dynamics of this type of interaction could manifest quite differently in interactions with the armed forces of other countries, even those from similar Northeast Asian cultures. In South Korea, for example, it is not unusual for military officials of the ROK, to expect, or even show preference, for U.S. officials taking charge of joint and bilateral exercises; this is due to the extensive historical role that the United States has played in the defense-related affairs of South Korea, particularly in its deterrence of North Korean aggression and the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Meanwhile, the Taiwanese may not necessarily feel the need to show the same level of openness for U.S. advice, since the United States severed official diplomatic ties with the government of the ROC in 1979 in order to reinstate official relations with the PRC.

4.5 Perspective Taking and Perception Checking

Background:

You are the executive officer for an infantry battalion. As the designated senior U.S. Marine Corps representative, you have been tasked with the responsibility of organizing a multinational seminar where field-grade officers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries will discuss lessons learned from bilateral, joint, and multinational military exercises held with the United States and among ASEAN member nations. The symposium will bring together officers from all ASEAN countries. One of the focuses of the seminar will be the protection of at-risk UNESCO World Heritage Sites in the region. In support of this effort, you have prepared a presentation to highlight various important regional UNESCO World Heritage Sites in the region, including the Preah Vihear Temple complex. This site is situated along the Thai-Cambodian border, but it is officially considered to be on Cambodian territory, as declared by multiple rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), most recently in 2013.



Figure 4-4: Preah Vihear Temple. Source: Wikimedia Commons.¹⁷⁷

Critical Incident:

During the presentation, an officer from the Royal Thai Armed Forces (Thailand) rises from his chair and verbally issues a formal protest to you. The Thai officer protests the slide in your presentation labeling Preah Vihear as being located on Cambodian territory. In response, the Cambodian officer counter-protests the Thai officer's objections, stating that the ICJ ruled, then reaffirmed, that the ancient Hindu temple complex belongs to Cambodia. Both the Thai and Cambodian officers appear visibly angry during the exchange and for the remainder of the symposium.

Context Considerations:

The dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple stems from a border dispute dating back at least a century, when French Indochina and Thailand first sought to demarcate their common border. Thailand claims the demarcation has not yet been completed for areas around and adjacent to the temple, even though an ICJ ruling in 1962 affirmed that the temple itself belonged to Cambodia. Clashes occurred between the armed forces of both nations between from 2008 and 2011, with Thai forces being forced to withdraw following another ICJ ruling in 2011 declaring that the temple and the surrounding area was territory belonging to Cambodia.

While the manner in which an ancient temple is officially introduced at a seminar may carry little significance to you, it may have a higher level of importance for others. What's at stake for the Thai and Cambodian officers is not just their official military careers and positions (after all, they are tasked with properly representing their countries), but personal pride and honor associated with their countries' past and present. For Thailand, the dispute reaches back to issues of colonization of the region and the illegitimate demarcation of borders by Western colonial powers. For Cambodia, the dispute is a matter of

cultural and religious heritage, as the temple was built by the Khmer civilization, the same empire that built the famed Angkor Wat temple complex in Cambodia.

How could this information inform your perspective on the situation and guide your response?

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

Interacting with a foreign population requires taking into consideration a different perspective. Once you have resolved not to rush to judgment and you have your emotions and body language in check, try to put yourself into the shoes of the other person or group. How do you think they see the situation? What are their priorities and constraints?

If you stop the Thai officer then and there, asking him not to interrupt the symposium but to discuss it with the Cambodian officer one-on-one afterwards, you may prevent the situation from escalating. However, doing so will undermine the legitimacy of the Thai officer's concern, putting him in an inferior, possibly humiliating, position in front of his peers.

Alternatively, you may decide to let the officers voice their grievances. While doing so will give the officers a chance to vent, the situation may escalate out of control, and you may lose your standing as a person in charge of the symposium.

Another way to handle the situation professionally and to engage in perspective-taking in order to understand where the officers are coming from is to ask them politely and firmly to take their seats and focus on the symposium, with a promise to address the issue with the officers afterward. Upon the end of the session, you can approach each officer individually, describe to them your understanding of their frustration, and ask them to clarify if what *you think* is going on is actually going on. Doing so will allow you to check your perception of the incident, revise your perception if need be, and acknowledge the legitimacy of the officers' concerns without losing control of the situation.

When you begin to think beyond your first impressions and when you consider the situational context and try to see things through the eyes of the local population or your military partners, you are engaging in perspective-taking.

For Further Consideration:

While perspective-taking is an "internal" process that you can engage at any time you encounter uncertainty or misunderstanding, perception-checking calls for a greater level of caution because it requires the solicitation of clarification from other people about something that you have observed. Conventionally, perception-checking would work best in "low-context" cultures that rely heavily on verbal, direct, individual-oriented communication for "meaning-making," with little concern for group harmony. In contrast, "high-context" cultures that value and rely on non-verbal cues to create meaning may find perception-checking rude because of the direct communication style that it involves, which can threaten group harmony. Therefore, in this situation, since both Thailand and Cambodia are generally high-context cultures, addressing the conflict individually with both officers after the end of the symposium would be a better choice than taking up the issue in a public setting. High-context cultures also tend to value established hierarchies and power relations to the point where a person in charge (such as the designated symposium organizer) will not necessarily seek clarification from the participating officers unless it is done discreetly and politely on an individual level, as doing otherwise or in a public setting may be perceived as a sign of weakness.

With that in mind, consider how you would handle a similar incident if it involved an Australian officer who comes from a “low-context” culture that values direct interpersonal communication style to a point of bluntness. Alternatively, how would you handle the incident if it involved a Vietnamese officer who comes from a culture that places a great emphasis on group harmony and “face-saving” of all involved, and who is accustomed to receiving clear orders as opposed to an invitation to clarify his or her position?

¹⁷⁴ “Philippines Relief Location Map (square),” *Hellerick - Wikimedia Commons*, accessed October 27, 2016, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Philippines_relief_location_map_\(square\).svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Philippines_relief_location_map_(square).svg).

¹⁷⁵ “Akha Village,” *Sputnikcccp – Wikimedia Commons*, accessed October 27, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Akha_village.jpg.

¹⁷⁶ “Tropical Cyclone Six (OB) over Sri Lanka and India,” *NASA*, accessed October 27, 2016, https://lance.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/gallery/?2008331-1126/TropicalCyclone_06B.A2008331.0525.2km.jpg

¹⁷⁷ “Preah Vihear Temple,” *Wikimedia Commons*, accessed October 27, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Preah_Vihear_Temple.png

5 Culture and Mission Planning

Good commanders know how to lead in combat. Great commanders possess the unique intuitive sense of how to transition very quickly from active, kinetic warfare distinguished by fire and maneuver to a more subtle kind of cultural warfare distinguished by the ability to win the war of will and perception. Rare are the leaders who can make the transition between these two disparate universes and lead and fight competently in both.¹⁷⁸

Major General Robert H. Scales, USA (ret.)

Marines serve as America's forward-based and forward-deployed expeditionary force; we operate globally. Consequently, MAGTF planners consistently must plan operations, exercises, and engagements in countries across the world among myriad cultural groups. Through careful cultural analysis – *seeking cultural understanding prior to executing these global operations* – Marines can anticipate and plan for potential reactions of local populations and other cultural groups in foreign operating environments. The most important application of operational culture thus lies in its role in military planning.

Cultural factors should be assessed not only for the local population but also for all groups in the area of operations (AO) whose culture differs from our own. Insurgents, warring factions, and militias within an AO may have cultural beliefs and norms that differ from the local population. Host nation and multinational allied forces, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating within an AO will also undoubtedly hold their own varied cultural beliefs. Even the different services within a U.S. joint force bring their own institutional culture to operations. Understanding that different cultures exist and greatly impact mission accomplishment is essential to deliberate military planning.

Consequently, this section provides an overview of culture as an integral variable of MAGTF planning for operations among foreign cultural groups, whether allies, adversaries, or the civil component within an operating environment. The learning outcome is for the MAGTF operator to be able to better assess techniques for aligning culturally appropriate and mission-effective behavior across the following activities:

- when conducting deliberate planning and employing the *Green Cell*
- when planning and conducting interorganizational operations
- when establishing a command communication strategy

The MAGTF operator should recognize and understand the necessity to utilize a systematic cultural analysis as a critical input when conducting these military planning activities.

5.1 Culture and the Marine Corps Planning Process

Sources and Supplemental Readings for Section 4.1.

- *MCDP 5 Planning*
- *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*
- *MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process*
- *MSTP Pamphlet 2-01.1 Red Cell / Green Cell*
- *Operational Culture for the Warfighter – Principles and Application*

*Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about.*¹⁷⁹

5.1.1 Marine Corps Doctrinal Planning

The Marine Corps doctrinal approach to planning is described in *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning* and *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process*. This section will not cover service or joint planning activities, hierarchies, or processes in detail. Rather, the following outlines the importance of cultural understanding of the operational environment as a critical variable and essential input into successful planning by Marine Corps commanders and staffs. This section also contains a discussion of the *Green Cell* as a mechanism to ensure cultural understanding as a mission variable and civil considerations are integrated throughout the *Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP)*.

5.1.2 The Nature of Planning

The key to the Marine Corps' shared doctrinal understanding of planning is to view planning as "a learning process – thinking before doing."

*We should think of planning as a learning process—as mental preparation which improves our understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms, planning is thinking before doing. Even if the plan is not executed precisely as envisioned—and few ever are—the process should result in a deeper situational awareness which improves future decision-making. We should thus think of planning as a learning activity that facilitates the exercise of judgment and not as merely a mechanical procedure.*¹⁸⁰

Part of the fundamental value of planning is that it can serve, at least in part, as a substitute for experience. Certainly, Marines lack first-hand, specific cultural experience when operating in unfamiliar environments among, unfamiliar cultures. In situations in which Marines lack specific, first-hand experience, planning may be used to think through the problem systematically and devise a workable solution. Planning activities therefore:

- Result in deeper situational awareness which improves future decision-making

- Posture leaders to be ready to act when necessary or advantageous and not merely to react to developments
- Facilitate the exercise of judgment
- Generate tempo

Culture as a variable plays an important role in the Marine Corps planning approach for military operations in complex, foreign environments. A systematic examination of culture as an operational variable aids in developing this deeper situational awareness of an AO.

5.1.3 Marine Corps Planning Process

The *Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP)* is designed to promote understanding among the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders regarding the nature of a given problem and to generate potential solutions to this problem. The plans which result may be considered hypotheses that will be tested and refined as a result of execution and assessment.¹⁸¹ The six steps of the MCP are —

- **Problem Framing** enhances understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem and also identifies the purpose of the operation.
- **COA Development** produces options for accomplishing the mission in accordance with commander's intent.
- **COA War Game** examines and refines options in light of adversary capabilities and potential actions/reactions as well as operating environment characteristics such as weather, terrain, and culture.
- **COA Comparison and Decision** requires the commander to review and decide how he will accomplish the mission.
- **Orders Development** translates the commander's decision into direction sufficient to guide implementation and initiative by subordinates.
- **Transition** may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution.



Figure 5-1: MCP Process. Source: MCWP 5-1.¹⁸²

The tenets of the MCP—top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning— derive from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. These tenets guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and execute military operations.

- **Top-Down Planning.** Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander must not merely participate in planning, he must drive the process. His personal involvement and guidance are keys to planning. The commander uses planning to increase understanding of the environment and the problem to support his decision-making.

- **Single-Battle Concept.** Operations or events in one part of the battlespace often have profound and consequent effects on other areas and events; therefore, a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. Commanders prepare for a single battle effort during planning primarily through their intent, which provides the larger context for subordinate units so they can exercise judgment and initiative when the unforeseen occurs while remaining consistent with larger aims.
- **Integrated Planning.** Integrated planning is conducted to coordinate action toward a common purpose by all elements of the force. Integrated planning is facilitated by the assignment of personnel with an appropriate level of knowledge of their respective organization or activity to the operational planning team (OPT). The key to integrated planning is to involve the right personnel from the right organizations in the planning process as early as possible to consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information as broadly as possible.

Important to the MCPP, MAGTF planners and operators must consider the beliefs, norms, and values of the people in their operating environment, while never assuming that these cultural characteristics mirror those of MAGTF forces. Therefore, the cultural understanding of the population within an AO is a critical input when planning for successful MAGTF operations among foreign populations.

5.1.4 Understanding Culture as an Input to Marine Corps Planning

*Culture is of unique importance in understanding an operational environment.*¹⁸³

To understand culture as an input into the MCPP – and the effects upon the resulting operations – Marine planners may require a working definition of culture as an operational tool. The U.S. military uses many definitions of culture. Two useful definitions for Marine Corps commanders and planners can be found in two relevant publications. *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* defines culture as a web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.¹⁸⁴ *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* defines culture as the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influence a person’s and a group’s actions and choices.¹⁸⁵

Regardless of the exact definition used, research and experience has resulted in some basic fundamental aspects of culture Marines should consider to successfully plan and execute military operations in complex, unfamiliar environments:

- Culture influences how people view their world.
- Culture is holistic.
- Culture is learned and shared.
- Culture is created by people and can and does change.¹⁸⁶

A brief description of these fundamental aspects follows:

5.1.4.1 Worldview

The way that a culture influences how people view their world is referred to as their worldview. Many people believe they view their world accurately, in a logical, rational, and unbiased way. However, people filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and worldview. Information and experiences that do not match what they believe to be true about the world are frequently reflected or distorted to fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other factor, culture informs and influences that worldview – perceptions, understandings, and interpretations of events. Marines should recognize

that their interpretation of events may be quite different from others' interpretations within the operating area. If Marines assume that locals will perceive actions the same as they do, they are likely to misjudge their reactions. The pattern of assuming others see events in the same way the U.S. does is referred to as *mirror-imaging*. Mirror-imaging is dangerous as it leads Marines into thinking that their assumptions about a problem and its solution are shared by the population and multinational partners, rather than employing perspective taking and looking at the problem from the population's perspective.¹⁸⁷

5.1.4.2 *Holism*

Holism is based on the principle that all socio-cultural aspects of human life are interconnected. While interacting with other cultures, Marines may be tempted to say their problems "are all about (fill in the blank: tribalism, corruption, lack of work ethic, et cetera)." In truth, every aspect of culture affects every other aspect in some way, even if indirectly. By acknowledging these interconnections, Marines can better assess how the local population might react to their presence and actions.¹⁸⁸

5.1.4.3 *Culture is Learned and Shared*

The process of learning a culture is called socialization. Children learn culture as they grow within a society, but culture can be learned at any age. For example, Marines learn their own service culture later in life through basic or officer training courses which teach Marine culture on ethics and core values. Understanding that culture is learned and shared can offer an important operational and tactical opportunity. A Marine can learn about the local culture simply through interaction with and observation of the local populace within an operating area.¹⁸⁹

5.1.4.4 *Culture Changes*

Large military presence and operations within a culture are often impetus for rapidly changing cultural norms in conflict areas. Since the arrival of a large military, often accompanied by the destruction of physical property and erosion of the local economy and security, is undoubtedly an enormous change for the local population, planners need to plan for the impact their operations will have upon the people and cultures in an area of operations.¹⁹⁰

5.1.5 *Assessing Cultural Situations*

Culturally savvy Marines are a threat to our enemies.

General James N. Mattis, USMC

Military planners use various frameworks and tools to assess and analyze cultural variables during operational planning. There is no formal, doctrinal process to systematically capture all cultural data and to analyze the civil component of an operating area during the MCPP. While no single "checklist" exists to capture the myriad cultural data of an AO, Marine planners can leverage established methodologies to provide the commander with a systematic analysis of the cultural aspects and the civil component of the operational environment. Examples include:

- Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (CIPB)
- Five Operational Culture Dimensions
- District Stability Framework (DSF)
- ASCOPE Across PMESII

Supplemental readings on these frameworks are available for details and further study.

- Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (CIPB) – *CMO Planners Handbook*
- Five Operational Culture Dimensions - *Operational Culture for the Warfighter – Principles and Application*
- District Stability Framework (DSF) – *MSTP Pamphlet Red Cell/Green Cell, Appendix C*
- ASCOPE Across PMESII - *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*

Regardless of the frameworks and tools used to capture and synthesize data for the commander and fellow OPT planners, *MCWP 3.33.5* outlines some fundamental aspects of cultures that planners should understand while assessing any cultural situation.

5.1.5.1 *Patterns*

All human groups interact with their world and each other in some basic, predictable patterns. The particular details of these patterns may vary, but the underlying patterns will not. By identifying these patterns in an AO, Marine planners may better assess the cultural situation and the influence of their operations upon the local population.

5.1.5.2 *Physical Environment*

All cultures have a unique and interdependent connection with their physical surroundings. The physical environment (including climate, terrain, and resources) influences the people living in it by providing a range of possibilities within which they act. People shape their environment by the choices they make, creating a cultural landscape reflecting their social, cultural, economic and political attitudes. A careful reading of the cultural environment can provide useful information about the people who create it, use it, and live in it. A military presence in an AO will affect a local population and its use of the physical environment. Marine planners need to anticipate how their operations will impact local population use of their environment. Since use of the environment is cultural, these impacts may be significantly different than in another culture such as the U.S.

5.1.5.3 *Economy*

All cultures have specific systems for obtaining, producing, and distributing items people need to survive (food, water, shelter) or luxury or material items. This system, which does not necessarily require money or banking, is called the economy of a culture. Formal and informal economies vary greatly among cultures. Also, different exchange methods and expectations from this exchange (money vs. relationship, for instance) of goods and services vary widely. Marine planners who do not assess the economic exchange expectations may find it difficult to anticipate people's behavior in an AO.

5.1.5.4 *Social Structure*

In all cultures, people hold differing positions of status and power often closely related to their roles in a group. The way that a group distinguishes among its members according to their roles, status, and power is reflected in its social structure. Positions within a social structure may depend on many factors such as age, gender, class, family name, tribal membership, ethnicity, religion, and rank. In conflict environments, different groups (tribal, ethnic, religious, et cetera) may each vie for power – often looking to outside militaries to support them.

5.1.5.5 Identity

A concept central to one's place in society is that of identity. Identity is a broad term used to describe how people conceive of themselves and are perceived by others. Identity shapes how people view themselves and the world. Understanding identity is complex because people have multiple identities. In times of conflict, people may choose to emphasize certain group identities, such as nationality or religion. At other times, different identities – such as one's profession or gender – may matter more. Both identity and social structure are extremely important concepts for Marine planners to understand in assessing a cultural environment. Both concepts affect people's allegiances and influence how groups will interpret and respond to U.S. actions.

5.1.5.6 System for Determining Leaders

In all cultures, people have a system that determines who leads the group and who makes decisions about its welfare. Marine planners should understand that both formal and informal leadership and governments can exist within any culture. Whether locals view leaders as legitimate or illegitimate, or effective or ineffective, should also be part of any cultural assessment of an AO. In most AOs, Marines will find that communities or groups are influenced by a variety of leaders, many of whom are not part of the government. Marine planners and operators need to accurately identify the various community leaders and develop strategies to engender the support of local power brokers who can influence the support of local populations.

5.1.5.7 Belief Systems

Cultures are characterized by a shared set of beliefs, values, norms, and symbols that unite a group. These beliefs come from many sources such as a person's background, family, education, religion, or history. Understanding the beliefs and values of a local population is critical for effective information operations. Failure to respect or understand beliefs of a local population can result in serious hostility towards foreign military operations.

5.1.5.8 Religion

Religion can be a powerful force in shaping beliefs. In many cultures, religion and religious leaders have significant influence over the local populations. Because religion is often an integral part of the values set of a local culture, Marine planners should conduct detailed analysis of religion and religious leaders within an AO.

5.1.6 Organizing to Integrate Cultural Considerations into the MCPP

As Marines prepare to integrate cultural considerations into the plan, it is important to recall the tenets of the MCPP: *top down planning*, *single battle concept*, and *integrated planning*.

Integrated planning is facilitated by organizing OPTs with the correct mix of knowledge and experience. Planning teams must develop an understanding of civilian aspects of the AO and the will of the population. There are many techniques to achieve this capability and each unit may approach this differently based on resources and available qualified personnel. The Green Cell is one technique to systematically analyze, synthesize, and present cultural information to the commander and fellow staff planners. (*The Green Cell will be discussed in detail in paragraph 4.2.7.*)

However, a dedicated Green Cell is not always an option for commanders with limited staff resources and expertise in analyzing cultural aspects of an operational environment. The Cultural Advisor (CULAD) is a

concept developed and employed in recent operations in Afghanistan. CULADs, the principle SMEs on culture and planning within their geographic region of expertise, serve as the cultural and language advisors to the commander. The CULAD is a special staff officer for the commander and a member of the planning staff. This advisor can often help explain to the commander what the advisor sees on the ground in the AO. A foreign area officer (FAO) or civil affairs (CA) Marine may be a good selection for a CULAD. These Marines can provide an understanding of the host nation and its specific regional, religious, and ethnic differences, and they may have foreign language skills. As a result, the commander can adjust operations in response to a culturally challenging environment.¹⁹¹

Overall, there are many options to task-organize staffs to incorporate culture into planning. While a Green Cell creates expertise in one part of the staff, those concerns are also important for other staff sections. Consequently, commanders must create staffs that are well-integrated across the warfighting functions. One danger in creating a “cultural cell” within the staff is that it will relegate cultural concerns to one staff element and inhibit integrating cultural concerns throughout the staff and the planning process. Regardless of the particular planning configuration, commanders and planners must find and use whatever cultural resources are available to the unit.

5.1.7 The Green Cell

The **Green Cell** is an ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of education and experience capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the host nation government, and other stakeholders within the operating environment. The Green Cell helps to inform the commander, as well as his staff and the OPT, creating a better understanding of the operating environment throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP).¹⁹²

5.1.7.1 Purpose

The Green Cell is a working group which assists the commander, staff, and the OPT in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both friendly and threat forces. The cell articulates the actions and dynamics of selected individuals, groups, tangible assets, and cultural factors in the civil environment which may significantly impact friendly operations. Like the Red Cell, the Green Cell is used throughout the entire planning process. The Green Cell focuses on developing a “civil environment model” for testing, improving, and modifying friendly courses of action to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment, and to mitigate potential negative effects.

While the purpose of a Green Cell is to consider the population in order to promote a better understanding of the civil environment through the entire MCP process, at a minimum the Green Cell provides for the independent will of the population. The Green Cell may also provide consideration for non-DOD entities, such as IGOs or NGOs.

5.1.7.2 Staff Cognizance

Whenever practicable, the Green Cell should fall under staff cognizance of the senior CA staff member in the command. Usually, CA staff members are resident at the MARFOR/MEF/MEB G-9. Less common, CA staff expertise may be resident on the MAGTF MSC G-3/S-3, or the Battalion/Squadron S-3 staff at these command echelons. When this expertise is not resident on command staffs, staff cognizance of the Green Cell should fall to a staff member in the Intelligence section, or even under the OPT leader. In any case, the Green Cell should have a clearly designated staff cognizance relationship in order to ensure effective advocacy for resourcing, staffing, and other issues.

5.1.7.3 Staff Composition

The cognizant staff officer, in close coordination with the OPT leader, will direct standup of the Green Cell and designate the Green Cell officer-in-charge (OIC). The OIC will direct and oversee the detailed work of the Green Cell, coordinate Green Cell efforts with other command and external planning organizations (Intelligence section, Red Cell, higher and adjacent Green Cell equivalent organizations, et cetera), and serve as the primary “voice” and “face” of the Green Cell to the commander and the OPT. The OIC can be a Foreign Area Officer, Regional Affairs Officer, or expert in a civil-military operations (CMO) functional area relevant to the command’s battlespace (such as public works or governance). Above all, the Green Cell OIC should be an experienced MAGTF professional who can effectively synthesize, apply, and articulate relevant Green Cell input to the command planning process.

Other factors influencing cell composition may include:

- the security classification level of the planning evolution
- “high-demand, low-density” SME availability (in some cases, the Green Cell may “share” a SME with another planning organization (intelligence section, red cell, combat engineer section, et cetera)
- in the case of non-DOD / U.S. interagency organizations – the willingness of those organizations to participate in a military planning evolution

By the very nature of the civil environment, the Green Cell will often require “non-traditional” cell membership – to include interorganizational, coalition / host nation civil officials, cultural / academic SMEs, and in some cases members of the civil population in the battlespace. This “non-traditional” membership requires creative ways to physically integrate members into the cell and to integrate their intellectual input and products into the process. Additionally, non-DOD personnel may only be available on a limited or part-time basis. Despite these challenges, the Green Cell OIC should make the necessary effort to integrate “non-traditional” member expertise and input. This input is often critical to understanding the civil environment and the character of the population with whom Marine forces must interact.

5.1.7.4 Contributions to the MCPP

During deliberate planning with the MCPP, the chief contribution of the Green Cell usually occurs during the COA Wargame step. However, Green Cell input plays a role in each step of the MCPP.

5.1.7.4.1 Receipt of Mission

The Commander forms the Green Cell upon receipt of mission and prior to the problem framing step of the MCPP. The Green Cell will add to the Commander’s and OPT’s cultural understanding of the operating environment. In order to support the OPT, the Green Cell understands the OPT mission and tasks and is constructed to translate cultural information that is relevant to the overall OPT mission.

5.1.7.4.2 Problem Framing

During problem framing, a critical function of the Green Cell will be the development and approval of the Civil Environment Model concept. As early as possible in this step, the Green Cell OIC should brief his staff cognizant officer and the OPT leader / selected OPT members on the key influences that the cell intends to portray in the planning process. The key influences the cell portrays will determine the direction and

scope of Green Cell activities for the remainder of the process, and drive the commander, staff, and OPT to understand the civil environment and its effects on friendly plans and operations.

Other activities during this step include cell members gaining situational awareness, and providing civil environment input to the commander and OPT design dialogue. Green Cell members also assist in ensuring that aspects of the Civil Environment Model¹⁹³ are applied to the center of gravity analysis, suggested commander's intent, proposed commander's critical information requirements, assumptions, task analysis, and the other staff actions performed during the problem framing step. The Green Cell will also coordinate with the OPT to provide relevant input for the OPT *Problem Framing Brief*. This input should include a summary of significant aspects of the civil environment (individuals, groups, infrastructure, and belief sets / intangibles) as well as associated potential friendly planning considerations.

Green Cell Actions – Problem Framing

- Gain and develop situational awareness
- Ensure OPT integrates civil and cultural considerations into its understanding of the operational environment
- Participate in design dialogue and contribute to IPB
- Complete sources of conflict/resiliency study

5.1.7.4.3 COA Development

During COA Development, the OPT develops one or more options for how the mission and commander's intent might be accomplished. As options are developed, the Green Cell ensures that the OPT considers the civil environment. The cell assesses how friendly actions might affect the civil environment, provides the OPT with feedback on these effects, and suggests possible enhancement or mitigation measures that can be built into COAs. In addition, the Green Cell begins COA wargame preparation, and continues to refine the Civil Environment Model.

The Civil Environment Model can be used to provide specific recommendations to COA development. Examples include:

- *Identification of key influences.* Key influences (individuals, groups, tangible assets, and societal-cultural factors) become potential engagement targets for friendly leadership, units, and organizations – in particular, the command effects and assessment cells may identify key influences for further information collection and nonlethal shaping. Key influence engagements will often translate into COA tasks for subordinate elements.
- *Identification of grievances.* By identifying grievances of specific groups or influential leaders, the OPT can generate tasks to subordinate elements, along with intermediate objectives, that address grievances that need to be mitigated for friendly success. Likewise, grievances associated with threat actions can be used to a friendly advantage in a COA.
- *Identification of “windows of opportunity” and “windows of vulnerability.”* Key events (holidays, elections, et cetera) may create opportunity or vulnerability for friendly force COAs, and influence the timing, scope, and location of friendly actions. Likewise, civil events may be windows of opportunity or vulnerability for threat forces.

In addition to aiding friendly COA development, the Green Cell may support the CMO or CA OPT representative (if one assigned) in developing the CMO portion of the synchronization matrix and the CMO staff estimate / supporting concepts, while providing CMO input to the OPT course of action brief. Lastly, the Green Cell provides input from the civil environment perspective to assist the commander in

the development of his COA wargame guidance and evaluation criteria, which may be given to the OPT at the conclusion of the COA development step.

5.1.7.4.4 COA War Game

The COA wargame is used to improve the plan by examining and refining options (COAs) in relation to adversary capabilities and actions, as well as in relation to the physical and civil environments. In this step, the Green Cell “brings the civil environment to life” in the form of key influence wargame actions that describe how friendly COAs, threat actions, and the civil environment will affect one another.

The importance of a well-developed Civil Environment Model and the proper selection of key influences will become readily apparent during the COA wargame. If the model does not have sufficient detail – and/or if too many, too few, or the “wrong” key influences have been selected – then the ability of the Green Cell to assist the OPT in assessing, refining, and modifying friendly COAs will be degraded.

COA wargame can take many forms, from a quick tabletop discussion at the small unit level to a complex multi-day event at higher echelons. In most cases, a normal wargame “turn” consists of a friendly action portion (friendly force representatives brief actions along warfighting function or lines of operation [LOO]) which are then followed by a threat reaction portion (Red Cell briefs reactions in response to friendly actions). Following the Red Cell reaction, the Green Cell should brief civil environment reactions by key influences - a significant point is that civil environment reactions are in response to both the friendly action AND the threat reaction within that turn.

The “reaction” portions of the turn are then followed by a “counteraction” portion - based on the outcome of “action / reaction,” the friendly initial action may be “modified” based on the results of the turn. Note that this modification is an improvement / enhancement to the initial friendly COA action and not an additional friendly “turn” within the wargame turn. Note also that, while the Red Cell may have created its own undesired effects in the civil environment due to its “reaction” during that turn, the Red Cell will not normally modify (counteract) the threat COA - it is worth discussing in the OPT, but the purpose of the COA wargame is not to “improve” the threat COA.

From a civil environment perspective, the Green Cell helps improve the friendly COA by realistic and well-developed Green Cell reactions portraying key influences, as well as by providing feedback to the OPT on opportunities / risks in the friendly COA and identification of 2nd and 3rd order effects of friendly actions that may impact the mission.

The Green Cell continues to work with the CMO and/or CA OPT representative in developing the CMO staff estimate, supporting concept, et cetera. The cell also provides relevant input to the CMO OPT representative for the COA wargame brief, with emphasis on advantages / disadvantages of COAs from a civil environment perspective.

5.1.7.4.5 COA Comparison and Decision

The Green Cell should be prepared to provide input to this process by explaining how the wargamed COA(s) affected the civil environment and key influences. If COAs are compared, the Green Cell will offer input about which COA was most (and which was least effective) in achieving friendly objectives / end states in the civil environment.

5.1.7.4.6 Orders Development

During this step, the decision could be made to stand down the Green Cell. This should be a mutual decision involving the staff cognizant officer and OPT leader. However, the Green Cell OIC may still serve as a resource to other staff sections as they develop their portion of the orders.

5.1.7.4.7 Transition

This step is a wide range of activities conducted to ensure a successful shift by the force from planning to execution of the plan. Similar to the orders development step, having the Green Cell OIC available during transition can greatly facilitate translating the products and rationale of planning to the assets that will execute the plan.

5.1.8 Conclusion

An effective Green Cell integrates diverse perspectives and skill sets into the planning process and produces appropriate products or dialogue that strengthen the overall planning effort. Throughout the planning process, it is imperative the Green Cell be in close communication with the OPT and staff.¹⁹⁴

5.2 Culture and Interorganizational Operations

Sources and Supplemental Readings for Section 4.2

- *MCRP 3-36B MAGTF Interorganizational Coordination*
- *JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*
- *Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Special Forces Advisor Reference Book, Research Planning Inc., October 2001.*

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.

General James Mattis, USMC (May 2010)

5.2.1 Interorganizational Operations Overview

The DOD conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. Each interorganizational partner brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the task of coordination. Additionally, each USG agency has different authorities which govern operations and determine the use of its resources. These factors can make planning and operating in an interorganizational environment very different for Marines practiced in only USMC or joint service operations. Key terms in discussing interorganizational operations, planning, and coordination include:

Interorganizational Coordination — *the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector*

Interagency — *of or pertaining to USG agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense*

Intergovernmental Organization — *an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union*

Nongovernmental Organization — *a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society*

Private Sector — *an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations¹⁹⁵*

Interorganizational coordination aids in:

- *Facilitating Unity of Effort.* Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination.
- *Achieving Common Objectives.* Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.
- *Providing Common Understanding.* Interorganizational coordination is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced. Such common understandings will be essential to enable stakeholders to operate effectively in the same space, identifying opportunities for cooperation and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

The role of the Marine Corps is to be responsive and scalable, teaming with other services, interagency partners, and allies. Forecasts of the future security environment include threats and challenges; the solutions for which require a sustainable, integrated, whole-of-government application of national power and influence. Collaboration with the Marine Corps' interagency partners NGOs, IGOs, and multinational partners – all with their own distinct cultures – before and during a crisis is a critical component to reduce risk and help ensure the Nation's strategic success.¹⁹⁶

5.2.1.1 *Interorganizational Coordination Challenges*

Why is it often so difficult for USG agencies and other organizations to work together? The U.S. Army Special Forces Command addresses these difficulties:

Part of the answer is found in the fact that organizations, like nations, can have cultures that are very different from one another. Even though all parties may agree to the ends, the ways and the means may differ from agency to agency. Distinct organizational cultures can inhibit cooperation among agencies. Commonly an agency employs resources in ways that run counter to other agencies' cultures. What one agency views as "by the book," another may see as "slow and bureaucratic;" "fast and loose" to one is "flexible and responsive" to another.

The UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations often do not understand the military or military organization; likewise the military often does not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions of military capabilities, and little or no understanding of limitations and restrictions. On the other hand, the U.S. military personnel do not realize that those organizations do not have a real chain of command as they are used to. In dealing with NGOs in particular it can be very hard to know who to listen to. They generally lack one voice that could speak for all subordinates, sometimes even within a single NGO.¹⁹⁷

Some of the interorganizational planning and operations challenges for MAGTF planners include:

- interagency partners operate under disparate authorities and often have very different institutional cultures, norms, and agendas than the Marine Corps
- often interagency operational doctrine is very broad and lacks a concept of operations
- there is a limited comprehensive interagency planning frameworks and authorities
- demand for interagency expertise in operations, training, education, experimentation, and engagement generally outpaces supply
- interagency organizations have different planning and assessment practices than those recognized by the Marine Corps
- stability operations are core missions that have a high requirement for interagency integration. Currently, there is no Marine Corps doctrine for stability operations.
- currently, there are limited methods to identify and track interagency experience within the Marine Corps
- interagency partners manning and resourcing levels are significantly lower than those of the Department of Defense

5.2.1.2 Policy

United States law, policy, and the requirements of ongoing operations dictate that Marines integrate interorganizational capabilities into both service-led operations and operations in support of another service, partner, or ally. Effective integration requires an understanding of the authorities available to a MAGTF and its partners, as well as their application in a complex operational environment. Marines must understand responsibilities beyond their traditional role, to include the capabilities and limitations of partnering organizations. MAGTF planners must coordinate with partners from the early planning phase through all phases of an operation.

In 2010, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed improvement in Marine Corps interagency interoperability. It was an effort that yielded the *United States Marine Corps Interagency Integration Strategy* — which became *Annex V* to the *Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan* — and involved both policy and capability development products. It articulates the following mission:

The Marine Corps will strengthen integration with select interagency organizations in order to effectively plan and execute operations across the range of military operations, both for current operations and to posture Marine Corps forces to remain the Nation's premier expeditionary force in readiness.

DOD conducts interorganizational coordination across the range of military operations. Depending on the operation (e.g. domestic and/or foreign) coordination will occur within the federal USG; with state and/or local governments; with tribal authorities; with intergovernmental organizations; with nongovernmental organizations, and with the private sector. Interorganizational coordination enables unity of effort, allows for common objectives, and provides common understanding. Marines are increasingly deployed into complex and volatile situations where the separation between the warfighting and peace support is unclear. The requirement for pre-conflict and post-conflict stabilization has become central, such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

5.2.1.3 *Unified Action and Unity of Effort*

The concepts of unified action and unity of effort are critical to interorganizational mission success. Marines conducting complex operations in the future security environment will continue to pursue unity of effort to achieve unified action objectives. Achieving effective interorganizational command and control in the military sense is extremely challenging because of the number of interorganizational entities participating as partners in the operating environment. Command and control is further complicated because many of

Unified Action – the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort

Unity of Effort – coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action¹⁹⁸

these partners are not under the military chain of command. Other constructs for managing and influencing military and interorganizational partnered operations are required to achieve unified action and unity of effort. Military forces organize to achieve unity of command, a central principal of joint operations. Achieving unity of command is possible as all military forces work in a hierarchy in which one person is in charge of the overall military operation. Unity of effort requires dedication to establish personal relationships among military commanders, subordinates, and interorganizational counterparts. Commanders must understand the differing perspectives of organizations outside the DOD.

Unified action begins with national strategic direction from the President, and includes a wide scope of actions such as interorganizational coordination techniques, information sharing, collaborative planning, and the synchronization of military operations with the activities of all the civilian stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination depends on a spirit of cooperation, while military efforts depend on command and control and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military command and control can facilitate unified action when adjusted to the dynamics of

interorganizational coordination and different organizational cultures. Marine leaders should work with civilian stakeholders with skill, tact, and persistence. Unified action is promoted through close, continuous coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

Achieving unity of effort requires the application of a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. An inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders is often more appropriate than a military command and control (C2) focused approach. Taking an authoritative, military approach may be counterproductive to effective interorganizational relationships, impede unified action, and compromise mission accomplishment. Gaining unity of effort is never settled and permanent; it takes constant effort to sustain interorganizational relationships. Important to achieving unified action and unity of effort is a *whole-of-government approach* by USG agencies:

Whole-of-Government Approach

Integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of the full range of available USG capabilities and resources that reinforce progress and create synergies. This approach facilitates all USG capabilities and resources being shared, leveraged, synchronized, and applied toward the strategic end state. In order to do this, interagency members must, to the greatest degree possible, resist seeing their resources (e.g., financial, diplomatic, military, development, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, consular, commerce) as belonging to a single agency, but rather as tools of USG power.¹⁹⁹

5.2.1.4 Command and Control for Unified Action

Regardless of whether the operation is domestic or foreign, the U.S. military conducts joint operations commanded by a Joint Force Commander (JFC). A JFC may be a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or joint task force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. During Phase 0, which is to shape the environment, GCCs conduct operations through their Service components. In other situations, requiring the use of military force, GCCs create JTFs, which provide air, ground, and naval forces to the JTF commander. Most JTF commanders organize by function with air, ground, and naval components.

The MAGTF commander and his staff have expanded responsibilities when their operations occur alongside other organizational actors, especially in the area of problem understanding and operational deconfliction. These expanded responsibilities place increased demands on commanders and staffs at all levels that hold rigidly to military principles of chain of command and doctrine. Working with interorganizational partners requires negotiation skills, compromise, and patience. Commanders and staff officers interact with a larger number of personnel who are not under the formal military chain of command. Marines must understand the roles and responsibilities of these new partners, and work with them to ensure a common approach to problem framing and problem solving is developed.

5.2.2 Interorganizational Coordination

5.2.2.1 Domestic Interagency Operations

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the Nation. The Homeland Security Council is made up of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Homeland Security, Attorney General, SecDef, and other individuals designated by the President. For the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the USG relating to homeland security, the Homeland Security Council:

- Assesses the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of homeland security and makes resulting recommendations to the President
- Oversees and reviews homeland security policies of the USG and makes resulting recommendations to the President
- Performs such other functions as the President may direct

Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in some respects, fall into two mission areas—homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). The two GCCs with major homeland defense and DSCA missions are USNORTHCOM and USPACOM as their AORs include the U.S. and its territories. The CJCS ensures that homeland defense and DSCA plans and operations are compatible with other military plans.

CJCS responsibilities relating to homeland defense and homeland security include:

- advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs
- assisting the SecDef with implementing operational responses to threats or acts of terrorism
- translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to provide assistance to the primary agency

5.2.2.2 Foreign Interagency Operations

SecDef is a regular member of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Principals Committee. The NSC System is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. The CJCS acts as spokesperson for the combatant commanders, especially on their operational requirements. The CJCS also represents combatant command interests in the NSC System through direct communication with the combatant commanders and their staffs. Combatant commanders and their staffs can coordinate most of their standing




Figure 5-2: Integrating the Interagency Community.
Source: JP 3-08.²⁰⁰

requirements with the Chief of Mission (COM) and their joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization).

5.2.2.2.1 The Country Team

The senior, U.S. bilateral coordinating and supervising representative body in the foreign country is known as the country team. The DOS provides the core staff of a country team and coordinates the participation of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A country team is led by the COM who is usually the ambassador or the *chargé d'affaires*. The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an international governmental organization. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning directly to the GCC and JTF. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from the COM's statutory authority, the COM confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate U.S. military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the host nation. The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. programs and policies.

5.2.2.2.2 GCCs and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)

GCCs are augmented by representatives from other USG agencies to effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater, and to incorporate those instruments into regional strategies and into campaign and operation plans. GCCs use the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) staff structure to facilitate interorganizational coordination. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

Composed of USG civilian and military experts tailored to meet the requirements of a supported GCC, the JIACG (or equivalent organizations) provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the DOD and the NSC and HSC systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and CAP, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.

JIACG is a common DOD term across combatant commands. The operational environment and differing missions for each combatant command




Figure 5-3: Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure. Source: JP 3-08.²⁰¹

has resulted in unique organizations (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, interagency group), but with similar functions. If augmented with other partners such as IGOs, NGOs, and/or multinational representatives, the JIACG enhances the capability to collaborate and coordinate with those organizations and the private sector.

5.2.3 Interorganizational Planning

In the interorganizational operating environment, differences in organizational culture and priorities result in critical differences in planning. These organizational differences pose challenges in ensuring the alignment of the various plans. One of the challenges associated with planning whole-of-government operations with other USG departments and agencies is ensuring consideration of a broader and somewhat unfamiliar set of planning approaches, organizational timelines, and different notions of mission success. For example, many nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations have limited budgets with long-term time horizons; they tend to see mission success in what is achievable and sustainable over the long term.

A lack of understanding by counterparts of how each of the participating organizations are structured – and how each organization approaches its responsibilities – can result in misunderstandings and communication failures. Organizations tend to have their own unique culture, which influences their decision-making processes and how they perceive and approach problems.

As discussed in Section 4.1, culture is a critical variable in planning operations among foreign populations in foreign operating environments. IGOs, NGOs, and multinational partners can bring important insight and expertise into the local culture not resident on MAGTF staffs. Critical to planning for and coordinating this insight is understanding information sharing challenges in interorganizational operations.

5.2.3.1 Information Sharing

All military operations are information intensive. Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of non-USG organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military, and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, Marine planners can help encourage active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis.

Locally stationed IGO and NGO personnel are usually well-qualified individuals who understand the local culture and practices, and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. Commanders at all levels should determine and provide guidance on what information needs to be shared with whom and when. DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made available throughout the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the maximum extent allowed. Commanders and staffs need to recognize the criticality of the information-sharing function at the outset of complex operations, and not as an afterthought. The relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

- historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand
- local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces with the populace
- local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders
- security situation

- role and capabilities of the host nation government.

This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. Therefore, it is important to not compromise the position of the IGOs and impartiality of the NGOs, and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of unity of effort and a common purpose. A collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue—effective, low-cost network equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task sharing and collaborative planning — all of which depend on communications and management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate effective civilian-military coordination:

- a lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation
- suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering
- tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data for operations security (OPSEC) and “need to know,” versus the civilian need for transparency
- differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities
- the compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures

The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding source — whether it is an NGO, IGO, assisting country government, or host government — can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration, and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of information among civilian and military organizations.

C2 structures should be equipped with the capability to access the Internet to ensure effective collaboration with the external mission participants (e.g., IGOs, NGOs). The JFC establishes interoperable and compatible communications by using available commercial telecommunications networks, military satellite channels, C2 radio and radar coverage, and conventional military communications systems to support the exchange of orders, directions, and information among all participants. Establishment of direct communications between commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), and the private sector facilitates effective coordination and decision-making. Information protection for non-secure communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning must consider the termination or transition of U.S. involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations.²⁰²

Terminology in information sharing during planning can also be a challenge in interorganizational operations. Among diplomacy, development, and defense communities, there are frequently important differences in the way that basic terms are used with regard to planning. For example, one agency's strategy is another agency's plan, or one agency's goal is another agency's intermediate objective. Marine planners should recognize and plan for misunderstandings in language and terminology during these operations.

5.2.4 Interorganizational Considerations for the MCPP

MAGTF commanders and staffs must continually consider how to involve relevant government agencies and other nonmilitary organizations in the planning process. They must also integrate and synchronize joint force actions with the operations of these agencies. In addition to real world planning events, interorganizational partners should be included in MAGTF planning through training and exercises.

The following subparagraphs provide important planning considerations for MAGTF commanders across the first three steps of the MCPP —*Problem Framing*, *COA Development*, and *COA War Game*. Failure to include partners early in planning prevents effective development of interorganizational teams and inhibits collaborative planning. Failures in collaboration often result in an “us-versus-them” mentality that could negatively impact interorganizational coordination

5.2.4.1 *Problem Framing*

During the Problem Framing step of the planning process, planners should consider the following:

Problem Framing – Interorganizational Considerations

- establish contact with the JTF commander and other component commanders
- establish preliminary contact with the country team
- identify all agencies and organizational partners and invite them to MAGTF planning sessions
- understand the role each agency and organizational partner plays in the operation
- identify the resources of each participant to increase collective effort and reduce duplication of effort
- identify the legal and fiscal authorities for the operation
- determine whether there is a status of forces agreement in effect. If not, should a status of forces agreement or some other type of international agreement be negotiated or implemented
- determine whether interpreters are available
- identify constraints imposed by the host nation
- define the types of information that can and cannot be exchanged
- identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities
- begin to identify range of funding sources available
- examine applicable national and international maritime laws
- conduct initial assessment
- form an inclusive planning team with wide representation to ensure linkage among agencies and with the host nation
- establish transition criteria with measures of effectiveness and measures of performance
- support the development of the strategic narrative
- ensure the analysis carefully considers the complex set of actors (public, private, military, and civilian personnel and organizations) with a range of motivations
- ensure the analysis includes the identification of transnational entities, such as the European Union for example²⁰³

5.2.4.2 Course of Action Development

During the COA Development step of the planning process, planners should consider the following:

COA Development – Interorganizational Considerations

- include interorganizational partners
- compromise as necessary with key partners to achieve unity of effort
- identify short-term actions to help build momentum within the framework of strategic goals
- plan solutions that are implementable by host nation organizations and sustainable over the long term
- consider battlespace options that preserve maritime freedom of action
- provide for displaced civilian and detainee management
- provide a platform for special operations forces afloat forward staging base, as required²⁰⁴

5.2.4.3 Course of Action War Game

During the COA War Game step of the planning process, planners should consider the following:

COA War Game – Interorganizational Considerations

- include white, green, and red cells during the War Game
- use existing NGO/IGO assessments and open source analysis tools
- ensure lethal effects do not create unmanageable consequences in subsequent phases
- ensure COAs include consideration for human rights traditionally guaranteed by the state or by international organizations empowered to do so
- ensure communications plan supports unity of effort
- examine plan for intelligence and information sharing with all partners
- identify the logistical requirements (e.g., food and water, shelter, medical, transport, engineering) that must be provided to the host nation and to other partners
- assess COA against strategic narrative
- modify COA as needed in order to link to the strategic narrative²⁰⁵

During interorganizational planning, MAGTF partners may also be included in the *Orders Development* and *Transition* steps of the MCPP. If not however, these partner organizations should certainly be informed of MAGTF actions during these steps, as necessary, to facilitate *unified action* and *unity of effort* during interorganizational operations.

5.2.5 Interorganizational Coordination Resources and Enablers

5.2.5.1 Assessment Models

Various assessment frameworks/models have been developed by elements of the interorganizational community to assist in assessing status, evaluating progress, and measuring effectiveness of interorganizational activities in support of a range of domestic and international support activities. A few of these assessment frameworks / models have gained broad acceptance and are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

5.2.5.1.1 Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

The purpose of the ICAF is to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant USG departments and agencies of the dynamics that drive and mitigate conflict within a country that informs U.S. policy and planning decisions. The framework may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. The ICAF is a process and a tool available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning.

The ICAF draws on existing methodologies for assessing conflict that are currently in use by various USG agencies as well as international organizations and NGOs. The ICAF is not intended to duplicate existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the intelligence community. Rather, it builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework through which USG agencies can leverage and share the knowledge from their own assessments to establish a common interagency perspective.

The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of instability or violent conflict. The ICAF builds upon this forecasting by assisting an interagency team in understanding why such conditions may exist and how to best engage to transform them. To do so, the ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by which an interagency team will identify societal and situational dynamics that are shown to increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, an ICAF analysis provides a shared, strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured.

The ICAF can be used by the full range of USG agencies at any planning level. Conducting an ICAF might be an iterative process with initial results built upon as the USG engagement expands. For example, an ICAF done in Washington at the start of a crisis might be enhanced later by a more in-depth examination in-country. The level of detail into which the ICAF goes will depend upon the conflict and type of USG engagement. The two major components of the ICAF are the *conflict diagnosis* and the *segue into planning*.

1. *Conflict Diagnosis* - Using the conceptual framework for diagnosing a conflict (*Figure 5-3*) the interagency team will deliver a product that describes the context, core grievances and social/institutional resilience, conflict-drivers/mitigators, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict. For detailed information on when and how to use the ICAF see *JP-3.08 Appendix H*.

2. *Segue into Planning* – An ICAF analysis should be part of the first step in the process of planning for conflict. It should inform the establishment of USG goals, design or reshaping of activities, implementation or revision of programs, or allocation of resources. The interagency planning process within which an ICAF analysis is performed determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF analysis, the time and place for conducting it, the type of product needed and how the product will be used, and the level of classification required.

When an ICAF is undertaken to support crisis response planning or contingency planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into situation analysis and policy formulation steps of the planning process. Specifically, the findings are inputs to the Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.




Figure 5-4: Conceptual Framework for Diagnosing a Conflict.

Source: JP 3-08.²⁰⁶

When an ICAF is undertaken to support interagency engagement or conflict prevention planning, after completing the diagnosis, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Team (ICAT) begins preplanning activities. During the segue into these types of planning, the ICAT maps existing diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors to identify gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics, it is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or value of any program or initiative. The ICAT uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities.²⁰⁷

5.2.5.1.2 Stability Assessment Framework

The Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) methodology is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support the civil affairs methodology and nonlethal targeting approaches during MAGTF operations. The SAF methodology helps Marine and civilian practitioners identify sources of instability and stability, design programs or activities that address those sources, and measure the effect of those programs or activities in fostering stability.

The SAF methodology is a holistic analytical, programming, and assessment tool that reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on understanding and integrating multiple perspectives into planning and assessment. The SAF methodology has four basic components, nested within both the civil affairs methodology and the Marine Corps Planning Process. These components (civil preparation of the battlespace, analysis, design and monitoring, and evaluation) complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes used during civil affairs operations. To the maximum extent possible, all relevant

actors and organizations in the battlespace should be encouraged to participate in the SAF process to create comprehensive efforts while conducting stability operations.²⁰⁸

5.2.5.1.3 Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework

Published by USAID but recognized as guidance for the USG, the Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework (ISSAF) provides a 10-step framework for security sector analysis. Because detailed assessments of a host nation's security, rule of law, and justice sectors are critical to understand and strengthen partner security sector capacity, the ISSAF is increasingly in use.²⁰⁹

5.2.5.1.4 Other Models

Other assessment models have been developed and used by various organizations: some based in systems design and others based in civil engineering or conflict simulation study. Additional assessment models include:

- ASCOPE: area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (characteristics of civil considerations during a military campaign)
- DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic elements of national power
- PMESII: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information are elements in system of systems thinking. The PMESII model describes the foundation and features of an enemy (or ally) state, can help determine the state's strengths and weaknesses, and help estimate the effects various actions will have on states across these areas

5.2.6 Conclusion

MAGTF commanders and staffs have expanded responsibilities when their operations occur alongside other organizational actors with different organizational cultures, especially in problem framing and operational integration and deconfliction. These expanded responsibilities place increased demands on commanders and staffs at all levels that hold rigidly to military principles of chain of command and doctrine. Working with interorganizational partners requires negotiation skills, compromise, and patience. Some summary thoughts on operating in interagency and interorganizational environments are offered below:

Operating with other USG Agencies

Develop an Understanding of Other Agencies, Departments, and Organizations. Other Federal agencies and NGOs can see the ends, ways, and means differently than DOD. Interagency participants should understand that agencies are often guided by their unique cultures.

Establish Unifying Goals. Successful interagency operations require a consensus on a unifying goal. Reaching consensus on a unifying goal is the most important prerequisite for successful interagency operations. Consensus is frail and must be constantly nurtured; consensus is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. The objective is to ensure that everyone has a stake in the outcome.

Determine Mutual Needs. After developing an understanding of other agencies, determine the mutual needs between your unit and each of the other agencies. What things are important to both your unit and to other organizations?

Establish Functional Interdependence. Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is the strongest and the most lasting potential bond between agencies, departments, and organizations. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes a framework for cooperation.

Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. Long- and short-term objectives should be considered separately. Participants should not lose sight of establishing a continuing relationship in deference to the issue at hand. Dominating on a short time issue can poison future relationships.

Operating with IGOs and NGOs

Remember that the members of IGOs and NGOs:

- are just as committed to their cause as you are to yours
- are extremely unlikely to accept subordinate or junior partner status with military
- have on-ground and in-country experience that may vastly exceed yours
- are essential in the transition to peace
- vary widely in willingness to work with the military
- usually stress impartiality, neutrality, and independence above all else.
- are sometimes suspicious of the purpose of your activities
- may choose to work near you but not with you
- have no central command. There is no "CINCNGO." They only work for their organization, but will work out cooperative efforts on ground
- may perceive info gathering as an interrogation²¹⁰

Ultimately, successful integration during interorganizational operations comes down to the commander and the staff, and the personal relationships they form with their counterparts in the AO. As *MCWP 3.33.5* notes:

The importance of the commander's personal involvement in building interorganizational trust, understanding, mutual respect, and friendships cannot be overstated. If organizational leaders do not set the appropriate tone and establish the necessary climate, the best whole-of-government plan will fail.²¹¹

5.3 Culture and Command Communication Strategy

Sources and Supplemental Readings for Section 4.3

- *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*
- *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Joint Warfighting Center, June 2010*
- *Joint Doctrine Note 2-13: Commander's Communication Synchronization, 16 April 2013*
- *FM 3-14 Inform and Influence Activities*

It's impossible to not communicate. Everything one does – even an attempt to do nothing – communicates something to somebody somewhere.²¹²

5.3.1 Introduction

Communication is not merely a matter of what is said, but is also, perhaps primarily, a matter of what is done. For this reason, communication cannot be treated as a discrete function within military planning and operations. Rather, communication strategies must be fully integrated into planning and operations to ensure consistent alignment between the military's words and deeds. Simply put, the U.S. military must prove both more trustworthy and more credible than its enemies.²¹³ Marines' actions in their AO are the most powerful influence on credibility of their commander's message. All audiences (including local, regional, and threat) compare the friendly force's message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by building trust and credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose credibility. Loss of credibility makes Marine forces vulnerable to threat counter propaganda, and places our forces at a disadvantage.

In this age of interconnected global communication networks and social media platforms, everything a military force does sends a message. Strategies, policies, plans, and actual military operations communicate intent in ways that confirm or conflict with what we want the audience to believe. MAGTF actions in foreign operating environments send clear messages to many different groups. In our messaging among varied cultural groups, what's meant isn't always what's perceived, adding further complexity to the communication process. Regardless of actions taken or not taken, words spoken/written or left unsaid, and images disseminated or withheld, Marine forces on the ground are always communicating something. Whether or not the consequences or effects communicate what the MAGTF or JFC intended. Not synchronizing communication activities and operations results in conflicting messages, reduces credibility, directly impacts communication effectiveness, and allows the adversary to undermine our credibility and narrative.

Cultural awareness and analysis are important tools to assist MAGTF planners in culturally vetting and synchronizing operational words and images with actions when developing communication strategies to support operations among unfamiliar cultures. Cultural analysis of all target audiences in an operating environment will increase the likelihood that “message sent is message received” in words and actions by these target audiences of different cultures.

5.3.2 Communication Strategy Terminology

Though the term “strategic” communication may connote developing communication strategies at the national strategic level, communication strategies apply at all levels of command across the range of military operations. A rifle platoon commander may have a communication strategy for engaging local audiences in his AO, just as the *National Security Strategy* may provide key strategic communications to global audiences at the national levels. Joint publications recognize the problem with the term “strategic” and explain thusly:

Using the term “strategic” communication naturally brings a mistaken intuition that it resides only at the strategic level. However, every level of command needs a strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions in support of SC-related objectives and ensuring the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. This strategy must be coordinated with those above, below and adjacent in order to deliver a mutually supporting communication to the intended audiences. In order to eliminate the confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term “strategic,” we may want to consider using the term “Communication Strategy” for the overall construct, leaving specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of war. For example, the U.S. Army uses the term “information engagement” at the tactical level, “commander’s communication strategy” at the operational level, and “strategic communication” at the strategic level.

*Commander’s Handbook for SC and Communication Strategy,
Joint Warfighting Center 2010*

Some doctrinal terminology and the concept of “nesting” communication strategies for consistency, credibility, and unity of effort within any operating environment are important to the concept of strategic communication.

Some key terms relevant to developing a command communication strategy include:

- *Strategic communication* — Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power
- *Communication strategy* – A commander’s strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support national level strategic

communication-related objectives, and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level

- *Commander's communication synchronization* – A joint force commander's process for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives, and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communication activities
- *Narrative* - enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state
- *Theme* – an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives
- *Message* – a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a theme
- *Target audience*– an individual or group selected for influence (JP 3-13)
- *Information environment* – the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13)
- *Information operations* – the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13)

5.3.2.1 Nesting

Themes provided from the strategic level will necessarily be very broad and typically do not change for the duration of the operation. Commanders must create their own themes that are appropriate for their level of command, are slow to change, achieve specific objectives, and support higher-level themes. To provide a consistent effect, the themes at each level must be nested underneath the themes of the next higher level, and all levels support the strategic themes. Messages are subordinate to themes and deliver precise information to a specific audience to create desired effects while supporting one or a number of themes. Messages are necessarily more dynamic, but must always support the themes. This construct is widely accepted and used throughout the force.

In sum, messages should support the themes at that level, the themes should support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes, and themes at all levels should support strategic themes and the enduring national narrative. This ensures consistent communications to global audiences over time.

5.3.2.2 Battle of the Narrative

Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners construct a narrative to help understand and explain an operational environment, its problem, and solutions. Narratives are tied to actions in an operational environment. A narrative is a brief description of a commander's story used to visualize the effects the commander wants to achieve in an information environment to support and shape an operational environment.²¹⁴

For enduring conflicts, such as the previously named “Global War on Terrorism,” there can be a continuing clash between the competing narratives of the protagonists – often referred to as the *Battle of the Narratives*. Succeeding in this battle is critical to both long-term strategy and operational success, particularly in irregular warfare where gaining the support of the local populace is, by definition, a center of gravity.

The *Battle of the Narrative* is often thought of as a battle for the local audience to “buy” our “story” and push out the enemy’s “story,” such as “we are the good guys, we are here to help you and bring you a better quality of life.” This perspective on the *Battle of the Narrative* is incorrect. The battle is not merely to push aside, defeat or gain superiority over the enemy’s narrative; it is to completely supplant it. In fact, upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in a different setting and purpose.

The *Battle of the Narrative* is a full-blown battle in the cognitive dimension of the information environment, just as traditional warfare is fought in the physical domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare in the physical domains, is to shape the environment such that the contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to your advantage. Likewise, a key component of the *Battle of the Narrative* is to succeed in establishing the reasons for and potential outcomes of the conflict, on terms favorable to your efforts. These “reasons” and “outcomes” must be well-grounded in the realities of the situation, including cultural, political, and social perspectives of the intended audiences.²¹⁵ Consequently, cultural awareness and analysis of target audiences is critical to constructing effective narratives and success in the *Battle of the Narrative*.

5.3.2.3 Information Environment

The *Battle of the Narrative* is fought in the *information environment*. This information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Understanding these communications systems is important because they influence international, national, regional, and local audiences. Adversaries within an operating environment often use information and disinformation to gain credibility and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining their opponents. Understanding how people communicate and who influences them on a daily basis is essential at all levels. For example, identifying local gathering places is important to understand or influence the spread of information, rumors, and gossip.

The information environment is made up of three dimensions: *physical*, *informational*, and *cognitive*. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision-maker or specific audience, and is the dimension where people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. The informational dimension is the place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected with key components of the content and flow of information. The physical dimension is composed of systems, human beings (including decision-makers, leaders, and military forces), and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects and conduct operations across multiple domains.²¹⁶

The information environment is a very active and competitive venue, especially when trying to create effects in the cognitive dimension. Adversaries are normally very motivated and aggressive in selling their agenda. Likewise, local cultural and social communication has quite a powerful influence on local populations. Therefore, if the joint force is to compete favorably in this environment, there must be synchronization of all communication efforts with operations.²¹⁷

Dimension	Description
Cognitive dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> exists in the minds of human beings consists of individual and collective consciousness where information is used to develop perceptions and make decisions significant characteristics include values, beliefs, perceptions, awareness, and decision-making
Informational dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive dimensions where information is collected, processed, and disseminated significant characteristics are information content and flow
Physical dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the tangible, real-world where the information environment overlaps with the physical world consists of targetable individuals, organizations, information systems, and the physical networks that connect them significant characteristics include terrain, weather, civilian information infrastructure, media, populace, and third party organizations

Cultural awareness, expertise, and analysis are critical to effectively operating in the modern information environment among foreign cultures.

5.3.3 Communication Strategy Principles

The following are some principles for developing communication strategies across the range of military operations. The MAGTF planner should consider these principles when planning and supporting a command communication strategy.

5.3.3.1 Leadership-Driven

Leaders must decisively engage and drive the communication strategy process. To ensure integration of communication efforts, leaders should place communication at the core of everything they do. Successful Strategic Communication – integrating actions, words, and images – begins with clear leadership intent and guidance. Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the organization, command or joint campaign plan. The results are actions and words linked to the plan. Leaders also need to properly resource strategic communication at a priority comparable to other important areas such as logistics and intelligence.

5.3.3.2 Credible

Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties. Credibility and consistency are the foundation of effective communication; they build and rely on perceptions of accuracy, truthfulness, and respect. Actions, images, and words must be integrated and coordinated internally and externally with no perceived inconsistencies between words and deeds or between policy and deeds. Strategic Communication also requires a professional force of properly trained, educated, and attentive communicators. Credibility also often entails communicating through others who may be viewed as more credible.

5.3.3.3 Understanding

Deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems. What we say, do, or show, may not be what others hear or see. An individual’s experience, culture, and

knowledge provide the context shaping their perceptions and therefore their judgment of actions. We must understand that concepts of moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the individual's societal and cultural narrative. Audiences determine meaning by interpretation of our communication with them; thus, what we say, do, or show, may not be what they hear or see. Acting without understanding our audiences can lead to critical misunderstandings with serious consequences.

5.3.3.4 Dialogue

Multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships. Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, engagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust. Success depends upon building and leveraging relationships. Leaders should take advantage of these relationships to place U.S. policies and actions in context prior to operations or events. Successful development and implementation of communication strategy will seldom happen overnight; relationships take time to develop and require listening, respect for culture, and trust-building.

5.3.3.5 Pervasive

Every action, image, and word sends a message. Communication no longer has boundaries, in time or space. All players are communicators, wittingly or not. Everything the Joint Force says, does, or fails to do and say, has intended and unintended consequences. Every action, word, and image sends a message, and every team member is a messenger, from the 18-year-old rifleman to the commander. All communication can have strategic impact, and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment; therefore, leaders must think about possible "Nth" order communication results of their actions.

5.3.3.6 Unity of Effort

Integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally. Strategic Communication is a consistent, collaborative process that must be integrated vertically from strategic through tactical levels, and horizontally across stakeholders. Leaders coordinate and synchronize capabilities and instruments of power within their area of responsibility, areas of influence, and areas of interest to achieve desired outcomes. Recognizing that your agency/organization will not act alone, ideally, all those who may have an impact should be part of communication integration.

5.3.3.7 Results-Based

Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated end state. Strategic communication should be focused on achieving specific desired results in pursuit of a clearly defined end state. Communication processes, themes, targets and engagement modes are derived from policy, strategic vision, campaign planning, and operational design. Strategic communication is not simply "another tool in the leader's toolbox," but must guide all an organization does and says; encompassing and harmonized with other functions for desired results.

5.3.3.8 Responsive

Right audience, right message, right time, and right place. Strategic Communication should focus on long-term end states or desired outcomes. Rapid and timely response to evolving conditions and crises is important as these may have strategic effects. Communication strategy must reach intended audiences through a customized message that is relevant to those audiences. Strategic Communication involves the broader discussion of aligning actions, images, and words to support policy, overarching strategic

objectives, and the longer term big picture. Acting within adversaries' decision cycles is also key because tempo and adaptability count. Frequently there will be a limited window of opportunity for specific messages to achieve a desired result.

5.3.3.9 Continuous

Diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action. Strategic Communication is a continuous process of research and analysis, planning, execution, and assessment. Success in this process requires diligent and continual analysis and assessment feeding back into planning and action. Strategic Communication supports the organization's objectives by adapting as needed and as plans change. The Strategic Communication process should ideally operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries.²¹⁸

5.3.4 Synchronizing Communications

An effective command communication strategy requires synchronization of crucial themes, messages, and images with military operations to inform and influence selected audiences in support of operational goals. Conflict is a battle of wills, for those waging it, for those supporting the effort, and for even those who are undecided. The main effort for winning the battle of wills, particularly in operations characteristic of irregular warfare, will likely occur in and through the information environment. Because Strategic Communication may involve activities outside a MAGTF or JFCs control, coordination, and *synchronization* of a nested communication strategy can be inherently complex.

Synchronized communication focuses on the behavior of publics that can have an impact on mission success. The commander's approach to synchronizing communication emphasizes early planning, training, and guidance that enables decentralized, yet responsive action that reflect strategic guidance. In developing a communication strategy, planners must consider a public's awareness, motivation level, and ability and likeliness to act. The approach can create both positive and negative influences on publics' behavior. However, positive influence creates desired long-term effects, contributes to success across the lines of effort, and engenders lasting support. Therefore, research should be prioritized up front to support behavioral change in audiences intended for influence activities.

Research considerations should include, but are not limited to:

- local U.S. Embassy perspectives
- what information publics may have
- social norms
- how and when to intervene to effect genuine behavioral change
- how much change is actually possible
- how change will support force operations and/or activities

Likewise, communication activities should focus on important decision points of key publics to achieve the commander's objectives. The integration of operations, actions, words, and images is vital in this endeavor. Cultural awareness, expertise, and analysis of the local AO are critical to this research.²¹⁹

An important first step is conducting sufficient research to understand the culture, language, dialect, means of communication, historical, social, religious, economic storylines, group dynamics, issues, grievances, world view, and other factors that resonate and affect how various publics get information, influence others, and are influenced.

Some resources for planners and staffs include:

- intelligence products,
- special operations forces area studies
- Red Team products
- USG sources such as the DOS country books
- other open-source material
- anthropological and sociological studies
- U.S. academic blogs and local in-country academic blogs
- U.S. and international think tanks

These resources can provide profiles of the salient features of a country or its people; analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assessment of attitudes; identified vulnerabilities; and suggested ways and means to influence people. Careful consideration of what we say and do, and what that communicates to key publics, is fundamental. Academic sources of information such as existing field work from anthropology, linguistics, archeology, sociology, political science, history, and social psychology can help protect against bias, misperceptions, or misrepresentation.²²⁰

Adding to the staff or utilizing reachback to SMEs that understand these factors can significantly help planners in developing a synchronized communication strategy focused on the particular cultures within an AO.

Examples of such expertise include the following:

- anthropology or sociology (understanding the local culture)
- local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/ interest in the local population and venues for communication)
- linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communication processes and products, translation of specific messages, and themes/messages to avoid)
- local and regional communication expertise (understanding the means, methods, relative impact of local and regional communication)
- diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)
- U.S. embassy/DOS/USAID expertise (understanding local coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)
- religious affairs expertise (may advise on various religious dynamics within the AO; or on occasion, may also be tasked with accomplishing certain liaison functions, particularly with indigenous religious leaders and faith-based NGOs operating in the AO)²²¹

5.3.5 Information Operations and Information Related Capabilities

When conducting operations such as COIN, FHA, and HA/DR, the culture of the populations within an AO impact the mission more so than during “traditional” kinetic warfare between two adversaries. During such operations, information and expectations are related; skillful military forces in foreign AOs manage both. To limit discontent and build support, the affected government – and any U.S. forces assisting it – create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the population, friendly military forces, and the international community. The key tools to accomplish this are information operations through the effective coordination and synchronization of information-related capabilities.

Information Operations — the integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken in the information environment to affect a target audience’s behavior in order to create an operational advantage for the commander.²²²

Information operations seek to generate effects against the decision making of individuals, a group, or perhaps elements of a population. In general, the integration of information-related capabilities is most effective when employed against precisely selected targets to achieve clearly defined objectives. Information-related capabilities generate effects that support achievement of the commander’s objectives. There are many military capabilities that contribute to operations, and commanders and staffs should consider them during the planning process.

Some of these capabilities are:

- Marine and key leader engagement
- Civil-military operations
- Cyberspace operations
- Military deception
- Electronic warfare
- Operations security
- Military information support operations
- Physical attack
- Physical security
- Counterintelligence
- Public affairs
- Combat camera
- Defense support to public diplomacy
- Space operations
- Special technical operations
- Intelligence
- Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations.
- Information assurance²²³

Marines execute information operations as an integral element of all MAGTF operations to enable and enhance the ability to conduct successful military actions. In their information operations, Marine forces must ensure that their deeds match their words and both are consistent with the broader narrative. They should also understand that any action has an information reaction. U.S. forces should carefully consider that information reaction’s impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They should work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global information environment, people in the AO can access the internet and satellite television to determine the messages U.S. forces are sending to the international community. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines operational efforts.²²⁴

The key to successful information operations is the commander’s intent. The commander’s intent provides a focus for the coordination and synchronization of information-related capabilities. Staffs and information operations planners must balance the use of different information-related capabilities, such as civil affairs operations, physical attack, and cyberspace operations; in order to communicate the intended message to the target audience with an understanding of possible 2nd and 3rd order effects on the rest of the global population.

When commanders and staffs use the various types of information capabilities, there is a tension between a broad message and engaging the population to achieve a two-way understanding. For example, in COIN operations, the U.S. is generally involved to aid host nations. As such, commanders and staffs integrate information capabilities with the host nation’s message to tell the population the reason for U.S. involvement. Commanders and staffs have to establish relationships, seek two-way understanding, and listen to what others think. Effective counterinsurgency normally requires an effective broad message and

engaging the population in a dialogue. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance between using information capabilities to give a broad message versus creating a dialogue.

Commanders and staffs balance between controlling the message and allowing for complete freedom of messaging. Having a perfectly controlled message does not allow for real, timely communication with a population. Leaders must have some ability to actually engage a population and create a shared understanding. However, if representatives of a command have total freedom of message, the population is bombarded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance to allow real communication, but also to ensure that the command has a coherent message.

5.3.5.1 Public Affairs

Public affairs and information operations are separate but related functions. Public affairs are *those public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (JP 3-61)*. External publics include allies, neutrals, and threats. When addressing external publics, opportunities for information overlap exist between public affairs and information operations. Information operations and public affairs personnel must maintain a common awareness of each other's support to operations to preclude the potential for information conflict. The information operations cell provides an excellent place to coordinate and deconflict information operations and public affairs activities that could result in information fratricide. Information fratricide is the result of employing information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces (FM 3-13). Final coordination of public affairs and information operations must occur within the operations process.²²⁵

5.3.6 Engagement of the Population and Key Leaders

Engagements – whether by the individual Marine or commander with the population or with key leaders – are critical to any command's communication strategy. While critical to a comprehensive communication strategy, these engagements are difficult to synchronize and control. U.S. Army *FM 3-13* gives planners an idea of both the risks and rewards of engagements of local populations within an AO.

Communicating is difficult to predict and control. Pragmatic Soldier (Marine) and leader engagement accepts the unpredictable, often opaque, nature of communications and operates with realistic expectations of message control. Leaders guide what their units say and do. However, they cannot control how others interpret friendly force messages and actions. Soldiers and leaders understand that the cultures, biases, religions, education, and experiences of the individuals and groups observing them shape perceptions or interpretations. Given the prevalence of technology, Soldiers (Marines) and leaders cannot control who eventually receives communications beyond the intended receiver.

FM 3-13 continues with the concept of *pragmatism* in applying engagements within a communication strategy: Pragmatism reflects an expectation and acceptance of prudent risk. Effective leaders expect small setbacks. Nurturing relationships and building trusted networks sometimes entails interacting with untrustworthy individuals. Leaders may even reveal those maligned actors who previously went undetected. Engagements with the local population and key leaders is a long-term, building effort

assessed in terms of months or years, rather than in hours or days. Pragmatism acknowledges that the effects of Marine and leader engagement may not be immediately achievable or recognizable. Influencing audiences in an area of operations requires credibility. Building credibility, or trust, requires repeated and meaningful interaction. Recognizing any resulting change from these interactions requires familiarity or experience with the culture in which the engagement occurs.

As U.S. forces conduct engagements, they use discipline and professionalism in day-to-day interactions. Such interaction amplifies positive actions, counters enemy propaganda, and increases good will and support for the friendly mission. These engagements provide the most convincing venue for conveying positive information, assuaging fears, and refuting rumors, lies, and misinformation. Conducted with detailed preparation and planning, interactions often prove crucial in garnering local support for operations, providing an opportunity for persuasion, and reducing friction and mistrust.

5.3.6.1 Cultural Awareness in Engagements

Cultural awareness of engagement participants facilitates effective interactions that contribute to mission success. U.S. forces conduct engagements in the context of local customs, beliefs, and ways of communicating. Doing so builds understanding and cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and mistrust. Beyond familiarization with cultural practices, interacting with cultural awareness requires that Marines understand each population's communication style (direct versus indirect), their value of relationship over task, and their attitude toward time. A cultural support team facilitating an engagement illustrates how cultural awareness enhances engagements. Cultural support teams often consist of female Marines so teams can interact with indigenous women in regions where contact between an unrelated male and female is culturally unacceptable. Specially configured teams, such as cultural support teams, enable friendly forces to interact with a key demographic group while respecting cultural norms.

Indigenous communicators and leaders are sometimes the most effective at framing messages for populations in the AOs. In the past, commanders and staffs have developed messages unilaterally from their own cultural perspective and simply translated or interpreted them into the local languages or dialects. Invariably, the intended message got lost in translation or the message conflicted with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors from target audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those same selected audiences. It increases the likelihood that an interaction will inform or influence audiences as desired. Understandably, units balance the use of such individuals against security concerns. Units employ trained influence specialists (such as military information support and noncommissioned officers) and resident cultural experts (such as FAOs or political advisors at higher-level headquarters) to carefully craft messages for delivery through culturally and linguistically familiar means.²²⁶

5.3.6.2 Commander Involvement

Commanders are the key engagers because their position and authority often invest them with the greatest degree of credibility and access to undertake engagements. They do more than simply model appropriate actions. During stability operations, in particular, commanders maximize interactions with the local populace through frequent Marine and leader engagement.

Doing so enables commanders to:

- assess attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors first-hand
- sense shifts in perceptions, both positive and negative, and take appropriate action
- engender the trust and confidence of the local populace
- sense and map the social networks active in the area of operations
- confirm who the key leaders are, as well as trusted, credible voices, both formal and informal
- bolster confidence in and consensus behind effective and mission-supportive local leaders
- deliver messages
- assess how effectively units synchronize words, images, and actions and make needed refinements
- quickly address adversary information
- ensure Marines and subordinate leaders effectively engage the populace in their areas

Commanders foster a culture to achieve both their vision and their unit's mission. As commanders seek to shape a culture that exhibits and upholds the values of the U.S. military (among many other shared beliefs and practices), they shape a culture of engagement. This culture buoys Marines' confidence to engage many audiences, especially the populace in which they operate.

Commanders may foster a culture of engagement in multiple ways:

- guidance in the development of a robust communication strategy
- reporting and critical information requirements
- organization of the staff
- employment of public affairs and MISO for advice and assistance
- leading by example (such as actively conducting engagements)
- training requirements (cultural, language, and negotiation training)
- ensuring resources are provided to staff (manning, funds, and time)
- building partner capacity with unified action partners

Critical to fostering a culture of engagement is the commander's supplying subordinates with proper training and guidance. The commander's themes and messages and unit cultural and language training requirements provide subordinates with critical tools for engagements. Still, Marines and leaders will likely make mistakes as they navigate the values and norms of an unfamiliar culture. Commanders balance their response to cultural and linguistic missteps with the task to actively seek engagement with target audiences.²²⁷

5.3.7 Conclusion

Developing a command communication strategy is a critical capability for winning the *War of Ideas* at all levels of war across the range of military operations. A command's communication strategy should be integrated into all operations processes at the outset and synchronized throughout planning, execution, and assessment to ensure the greatest effect in the information environment. Synchronizing words and actions can help the JFC close the "say-do gap" and significantly increase the potential to influence intended audiences. Effectively employed communication strategies can potentially achieve national, theater-strategic, operational-level, and tactical objectives in a manner that lessens the requirement for

combat in many situations.²²⁸ Operational culture principles and cultural analysis of the information environment are critical factors in developing effective communication strategies for military operations in foreign AOs.

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Senate. *Army Transformation: Implications for the Future: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee*, 8 (Washington D.C.: July 15, 2004) (Major General Robert H. Scales, USA (ret.)).

¹⁷⁹ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Planning*, MCDP 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, July 21, 1997), 3.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸¹ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, MCWP 5-1 (Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2010), 1-6.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, FM 3-24/ MCWP 3.33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Dec 15, 2014), vii.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.1.

¹⁸⁵ Barak A. Salmoni, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter*, OCFW (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2008), 36.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 213.

¹⁹¹ Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3.33.5, 3.5.

¹⁹² U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTAF Staff Training Program*, MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1 (Quantico, Virginia: October 2011), Green-1.

¹⁹³ U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTAF Civil-Military Operations*, MCTP 3-03A, (Quantico, VA: May 2, 2016), Appendix C.

¹⁹⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1., Green-3.

¹⁹⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, JP 3-08 (Washington D.C.: June 24, 2011), II-26.

¹⁹⁶ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTAF Interorganizational Coordination*, MCRP 3-36B (Washington D.C.: April 15, 2015), 1-1.

¹⁹⁷ U.S. Army Special Forces Command, *Special Forces Advisor Reference Book*, (October 2001), Ch. 3.

-See more at: <https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2007/02/marine-advisors-can-marine-corps-better-prepare-them#sthash.1Xgdows7.dpuf>.

¹⁹⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP-1 (Washington D.C.: March 25, 2013), GL-12, GL-13.

¹⁹⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, II-2.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, D-2.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, D-10.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, II-26.

²⁰³ U.S. Chiefs of Staff, MCRP 3-36B, 2-10.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 2-10.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-10, 2-11.

²⁰⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP3-08, H-4.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Appendix H.

²⁰⁸ MCRP 3.36B, 3-2.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ U.S. Army Special, *Special Forces Advisor Reference*, Ch. 3.

- ²¹¹ Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3-33.5, 1-12.
- ²¹² U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, (Suffolk, VA: June 24, 2010), Appendix P.
- ²¹³ Ibid.
- ²¹⁴ Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3-33.5, 7.
- ²¹⁵ U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook*, II-13.
- ²¹⁶ Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3-33.5, 2-8.
- ²¹⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Commander's Communication Synchronization*, JDN2-13 (Washington D.C.: April 16, 2013), I-2.
- ²¹⁸ U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook*, A-3.
- ²¹⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Commander's Communication*, I-8.
- ²²⁰ Ibid., III-14.
- ²²¹ Ibid., III-15.
- ²²² U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTF Information Operations*, MCWP 3-40.4, (Washington D.C.: July 1, 2013), 1-1.
- ²²³ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Inform and Influence Activities*, FM 3-13 (Washington D.C.: January 25, 2013), 1-1.
- ²²⁴ Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3.33.5, 1-21.
- ²²⁵ Ibid., Ch. 7.
- ²²⁶ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-13, 8-2.
- ²²⁷ Ibid., 8-4.
- ²²⁸ U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook*, V-8.

6 Impact of Culture on Military Operations: Operation Sahayogi Haat

6.1 Operation Sahayogi Haat

Operation “Sahayogi Haat (Helping Hand)” was a U.S. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operation in response to two major earthquakes that hit Nepal on 25 April and 12 May 2015. The United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) was the lead federal agency for coordinating the U.S. government response to the disaster. From the DOD, there were a total of about 900 U.S. military personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps that contributed to the relief effort under the command of Joint Task Force 505 (JTF-505), with about 300 of them being deployed to Nepal during the operation. Operation Sahayogi Haat officially lasted from 6-26 May 2015.

Background

On Saturday, April 25, 2015, at 11:56 AM local time, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake struck near Barpak, Gorkha District in Nepal’s Kathmandu Valley. The epicenter of the earthquake was located approximately 77 km (48 mi) northwest of Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu, and 73 km (45 mi) east of Pokhara, another major population center. Hundreds of aftershocks—ranging between magnitude 4.5 and 6.6—followed the initial earthquake,²³¹ until May 12, 2015, when a second 7.2-magnitude earthquake struck in Dolakha district, near Nepal’s border with China. The earthquake and its aftershocks triggered more than 5,000 landslides, choking many stream channels with sediment.²³² The subsequent overflow of the riverbanks flooded low-lying areas, making the delivery of relief supplies a significant challenge.

The earthquakes ultimately killed 8,841 people, injured more than 22,309, and damaged or destroyed 887,356 houses, based on calculations by Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs.²³³ The UN assessed that approximately 980,000 people were directly affected in the most impacted districts.²³⁴ It was the most powerful earthquake in the region since 1934.²³⁵ The Government of Nepal (GoN) declared a state of emergency and requested international assistance, which according to the UN included: search-and-rescue capacity, medical assistance, rubble-removal equipment, and logistical support for transport to difficult-to-access areas.



Figure 6-1: Nepal. Source: CIA Factbook.²²⁹




Figure 6-2: Locations of two earthquakes, Nepal. Source: CFE-DM.²³⁰

Number of Heavily Affected Districts	14 (National Planning Commission, 2015)
Population Affected	8 Million (National Planning Commission, 2015)
Number of Fatalities	8,841 Reported (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015)
Number of Injuries	22,309 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015)
Most Affected Sectors	Social, Productive, Infrastructure
Number of Private Houses Fully Damaged	602,257 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015)
Number of Private Houses Partially Damaged	285,099 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015)
Estimated Overall Damage	\$174 Million USD (National Planning Commission, 2015)
Estimated Overall Impact (Damages and Losses)	About 1/3 of GDP (National Planning Commission, 2015)

Figure 6-3: Earthquake impact. Source: CFE-DM.²³⁶

6.2 Operational Environment

6.2.1 Physical Environment

6.2.1.1 Land



Figure 6-4: Nepal. Source: CIA World Factbook.²³⁷




Figure 6-5: Nepal topography. Wikimedia Commons.²³⁸

Nepal is a relatively small, rectangular country wedged between two regional giants – India to the south and China (or the Tibet Autonomous Region) to the north. Thus, the country extends along an area that divides the Indian subcontinent from the Tibetan plateau. Nepal is landlocked and located along the Himalayan mountain range, which causes the country to be geographically insulated from much of the broader region. Geographically, the country can be divided into three physical regions: mountains, hills, and plains (Terai region), in topographical belts that run east-west across the country.

The Terai region in the south consists of flat lowland plains which border India and are part of the northern rim of the fertile Indo-Gangetic Plain. To the north of the plains, hills comprise the central belt that runs across the length of the country as foothills of the Himalayas. The third and northernmost geographical belt consists of the high-altitude mountains of the Himalayas in the north, bordering China, where some of the world's tallest peaks, including Mt. Everest, are located.

The topography and physical features of Nepal have played a significant role in shaping its culture, with the diverse terrain producing various subcultures throughout the country. Furthermore, the harsh terrain of the Himalayas caused Nepal to be largely isolated from neighboring regions, generally allowing it to enjoy undisturbed peace throughout much of its history. Its isolation not only protected it from the otherwise violent political transitions that periodically swept through northern India, but also helped to establish a quality of preservation in its cultural heritage. Many traditional aspects of ancient culture that have been lost or changed over time throughout the rest of South Asia have been preserved in Nepal. Many aspects of Nepali rituals, customs, religion, art, industry, architecture, and physical attributes of the country have remained the same over the centuries due to a significantly lesser degree of external influence.

Historically, Nepal has been one of the least urbanized countries in the world, with most of the country being rural and based on agriculture. The architecture in rural areas is generally simplistic, reflecting the building styles of different castes and ethnic groups, the materials available, and the climate. Rural houses generally have one or two stories and are made of mud brick with thatched roofs. Village houses tend to be clustered in river valleys or along ridge tops. However, in urban centers such as Kathmandu, urbanization is accelerating.²³⁹ Urbanization, urban sprawl, and an increasing population density in cities, combined with poor construction and a lack of enforcement of building regulations have created significant safety and infrastructure problems, which become particularly apparent during the aftermath of natural disasters such as earthquakes.


6.2.1.2 *Climate*

Nepal's climate generally consists of four distinct seasons throughout the year; however, the climate varies with the country's topography, terrain, and altitude. The low-land plains, or the Terai region, in the southern belt of the country, experiences tropical temperatures and hot and humid summers. The hills region in the central midlands belt of the country experiences more moderate temperatures and climate throughout the year. Meanwhile, the northern belt of the country, which consists of the high-altitude Himalayan Mountains, experiences an alpine climate of cold winters with significant snowfall.

The epicenters of the April 25 and May 12, 2015 earthquakes were located in the northern mountain belt of the country; the quakes occurred during the area's mid-to-late spring season. Thus, although the climate at the time was mild, the geographic location of the affected areas was in some of the harshest terrain and hard-to-reach areas of the country.

6.2.2 Political Structure

Nepal was a monarchy throughout much of its history, until 2008, when it transformed into a representative democracy in the form of a federal parliamentary republic. Nepal had been ruled by the Shah dynasty of kings from 1768. This began to change in 1990, when the People’s Movement, largely led by a movement of Communist Maoist rebels, began calling for political reform and a move to democracy. As a result, King Birendra agreed to large-scale political reform, transforming the country into a parliamentary monarchy with the king as the head of state and a prime minister as the head of the government. However, in April 2006, an interim parliament was established and the king was forced to give up more power. In December 2007, a bill was passed officially making Nepal a federal republic, with a president as the head of state. This bill was adopted by an overwhelming majority of a newly-elected parliament in 2008, which also voted for a total abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a federal democratic republic, ordering King Gyanendra to leave the Royal Palace in Kathmandu. He abdicated and left the palace on June 11, 2008, bringing an end to the centuries-old monarchy in Nepal. Ram Baran Yadav took office as the first President of Nepal and head of state in July 2008, with the country’s first female president, Bidhya Devi Bhandari, taking office in October 2015.



The list of major political parties participating in Nepal’s democratic system of governance includes two major Communist parties, including the “Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist” (UCPN-M) and the “Communist Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist-Leninist” (CPN-UML). The Communist parties of Nepal, particularly the CPN-UML, played a significant role in the People’s Movement during the 1990s, along with the Nepali Congress party, to push for a move from absolute monarchy to democracy in the country. Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, the Prime Minister and thus, head of government of Nepal, who assumed office in October 2015, belongs to the CPN-UML party.

6.2.3 Belief Systems

Nepal is a nation of over 31 million people²⁴⁰ comprised of a multitude of ethnic and linguistic groups, with multiple languages and diverse cultural communities within its borders. The various languages of Nepal fall broadly into two main language families: the Indo-Aryan and the Tibeto-Burman. The predominant language spoken in Nepal is Nepali, which is spoken by 44.6 percent of the population. Other languages include Maithali (11.7 percent), Bhojpuri (6 percent), and Tharu (5.8 percent).

Due to long historical, cultural, and religious links with India, Hinduism is the predominant religion of the country, with more than 80 percent of the population identifying as Hindus. Thus, the biggest group of people in Nepal consists of Nepali-speaking Hindus. Additionally, roughly 10 percent of the population is Buddhist, 5 percent is Muslim, and another 5 percent identify with other minor religious communities, including indigenous Kirant beliefs, animists, and small Christian communities.




Figure 6-6: Pashupatinath Temple. Source: Wikimedia Commons.²⁴¹



Figure 6-7: Boudhanath Stupa. Source: Wikimedia Commons.²⁴²

While Hinduism is the dominant religious framework among a vast majority of Nepalese society, a distinctive trait of Nepalese culture is the syncretic nature – or ability to blend together – many of its cultural and religious communities, particularly the synthesis or blending of Hinduism and Buddhism, thereby often obscuring their sectarian distinctiveness. Dozens of religious rituals, festivals, and holidays observed at the popular level have merged deities and rituals from both religions into a popular religious culture that incorporates aspects and symbols of both religious communities. Thus, many of these popular religious festivals attract participation from both Hindu and Buddhist devotees. In Nepal's hill and mountain regions, Hinduism has absorbed Buddhist tenets to such an extent that in many cases they have shared deities as well as temples.

The Pashupatinath Temple in Kathmandu (*Figure 6-7*), a Hindu temple dedicated to an avatar of Shiva, one of the three principal Hindu deities, is considered to be a sacred site by Hindus. Shiva is considered to be the guardian deity of Nepal. Devotees from throughout Nepal as well as India make pilgrimages to the site. The Boudhanath Stupa (*Figure 6-8*), one of the largest Buddhist *stupas* in the world, is a sacred site for Buddhists, and is a major tourist attraction in Kathmandu. Both Pashupatinath and Boudhanath are UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Both sites were damaged during the April 25, 2015 earthquake.

6.2.3.1 *Rituals, Norms, Mores, Taboos*

Hindus revere the cow as a sacred symbol of wealth, abundance, and being a sort of maternal caretaker of mankind. Cows are a part of various religious ceremonies and festivals in Nepal. In 2015, under the new constitution, Nepal officially established the cow as the national animal and banned the slaughter of cows in the country. Due to the sanctity of the cow according to Hindu beliefs, the consumption of beef is forbidden among practicing Hindus. Similarly, a number of Buddhists practice vegetarianism based upon religious teachings; this varies, however, depending on the sect of Buddhism. Nepal is home to all three major Buddhist sects, so while some may consider it permissible to eat meat obtained under certain conditions, many others practice complete vegetarianism.

6.2.3.2 Religious Beliefs

Another traditional practice in Nepal that is common among both Hindus and Buddhists, is the way in which the dead are disposed, particularly by means of open-air cremations conducted on funerary pyres. Cremation has long been the traditional means of disposing of dead bodies among Hindus in both Nepal and India. This is due to the Hindu belief of reincarnation, according to which a body must be reduced to ashes in order for the soul to attain future life through rebirth. Traditionally, cremations in Nepal, and generally throughout the rest of South Asia, are open-air and are done on a funerary pyre on a *ghat*, a flat surface at the top of a staircase leading down to a riverbank. Hindus believe that when a person dies, the soul is separated from the body, and that if the funerary rites and cremation are not conducted properly, the deceased's spirit will continue to exist in spiritual limbo and haunt the living as a ghost. It is also emphasized that dead bodies should be cremated as quickly as possible to prevent other spirits from entering the body. For Buddhists, burials and cremations are both customary, depending on the geographic location and traditional practices of their areas. Influenced by the practices of the Hindu majority, Buddhists in Nepal also cremate their dead, often sharing the same riverside *ghats* as Hindus to conduct their cremations.



Figure 6-8: Cremation Ghats at Pashupatinath Temple.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.²⁴³

6.3 Required Readings

- Chaturvedy, Rajeev Ranjan. "Structure and Resilience in India-Nepal Relations." *Institute of South Asia Studies (ISAS): ISAS Insights*, no. 324 (April 5, 2016).
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- Ramachandran, Sudha. "Sino-Nepalese Relations: Handshake Across the Himalayas." *China Brief*, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 15, Issue 22 (November 16, 2015).
[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=44603&cHash=5040f870e38c38499d84838a639567a8#.V4k35bgrKUm](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44603&cHash=5040f870e38c38499d84838a639567a8#.V4k35bgrKUm)
- *Liaison*, Vol. 8 (Spring 2016): Pages 7-38. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. <https://www.cfe-dmha.org/Portals/0/liaison/liaison-2016-VIII-1.pdf>

6.4 The Case – Operation Sahayogi Haat

6.4.1 Situation

Following the initial earthquake on April 25, 2015, USPACOM issued a warning order on April 26, directing COMMARFORPAC to:

- be prepared to deploy an assessment team to Nepal and establish liaison with U.S. Embassy, Kathmandu, Nepal and USAID/OFDA
- coordinate with USPACOM Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell (DJFAC), USARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) to establish a joint assessment team
- in support of USAID/OFDA, be prepared to conduct humanitarian assessment survey operations
- be prepared to deploy and lead disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal agency, USAID/OFDA²⁴⁴

While USAID/OFDA is the lead federal agency for coordinating the U.S. government response to a foreign disaster, the U.S. military is usually responsible for providing transportation and logistics to support USAID/OFDA efforts. Thus, the U.S. military transported USAID/OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), as well as two urban search and rescue teams to Nepal on April 28.

*“Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense activities conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. ...FHA operations (including foreign disaster relief (FDR) operations) are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DOS).
...FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration; designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation that has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance; and may support other U.S. Government departments or agencies.”*

Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance²⁴⁵

USAID/OFDA staff members are also assigned to USPACOM and subordinate commands like III MEF. This presence and the OFDA Joint Humanitarian Operations Course given to military audiences dozens of times per year, has increased the utility of DOD support to disaster responses. Besides training and staff support to USPACOM, USAID/OFDA decision-support products like their Disaster Fact Sheets, Program Maps, and situation reports inform the decision-making process.

USPACOM also directed the deployment of a joint liaison group/Joint Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (JHAST) of 22 personnel led by the commander of 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), that arrived in Nepal on April 30, 2015 to coordinate with OFDA's DART, and assist in assessing requirements for unique DOD capabilities to support relief efforts.

Also on April 26, the Department of State (DOS) requested DOD humanitarian disaster assistance to airlift U.S. government and non-DOD relief supplies and people, conduct airfield assessment, management, and operations; and provide logistics support such as commodity repositioning to a third-party staging area.²⁴⁶ On April 28, the Deputy Secretary of Defense formally approved the request to provide transportation support and provision of relief supplies.²⁴⁷ USPACOM received the authority to expend up to \$10 million of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) to provide airlift, airfield, and logistical support as requested by DOS.²⁴⁸

On May 2, 2015, III MEF was directed to activate Joint Task Force (JTF)-505 to provide core manning, forces, and capabilities in support of the United States government efforts led by USAID/OFDA and DOS to provide foreign disaster relief to the GoN and governmental/ non-governmental agencies (NGOs) when appropriate. The U.S. military earthquake relief efforts in Nepal led by JTF-505 were named “Operation Sahayogi Haat,” by USPACOM, which means “Helping Hand” in Nepali.²⁵⁰



Figure 6-9: Kathmandu, Nepal. Source: USPACOM.²⁴⁹

Nepali soldiers unload aid and relief supplies delivered by a U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y helicopter assigned to Joint Task Force 505 in Nepal's Kavrepalanchowk district during Operation Sahayogi Haat.

On May 3 2015, five U.S. Marine Corps aircraft – consisting of four MV-22 Ospreys and one UH-1Y – arrived at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) in Kathmandu, Nepal, to supplement GoN and international response efforts and aid in transporting humanitarian personnel and critical relief items, such as emergency shelter materials, to difficult-to-access affected areas, including remote villages in mountainous regions.²⁵¹ Two additional UH-1Ys arrived on May 6 and 7. JTF-505 was activated on May 6 from the III MEF headquarters at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan and became fully operations capable (FOC) on May 9.



Figure 6-10: Kathmandu, Nepal. Source: USPACOM.²⁵²

A UH-1Y, with the Joint Task Force 505, flies through a valley in the Sindhuli District, Nepal, May 10, in order to deliver aid and relief supplies to remote areas of the Dolakha and Sindhuli districts during Operation Sahayogi Haat.

Between May 4-22, 2015, 3d MEB, as the forward command element (FCE) of the alert contingency Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) (ACM), and other forces of what became Joint Task Force (JTF)-505 (Fwd), responded to validated relief mission taskings from USAID following the Nepal earthquakes. In coordination with USAID, the Nepal Armed Forces, other partner nation militaries and NGOs, JTF-505 delivered 115 tons of shelter, food, and medical relief supplies to remote villages, and transported 550 personnel, including 459 Nepalese and 75 casualty evacuees from affected areas.²⁵³

Other support included:

- critical stopgap airfield logistics support operations (2,198 short tons from 84 flights) conducted at TIA by the United States Air Force (USAF) Detachment, 36th Contingency Response Group (CRG) in support of aid distribution
- "in extremis" casualty reception, triage, and initial trauma intervention to injured Nepalese citizens evacuated by JTF aircraft, and coordination of local ambulance transportation to Nepalese hospitals by JTF-505 medical personnel, including squadron flight surgeons, as well as DART physicians²⁵⁵

As relief and immediate aid transitioned to recovery operations, and unique U.S. DOD capabilities were determined to be no longer needed, JTF-505 functions were transitioned to Nepal Armed Forces and/or appropriate host nation (HN) or NGO activities. By May 22, 2015, "JTF-505 efforts during Operation Sahayogi Haat set the conditions for successful transition to GoN-led, and U.S. government supported humanitarian recovery operations. Based on expanded support to GoN from the U.S. Embassy, USAID/OFDA and international and non-governmental organizations arriving in Nepal and following completion of relief operations uniquely suited to a U.S. DOD mission, COMUSPACOM directed the deactivation of JTF-505 and termination of Operation Sahayogi Haat."²⁵⁶




Figure 6-11: USAID JTF-505 Assistance, Operation Sahayogi Haat. Source: DOD.²⁵⁴

"Natural and man-made disasters regularly impact the stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region as a consequence of unstable geological fault lines, annual tropical depressions and over-burdened coastal environments. When called upon, USPACOM will extend assistance in support of other U.S. Government agencies and international organizations to victims of natural or man-made disasters and support efforts to reduce risk to vulnerable populations."

- USPACOM FRAGO 001 Nepal FHA Response, May 2, 2015²⁵⁷




Figure 6-12: USPACOM Operation Sahayogi Haat Significant Events Timeline. Source: CFE-DM.²⁵⁸

6.4.2 Mission

JTF-505 Mission Statement:

“On order, JTF-505 supports U.S. Government (USG) efforts, led by USAID/OFDA and DOS, to provide foreign disaster relief to the Government of Nepal to save lives and alleviate human suffering, transitioning relief efforts to the Government of Nepal and governmental/non-governmental agencies when appropriate.”²⁵⁹

The initial mission flow consisted of delivery of humanitarian aid and transporting USAID and assessment team personnel throughout the affected areas, and later, evacuation of injured Nepalese citizens on return flights.

6.4.3 Operational Culture Impacts on the Mission

6.4.3.1 Physical Environment

The physical location of Nepal, its terrain, elevation, and the fact that it is landlocked created various unique challenges for U.S. military and Marine personnel operating in the area.

Firstly, its distance from Okinawa, Japan, where much of the U.S. military, USPACOM, and Marine presence is located in the region, affected the efficiency and speed with which disaster relief and aid supplies were able to arrive in Nepal. In previous HA/DR efforts in the USPACOM AOR -- such as Operation TOMODACHI in the wake of the 2011 Japan earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor meltdown; or Operation Damayan, which provided support to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 -- III MEF and its subordinate elements were able to rapidly and effectively respond in the aftermath of the disasters due to their geographic proximity to Japan and the Philippines. For Nepal, the 3,600-mile distance from Okinawa delayed the response due to the complications of diplomatic requirements and the requirements to coordinate overflight and clearance for aircraft transiting various countries surrounding Nepal.

“Given that Nepal is a landlocked country, the [initial] challenge was getting [overflight] clearance from all the countries to get into Nepal. That was a recurring challenge throughout the operation as we flowed forces into Nepal...depending on the route of the aircraft, Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, etc....that delayed our response at times.”²⁶⁰

*LtCol Rodney Legowski
G-3, 3d MEB G-3/J-3, JTF 505 (Fwd)*

Additionally, the challenges of the terrain, especially in the mountainous northern areas of the country, were apparent during Operation Sahayogi Haat, highlighted by Colonel Robert Plevell, J-2, JTF-505/G-2, III MEF, who stated: “The country of Nepal is comprised of three distinct weather regions. ...In the south the environment was arid, hot and virtually cloud free. The middle portions of the country included expansive cloud decks and isolated thunderstorms, and along the northern border, the Himalayas proved challenging in both gathering data and forecasting. ...This environment led to forecasting challenges that included micro-terrain induced weather conditions in the mountains compounded by the fact that there was only one weather reporting station in the entire country which was located at Kathmandu.”²⁶¹

Following the second earthquake on May 12, 2015, JTF-505 assets immediately responded, including a UH-1Y that flew to Charikot, east of Kathmandu, in order to deliver aid. The aircraft accomplished the delivery, but during the return flight was involved in an aviation mishap, resulting in the deaths of six Marines, two Nepalese soldiers, and five Nepalese civilians being evacuated.²⁶²

6.4.3.2 Political Structure

Another challenge experienced in the case of providing relief support to Nepal during Operation Sahayogi Haat was the political dynamic of working with other major countries participating in relief efforts and humanitarian assistance. In addition to the United States, China and India were the two other major participants in relief and humanitarian assistance operations in the aftermath of the April-May 2014 earthquakes. In order to evenly share disaster response tasks among the United States, India, and China,

the GoN assigned affected geographic sectors to these responding countries on a “first come, first assigned” basis (shown in Figure 6-13).




Figure 6-13: GoN-assigned country sectors for HA/DR efforts. Source: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCLL).²⁶³

As a result, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Report on Operation Sahayogi Haat noted that JTF-505 was assigned a sector of Nepal in which 3d MEB could not exploit its full capabilities. According to the MCCLL report, 3d MEB could have supported the more damaged or stricken areas, while some of the landing zones in the U.S. sector were too high in altitude or small in diameter to be safely used by the MV-22 Osprey. As a result, the U.S. had underutilized MV-22 capacity.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, the JTF-505 AAR stated that the assignment of national sectors by GoN created an “unnecessary coordination barrier, did not allow the flexible use of unique aid resources of the JTF across the affected area, and should be avoided in future HA/DR operations.”²⁶⁵

Lieutenant Colonel Legowski noted, “We were somewhat restricted initially from delivering supplies into the other sectors [assigned to] the Chinese, the Indian sector, and the middle sector assigned to the Nepalese Army. Having that constraint and being [only able] to fly in one sector did not facilitate getting relief supplies to the people who needed it the most and having that [airlift] support USAID throughout the country.”²⁶⁶

6.4.3.3 Belief Systems

Religion plays a significant role in the lives of Nepalis. With a vast majority (over 90 percent) of the population of Nepal adhering to either Hinduism or Buddhism, an understanding of some important religious and cultural values and customs goes a long way to explain certain behaviors that may help to

make interactions with the local population go much more smoothly during HA/DR operations such as Operation Sahayogi Haat. Examples of such religious and cultural concepts in Nepal are the prevalence of strict dietary restrictions for both Hindus and Buddhists, as well as the rituals surrounding death and the manner in which dead bodies are handled and disposed. Furthermore, in an HA/DR operation in response to an earthquake, such as Operation Sahayogi Haat, providing food and clean water to people affected by a natural disaster becomes critical for those who have been left stranded, displaced, and/or homeless.

Read the following hypothetical scenarios and think about what cultural or religious traditions might play a role in this situation, and how they may impact the military operation in Nepal.

Scenario 1:

As part of JTF-505, III MEF, your battalion has been tasked with carrying out an evacuation of victims of the Nepal earthquake and to transport them to safer areas. Your commander has directed you to coordinate operations at the Evacuation Control Center (ECC) for displaced people staged at the Pashupatinath Temple outside Kathmandu. When you arrive at the temple housing the evacuees, you are introduced to the resident priest. The priest invites you inside the temple to assess the situation. Before entering the temple, are there any cultural considerations you should take into account?

Knowing the cultural landscape is important because it can provide significant insight into different aspects of the local culture. In the Hindu religion, the cow is considered sacred. Generally speaking, Hindus do not eat or wear anything that comes from a cow. Therefore, it would be important to be aware of the fact that removing all items made from or containing leather, including gloves and leather wristwatch, as well as your boots, would be a sign of respect before entering a temple. If it is not possible to remove your boots during a mission, the courtesy of at least asking if it is okay to enter with your boots on would display a level of cultural awareness and demonstrate your understanding of the Hindu belief system.

Scenario 2:

Shortly after arriving, your working party distributes “meals ready to eat” (MREs) to the evacuees. However, you notice that most of the evacuees — all of whom are Hindus — have discarded their main course and have only picked at the sides. Rather than attribute the behavior to ingratitude, what could explain the refusal of evacuees to eat the food provided to them?

In this case, most of the MREs had a main course of Salisbury Steak. Practicing Hindus are strict vegetarians, and the majority of Nepalis refrain from eating beef. From the perspective of a Hindu, enduring hunger is preferable to violating one’s religious practices. Therefore, requesting vegetarian food rations would show that you are using the channels available to you in an attempt to meet the needs of the evacuees.

Scenario 3:

Another aspect of the operation involves the request by the GoN for assistance with disaster cleanup and clearing debris. With a death toll of nearly 9,000 people, which was the case in the April 2015 Nepal earthquake, the cleanup process will inevitably involve the handling, removal, and disposal of dead bodies found among collapsed buildings. While discussing the planning phase of the cleanup with a member of the Nepali Army, you mention that JTF-505 support will include mortuary affairs capability, to include the provision of wooden coffins for the transport and prompt burial of the bodies of deceased victims. What

religious and cultural considerations could have been taken into account in order to better assess what type of equipment would be required for the specific needs of mortuary affairs in Nepal?

In Nepalese culture, rituals associated with Hindu beliefs about death are extremely important. Hindu traditions hold that it is necessary to cremate dead bodies on open-air funerary pyres in order to release the soul of the deceased and allow it to be re-born in the cycle of birth and rebirth. Nepali Hindus believe that if the body is not properly cremated, the spirit of the deceased person will haunt the living. Therefore, having a knowledge of the religious and cultural beliefs of the area would ensure a more appropriate planning phase of HA/DR that includes a request for proper materials and equipment related to the handling of dead bodies.

6.5 Conclusion: Enduring Lessons on Culture from Operation Sahayogi Haat

According to the Joint After Action Report (JAAR) for Operation Sahayogi Haat published by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM), “USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation initiatives with Nepal’s Government, Army, and international humanitarian organizations facilitated an integrated, coordinated, and collaborative disaster response.”²⁶⁷ Over the six years prior to Operation Sahayogi Haat, there had been hundreds of engagements with Nepal through which the U.S. military invested time and resources, and thus established a network of mutual trust. These prior engagements between the U.S. and Nepal militaries created a mutual familiarity with one another’s procedures; they were also an opportunity for the Nepalese to learn how international humanitarian disaster response organizations operated.

The GoN and the Nepal Army credit the 2009 USPACOM/Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Tempest Express Exercise as the “eye-opening event that introduced to them the complexities associated with responding to a complex earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley.”²⁶⁸ The Nepal Army also noted that its disaster response capacity had been improved because of their participation in: 1) the U.S. Army Pacific’s (USARPAC) Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange (DREE), 2) the USPACOM/Multinational Communications Interoperability Program’s (MCIP) Pacific Endeavor Exercise, and 3) frequent III MEF leader and senior staff engagements.²⁶⁹

Furthermore, the CFE-DM JAAR on Operation Sahayogi Haat reports that follow-on national, interagency, and multinational planning efforts, disaster response training and capacity building, tabletop exercises, international humanitarian organization seminars, and key leader engagements further enhanced important relationships, while familiarizing stakeholders with the nuances of an integrated response effort.²⁷⁰

Military-to-military engagements play a significant role in building mutual respect and trust; these encounters also enhance -- as noted by various key U.S. and GoN leaders -- the effectiveness with which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, such as Operation Sahayogi Haat, are conducted. A critical aspect of this process is having an understanding of the key cultural values and concepts that play a role in Nepalese society, and to comprehend, in turn, how those cultural concepts can have an impact on military operations. In order to do this, an overview of the culture and social framework of Nepal is necessary, including the factors that influence this, such as: 1) physical environment, 2) economy, 3) social structure, 4) political structure, and 5) belief systems – which are also the “five dimensions of operational culture” highlighted in *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*.²⁷¹

As is evident in the case of Operation Sahayogi Haat, various aspects of culture – physical environment, politics, regional relations, and religion and belief systems – all have an impact on the way in which military and HA/DR operations are conducted, and the extent to which the missions succeed. Depending on the area and context of each operation, other aspects of the five dimensions of operational culture will also likely play a role and have an impact on the mission. HA/DR operations such as Operation Sahayogi Haat usually provide humanitarian assistance, relief, aid, and the evacuation of people affected by a disaster. Overall, the mission entails the mitigation of human suffering, often through medical assistance and casualty evacuation. In dealing with people in circumstances of distress, such as in HA/DR operations, having an understanding of the cultural values of a population can make a significant difference in the efficacy of a mission and on the image that the U.S. military promotes and portrays throughout the world.

²²⁹ "Nepal." *CIA World Factbook*, accessed July 14, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>.

²³⁰ "Operation Sahayogi Haat: United States Pacific Command Operation Sahayogi Haat Joint After Action Report," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*, January 2016, 4.

²³¹ "Nepal Earthquake," *USAID*, 25 April 2015, accessed January 7, 2016, Fact Sheet 1, <http://www.usaid.gov/nepal-earthquake/fy15/fs01>.

²³² "Earth Sciences Researcher Examines String of Related Disasters Striking Nepal," *Phys.Org*, last modified July 29, 2015, <http://phys.org/news/2015-07-earth-sciences-disasters-nepal.html>.

²³³ C. Madamba, C. Gourraud, & R. Crozier, "Nepal Earthquake, Response and Early Recovery Case Study," *Earthquakes and Megacities Initiative*, (Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines: September 7, 2015).

²³⁴ "JTF-505 Fragmentary Order No. 002 for Government of Nepal Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) (Operation Sahayogi Haat)," *CG III MEF*, message 160552Z, May 2015.

²³⁵ "Nepal Quake," *United Nations Development Programme*, accessed on January 7, 2016, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/our-projects-and-initiatives/NepalQuake.html>.

²³⁶ "Operation Sahayogi Haat: United States Pacific Command Operation Sahayogi Haat Joint After Action Report," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*, January 2016, 5.

²³⁷ "Nepal," *CIA World Factbook*.

²³⁸ "Nepal Topo en," *Wikimedia Commons*, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nepal_topo_en.jpg.

²³⁹ "Culture of Nepal," *Countries and Their Cultures*, accessed May 24, 2016, <http://www.everyculture.com/Ma-Ni/Nepal.html>.

²⁴⁰ "Nepal," *CIA World Factbook*, accessed April 22, 2016.

²⁴¹ "Pashupatinath Temple, Kathmandu," *Laxman Thapa – Wikimedia Commons*, accessed October 27, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pashupatinath_Temple,_Kathmandu.jpg.

²⁴² "Boudhanath Stupa – Rear View," *Bikram Pratap Singh – Wikimedia Commons*, accessed October 27, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boudhanath_Stupa_-_Rear_View.jpg.

²⁴³ "Pashupatinath Cremation," *Pjottermans – English Wikipedia*, accessed October 27, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pashupatinath_Cremation.jpg.

²⁴⁴ "USPACOM Warning Order Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal," Headquarters, PACOM J3, 260438Z April 2015.

²⁴⁵ "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," *Joint Publication*, JP 3-29, Joint Staff, (Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2014).

²⁴⁶ "Operation Sahayogi Haat: United States Pacific Command Operation Sahayogi Haat Joint After Action Report," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*, January 2016, pp 12-13.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 13.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 13.

²⁴⁹ "DoD Continues Humanitarian Efforts in Nepal Following Aftershock," *U.S. Pacific Command*, May 13, 2015, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/588669/dod-continues-humanitarian-efforts-in-nepal-following-aftershock/>.

²⁵⁰ "Nepal Earthquake Relief Effort Named 'Operation Sahayogi Haat,'" *Department of Defense*, accessed January 7, 2016 at: <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604611>.

²⁵¹ "Nepal Earthquake," *USAID*.

²⁵² "Nepal Joint Task Force Begins Drawing Down," *U.S. Pacific Command*, May 20, 2015, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/589345/nepal-joint-task-force-begins-drawing-down/>.

²⁵³ Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Support to the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in May 2015," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, January 11, 2016, p 4.

²⁵⁴ "Operation Sahayogi Haat, Disaster Relief: Nepal Earthquake," *Department of Defense*, accessed July 15, 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_nepal-earthquake/.

²⁵⁵ "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Support to the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in May 2015," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, January 11, 2016.

²⁵⁶ Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Support to the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in May 2015," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, January 11, 2016, p 5.

²⁵⁷ "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, 31.

²⁵⁸ "Operation Sahayogi Haat," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*, 12.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*.

²⁶¹ Col Robert Plevell, USMC, J-2, JTF-505 and G-2, III MEF, interview with Mr. John Troutman, MCCLL Program Analyst to III MEF, 13 July 2015. Quoted in "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Support to the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in May 2015," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, January 11, 2016, 24.

²⁶² "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Support to the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in May 2015," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, January 11, 2016, p 7.

²⁶⁶ "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance," *United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*.

²⁶⁷ "Operation Sahayogi Haat," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*.

²⁶⁸ Operation Sahayogi Haat: United States Pacific Command Operation Sahayogi Haat Joint After Action Report," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*, January 2016, p 15.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ "Operation Sahayogi Haat," *Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*.

²⁷¹ Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*, 2nd Ed., (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2011).